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1/5 UNODC @ The Lao PDR & Alternative Development - Introduction

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • May 24, 2016
  • 9 min read

The UNODC Country Office in Lao PDR was created in 1989, under the auspice of UNDCP. The agency is engaged there with several drug-related technical assistance programs, but also in the areas of alternative development (AD), penal law reforms, human trafficking, and corruption fights. The author was able to witness first hand the way the agency is conducting these programs during his four month internship at the Country Office. One of the most preliminary information that should be disclosed in this regard is that since June 2015, for various financial and political reasons, no Country Manager is present within the Office and therefore no one is officially in charge to guide and supervise the Project Coordinators. This has resulted in slow implementation of planned activities within national projects, or even the very start of these projects.

Another, important issue, which is not directly concerned by UNODC programs but remains crucial to understand the drug policy context, is the concept of “drug-free” areas, notably schools and villages (1). This concept, which will be the focus of a separated article, greatly influences both the way the Lao PDR government is handling drug-related matters and the work of the agency in the country. In following parts, we will examine the case of the compulsory drug detention centers, officially called “Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers” by the agency and the Laotian government. These centers, although not under the care of the agency, are directly linked to the financial aid that UNODC has been providing to the drug-control Lao PDR governmental agency. Finally, we will analyze the way UNODC is handling and producing data, in the country and in the world through the production of the yearly World Drug Report (WDR).

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) was established in 1975 and since then, the nation has been ruled by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. In the end of the 80’s the government embarked on a limited program of administrative and economic reform with the aim of slightly moving towards a more market-oriented system. Today, the communist government has notably an overall objective to free the country from the status of a least developed country by 2020. Closely linked financially and politically, first to Vietnam and then to China, the economy of Lao PDR remains the least market-oriented of the region and only officially entered the ASEAN economic zone in 2015. Landlocked and at a crossroads in mainland Southeast Asia, the country shares long, porous borders with five different states: Myanmar (238 km), Cambodia (555 km), China (475 km), (Thailand 1,845 km) and Vietnam (2,161 km). About the size of the U.K. (236,800 km2), and 70% covered by mountains, Lao PDR is the most sparsely populated country in the region. According to the last estimates offered by a 2005 population census, Lao ethnic groups represent the majority of the people in the country (54.6%), other groups are particularly present in the center and north of the country. Among them are the Khmou (10.9%), the Hmong (8%), the Tai (3.8%), the Phuthai (3.3%), the Leu (2.2%), the Katang (2.1%), the Makong (2.1%), the Akha (1.6%). Other unspecified group represent roughly 11.4%. of the population of the country.

The country's geographic and demographic specificities make a very convenient corridor for illicit drug flux. Coupled with limited law-enforcement capacity and a certain lack of political will, the country is a bliss for all sorts of traffics, notably labelled as a ”black hole” (2) by foreign anti-drug agencies. These attribute make the Lao PDR, a potentially very interesting case study for drug policy analysis. One example among others can be useful to be noted here. In a classical case of neighboring policy spill-over, the 2003 Thailand 'drug war' had great consequences on the Lao PDR and illegal drug trafficking in the region. Traditionally, the Thai military had already been known to demand expensive bribes which periodically re-shift the illicit drug roads. But when Thailand allowed its military forces to take charge and started tightening-up its borders in 2003 - due to a royal decree defining drugs and drug trafficking as a national security issue - the consequences for the Lao PDR were not slow to rise and the illicit traffic coming from Myanmar became increasingly channeled through the Lao PDR through ancestral contraband roads.

Until we dig deeper in the data provided by UNODC at the end of this set of articles, it remains useful to present an estimation of drug production in the country. According to the UNODC 2015 WDR, the country can account for approximately 6,200 ha opium poppy production, while methamphetamine and heroine are - officially - exclusively produced and processed in Myanmar. The involvement and significant participation of UNODC in opium poppy eradication and AD programs is quite significant for our analysis and can show the evolution over the years of the organization in regard to this topic.

Programs in the Lao PDR

Since the beginning of the rise in opiate production in the region during the 1950’s, Laos has remained in the world top three country producers. Today’s views on opium in the country, consider the substance as “a symbol of highlander primitiveness, backwardness and poverty.” (Cohen, 2009) This narrow view does not take into account the many causes of the use and production of the substance which are historically and still varied: pharmacological, psychological, historical, economic, social, and political.

The opium is cultivated at-length in the nine highland Northern and most peripheral provinces of the country (3), where 40 percent of its inhabitants live below the internationally defined economic poverty line (4). Local per capita incomes amount to $300 a year in these regions in contrast to the $1,000 median in the country. Minority ethnic communities of the Akha, Hmong and Khmu people are among the principal cultivators of the illicit product. On these non-irrigated, nor fertilized Laotian mountainous slopes, the yield is notoriously very low. The workload, mainly done by women, is considerable: between 240 and 500 hours of work are needed per ton of raw opium produced (Bertrand, 2004).

