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3/5 UNODC @ The Lao PDR & Alternative Development - Country Office Programmes

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • May 27, 2016
  • 7 min read

  • UNODC Lao PDR Country Office Programs

At the 2015 CND 58th session, UNODC reported on the “implementation of alternative development programmes in six key countries affected by illicit crop cultivation: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Peru.” (CND 58th Session, Item 3 and 8, 2015) The agency later indicated that “alternative development programmes continued to address poverty reduction and food insecurity” and that “a long-term sustainable approach was encouraged, aiming to provide permanent cash crop alternatives to farmers.” (Ibid.) Officially in this regard, AD programs are a success. But when you start observing a bit closer, especially in countries where the government is not itself financially and politically invested in the projects, the actual results on the ground are often quite different than what is officially presented by the U.N. agency and the CND.

The UNODC AD programs in Lao PDR are conducted through 3 phases:

- monitoring;

- eradication and alternative crops;

- insertion within the broader classical framework of development.

Through the U.N. newspeak, we can somehow understand that very few details are in fact given by the agency in regard to the actual implementation processes of these steps. This is because, often the plans do not go as smoothly as depicted. Similarly, the details often vary from project to project. Although it is true, as noted by some researchers that the current concept of AD itself, is a significant upgrade (1) from what was practiced only a decade ago, what is often hidden, and needed to be read between the lines, is the constant financial and practical application uncertainties that surround the projects, especially in Laos where the government choose to remain ultimately completely dependent on foreign donors.

Furthermore, inter-agency cooperation exists but is limited as the 2009 UNIDO-UNODC states: “Provision of alternative livelihoods to match the opium elimination and the promotion of sustainable industrial development as a way of alleviating poverty are the main objectives of UNIDO-UNODC co-operation with the Lao government. While UNODC will contribute to a drug free environment and improved living conditions for targeted communities by providing socio-economic development and viable, legal alternatives to opium, UNIDO will provide technical assistance in order to enhance productive activities and build trade capacity at village district and provincial level. In that sense, the socio-economic constraints due to location, topography and remoteness of many of the target villages are effectively tackled on by combining the technical expertise and comparative advantages of both organizations to assist the Lao Government in creating a better life for the Lao people.” (UNIDO, 2009) In this regard, inter-agency cooperation, limited to the support of UNIDO but without the support of UNDP, the largest U.N. agency in the Lao PDR, has been a recurrent problem since the beginning of UNODC AD programs in the country.

  • History

As noted by the IDPC (2016a), “it is apparent that the UNODC has shifted its position considerably over the past decade with regard to the role of poverty as a driver of illicit crop growing.” The 2015 WDR now officially identifies the drivers of illicit crop cultivation as “lack of development, marginalisation, poverty, and thus, overall human insecurity.” (UNODC, 2015, p. 77)

The previous projects from UNODC in the Lao PDR included: (2)

  • “A balanced approach to opium elimination in Lao PDR: Programme Facilitation Unit“ (LAO/F13) and its subproject, closed in 2010;

  • A joint project, “Post Opium Surpass Poverty”, (PSP project), was conducted in 2011 in the Province of Oudomxay, within three districts: Xay, La and Houn with altogether 20 target villages assigned by the provincial Government (UNIDO, 2009);

  • “Phongsaly Alternative Development Fund Project-PADF” (LAO/I32), closed in 2011;

  • “Increasing Food Security and Promoting Licit Crop Production and Small Farmer Enterprise Development in the Lao PDR” (XSPK26), closed on March 2015;

  • “Social and Economic Rehabilitation of Former Opium Poppy Growing Communities” (LAO/I28), closed on April 2015;

  • In 2014, UNODC AD programs still operated in 78 villages and aimed at increasing “household income and support health treatment after the removal of a highlander's traditional opium cash crop.” (Al Jazeera, 2014)

