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5/5 UNODC @ The Lao PDR & Alternative Development - Conclusion

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Jun 1, 2016
  • 5 min read

The history of AD (seen as economic development tool in the service of the ‘fight against drugs’) shows that this approach has rarely reduced significantly agricultural production of illegal drugs. (UNODC ,2005) Indeed, as mentioned by researcher Julia Buxton (2015) “Evidence from thirty years of AD programming demonstrates limited success in supply reduction and that poorly monitored and weakly evaluated programmes cause more harm than good; there has been little uptake of best practice approaches, cultivators rarely benefit from AD programmes, the concept of AD is contested and there is no shared understanding of ‘development’.” However, despite disappointing results, AD is not to be rejected outright. It is indeed reasonable to assume that its failures are due to the weakness of methods and financial resources used rather than the logic that underlies it. This strategy has not failed because it is inappropriate, but because it has been mis- and under-utilized, reducing illegal agricultural production having often been too divorced from economic sustainable ‘development’ issues.

As noted by Buxton (2006, p. 115), “successful alternative development requires proper sequencing” of which the U.N. drug control system has been supportive of the principle. Nevertheless, by contrast, the author argues that much of the current UNODC sequencing has been ineffective and often ideologically driven. In contrast, the success of AD in Thailand is the result of a more pragmatic attitude on the part of the country’s authorities, “which put development and alternative livelihoods in place before eradication of illicit crops began.” (IDPC, 2016a)

As such, “rather than opium being a cause of poverty that justifies its rapid elimination evidence indicates that the opium-eradication campaign itself was the immediate cause of considerable economic hardship and social dislocation from which many highland communities have yet to recover.” (Cohen, 2009) In this regard, if AD can in certain cases woo farmers from growing illicit crops, the crops will still remain profitable, - which will almost always be the case within a prohibitive IDCR,- and as such there will certainly be other farmers willing to step in and take their place.

Furthermore, the deployment of alternative development programs, in Lao PDR but also in other countries, is still being hampered by various economic, political, and ideological constraints. As pointed out by the Transnational Institute, “as long as the amount of hectares eradicated remains the main indicator for success, sustainable development loses.” (TNI, 2015) Nevertheless, some positive experiences to which it has given rise suggest that this approach holds untapped potential. As much cannot be said of repressive strategies, which have been conducted for nearly four decades with means and at a scale that AD program providers could only imagine.

This is particularly the case regarding forced eradication programs, which exacerbates the vulnerability of peasants and a violation of their human security rights. Yet, it remains one of the principal recourse to the agricultural production of illegal drugs, which have been proved to be not only ineffective but counter-productive (OHCHR, 2009). Arguably, to be successful, programs necessitate a holistic view of sustainable development which take into account local knowledge and tradition, education, health and infrastructure programs. This entails, long-term planning and funding, civil society inclusion and transparency, all components which are cruelly lacking in the case of the Lao PDR.

The U.N. call for a balanced and integrated approach to the ‘world drug problem’, from which law enforcement activities and alternative development programs arose, have found to be somewhat elusive in the Lao PDR. Today, the UNODC and Lao National Commission for Drug Control & Supervision (LCDC) have recognized that the swift, campaign of opium elimination in the country had worsened the situation: “Laos is at critical juncture…the fact that opium elimination has outpaced the provision of alternative livelihoods has not improved an already difficult situation.” (LCDC, 2006) The ideological fixation on strictly quantitative reduction targets and the haste to meet them, coupled with donors and governmental withdraw from financial involvement after 2006 have made UNODC efforts in the matter quite limited, to say the least.

As stated by by Pien Metall from the dutch civil society organization Transnational Institute during a presentation at the CND 58th session, “for most farmers unfortunately AD constitutes a hollow phrase of empty promises and disappointing results, if any, understood to lure them into so-called voluntarily eradication of their crops, leaving them and their families without any income and dire poverty and debts. Good intentions alone have proved insufficient to address the complex issues of agricultural developmental challenges, instable international market prices, access to land and the ongoing social conflicts in rural communities around the world.” (TNI, 2015) These, somehow, harsh words express the need to integrate AD into a larger spectrum of inter-related issues, notably a need to create a juncture with current supply reduction policies. Forced eradications, which are still happening in the country, are indeed “the worst possible start of building relationship between these communities and the state, and had proven to be one of the root causes of the failure of developmental projects.” (Ibid.)

Furthermore, if analyzed in the economic sense, we can argue that prohibition has made opium a decently profitable cash crop which could jeopardize the possibility of alternative and sustainable rural development initiatives. Although slightly less concerned than other parts of the world, indigenous communities and ethnic minorities traditional uses of the poppy in Laos has been seriously threatened. Finally, the criminalization process of entire communities and families who simply wish to survive has resulted in deep frustration, violation of human rights and dignity, as well as a growing marginalization process.

One thing is rather sure: we need to stop pretending that AD programs are linked with drug control. They have very little effect on actual market supply, especially in the Global North, and they likely never will. They may serve other potential beneficial interests, but they have nothing to do with trying to reduce illicit drug supply. Therefore, it could be argued that they should not be part of drug control budget, but rather coupled with other sustainable developments services and projects.


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