Tthe fields are located, on average, one and a half hours walk from the villages and the roads. Governmental eradication programs further exacerbate this isolation and often force farmers to always look for more remote spots. Additionally, these populations, who live in a precarious environment, were very affected by the Vietnam wars and the subsequent, parallel “secret” wars launched by the U.S. The latters resulted in the most massive bombing in the world history and destroyed many of the mountainous villages. After the departure of the U.S. forces, the population of theses areas were targeted by governmental militias as retribution under the suspicion of being political and military opponents.

Geographical areas where illegal substances - such as opium poppy - are cultivated “often bear high levels of poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality. These socioeconomic conditions, along with weak political and judicial institutions, foster an environment in which drug cultivation and trafficking are not only possible, but for many have become attractive or necessary options to meet basic needs.” (Gautreau, 2012) In this sense, such activities notably provide a means to economic security, as defined by the 1994 UNDP report as an “assured basic income” (UNDP, 1994, p. 25) for the “hundred of thousands of individuals who depend on the illegal but profitable drug industry for their livelihoods.” (Gautreau, 2012)

As Anthropologist Paul Cohen reminds us, “alternative development emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and crystallised in the 1990s as a counter to mainstream development theory with its preoccupation with economic growth.” (Cohen, 2009) The concept was defined by the U.N. General Assembly during in its twentieth Special Session on September 1998 as “a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular socio-economic characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.” (5) Consequently, the premise of AD is that if growers could make more money, while taking less risks, they would stop growing illicit crops. In return, production will fall which will influence availability in 'consumers' areas. Except that this is not as straightforward.

While the potential of AD programs has been underlined by the 2015 WDR and by current UNODC ED Yuri Fedotov, the latter recognizes that “unfortunately, the Report also shows that widespread political support for alternative development has not been matched by funding.” (UNODC, 2015) In other words, we can see here a tacit call “to those many member states who have yet to put their donations where their rhetoric is.” (IDPC, 2016a) This is particularly relevant in the case of the Lao PDR as we will see.

For some researchers “Alternative development is the international aid component of supply-side policies in the global ‘War on Drugs’.” (Cohen, 2009) This quote allows us to understand the U.N. postulate which states that “illicit opium production is linked with organized crime which may result in undermining national security, stability and peace, elements that are at the core of poverty eradication and providing food security.” (UNIDO, 2009) For the U.N. agency, “Alternative Development (AD) continues to be recognized by Member States as a fundamental pillar of a comprehensive drug control strategy and plays an important role as a development oriented drug control approach. The concept of AD is much broader than just crop substitution and eradication, it also takes into account the various aspects of rural development and attempts to make structural changes in the socio-economic environment of rural farming communities.” (CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015) This definition has not always been the one undertaken by the international community and remains highly dependent on international aid.

If UNODC AD programs in the Lao PDR intend to take on the notorious illicit opium poppy cultivation in the northern mountainous parts of the country, results on the ground remain often unequal. As noted by the international organization, “a further challenge UNODC faces when implementing AD programmes is the fact that AD programmes are long-term and high investment endeavours. They can only yield results if implemented over a significant period of time with adequate funding involved. Although in some regions, governments have taken over funding of the projects, a serious problem still faced by many AD programmes is that traditional sources of funding are becoming scarcer and, national drug control budgets are diverted to other types of programmes.”(CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015) Further mentioned by UNDP contribution to UNGASS 2016, “The illicit drug market can also attract those who may not have the requisite skills or education to join the formal economy, such as small farmers and unskilled labourers.” (UNDP, 2015)

Considering all these informations, we need to understand why do farmers still grow illicit crops, as well as the consequences around the eradication of illicit crops. We will then take a closer look at the history of the UNODC AD programs in the country, the current programs, including the Opium Surveillance ones. Finally, we will question the inclusion and transparency aspects of the programs, and the role of civil society in defining them.

 

(1) Laos is divided into 17 provinces (khoueng) and one prefecture (kampheng nakhon) which includes the capital city Vientiane (Nakhon Louang Viangchan). Provinces are further divided into districts (muang) and then villages (ban) (Source: Wikipedia)

(2) Interview with Australian DEA representative, Embassy of Australia in Thailand: “Every country in the region cooperates with us, except Lao PDR. This country is a black hole on our maps.”

(3) These nine provinces are: Phongsali, Luang Namtha, Bokeo, Oudomxay, Hua Phan, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Xaisomboun, Xayabury.

(4) According to the Word Bank, as of October 2015, the new global poverty line has been updated to $1.90 per day and per individual.


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