Although this is less the case now, the beginning of AD in Lao PDR, severely neglected investment in infrastructure, as well as in technical assistance which “created a situation where alternative cash crops could not compete on a global market and upland farmers were left high and dry.” (Eyler, 2015) When eradication is a pre-requisite to any AD programs, whether forced or not, farmers often find themselves without means of survival. Alternative crops such as coffee and rubber, which could theoretically compete with the rentability of poppy cultivation, take 3 to 7 years to yield a harvest. Coupled with food price fluctuation at the regional and global levels, transportation costs often discourage investment. Consequently, other production of alternative crops, such as sugar and buckwheat, which take less time to grow, are also on the downside in the region. Investments in road infrastructures, logistical facilities and agrarian extension programs were needed if curbing the opium production and attracting sustainable capital were to be desired outcomes.

Control of poppy production in the country mainly emphasized on identification and eradication. With the help of few international donors (the U.S. and Australian embassies notably through UNODC), the Lao PDR government was able from the very beginning to locate and quite accurately measure the cultivated crops through aerial surveillance. The destruction of the crops was and still is left to the discretion of the security forces. (3) Often done without the involvement of the farmers, the eradication programs would result in driving the villagers into economic vulnerability and force entire villages to move to more remote areas. Initially, financed by China, and later on by European donors thought UNODC, the AD often failed “in its implementation because it neglects the needs of upland agriculture and flounders in its long term commitment to solving the problem.” (Eyler, 2015)

Faced with the absence of investment needed to create the proper conditions for AD, the Lao PDR UNODC office started to invest significantly in several infrastructure projects. Explaining why this has stopped in current AD programs, personnels from the Office said that the agency seemed not to have gotten the “proper recognition” they ought they deserved. (4) These costly, but essential sub-projects drained a considerable amount of the offices limited funds.

In 2008, the Vienna UNODC HQ decided to reduce considerably the sum allowed to such projects in the country and choose to focus on small scale AD projects and law enforcement support. In this regard, researcher Lea Gautreau (2012), reminds us that “rather than investing in crop eradication, the government should increase investment in infrastructure development that facilitates access to markets and health care, as well as increase investment in social safety nets, alternative development programs, and local agriculture that together enhance economic, environmental, health, and food security.”

  • Opium surveillance

UNODC has a fairly accurate measurement process of how much hectares of opium are cultivated in Laos and how they are able to estimate the production into morphine base, notably by testing the new strain of poppies. Using helicopter transportation, GPS data and satellite images (UNODC, 2014a), joint operations from the LDCD (the Lao national drug control agency) and UNODC are able to produce fairly reliable data in regard to opium raw production, which is then used in the agency Southeast Asia Opium Survey. But the estimation of heroin production process is quite different as it is largely dependent on the street value of where the product is sold. (5)

In a private meeting, LCDC made the argument “the opium survey must continue because the helicopter flights help deter farmer from growing opium.” (6) In this regard we can argue that although very useful for data collecting, the way the opium crops are monitored often alienate the populations, personnel mentioning shots being fired towards the helicopters several times. Furthermore, it was understood that because farmers were aware of the time of the year (usually in February) when the helicopters would pass, they would start plant the crops earlier, or later so that the cultivation would not appear when the survey was conducted. Although probably the most reliable way for UNODC to get drug-related data, the process is arguably loosing of its significance and efficiency, and can only impact the current and future UNODC AD projects in the country.

(1) For researcher Julia Buxton (2015), “the promotion of Alternative Development (AD) programmes that provide legal, non-drug related economic opportunities for drug crop cultivators reflects the limited success of enforcement responses, greater awareness of the development dimensions of cultivation activities and the importance of drugs and development agencies working co-operatively in drug environments.”

(2) Interview with UNODC personnel 15/10/15

(3) Interview with UNODC personnel 13/10/15

(4) Interview with UNODC personnel 13/10/15

(5) For information, the numbering of opium/heroine corresponds to the four stages of its purification: 0 (raw opium), 1 (morphine base), 2 (heroine base), 3 (brown heroin/Brown Sugar) and 4 (white heroin/China White).

(6) Interview UNODC 25/10/2015


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