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4/7 Southeast Asia & drugs - Thailand

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Jun 21, 2016
  • 10 min read

In Thailand, the illicit drug trade is essentially non-violent, as it is the case in most of the region (with the notable exception of Myanmar as we have just observed). The country is a major hub for illegal substances towards Oceania, East and Southeast Asia. It also shares remote and vast borders with Myanmar, the biggest country producer of the region for all illicit substances combined.

First Act: Alternative Development (AD)

Part of the axis of the Golden Triangle - which we will further discuss in later set of articles - Thailand's ethnic minorities living on the Eastern and Northern borders of the country have traditionally cultivated opium poppy in the Northern mountainous parts of the country. They mostly did so peacefully until the 1960’s when pressures from the U.S. shifted Thailand drug policy focus on destroying opium poppy crops (Renard, 2001). From that point, AD programs coupled with crops eradication remained the central core of the Thai drug policy up until the 1990’s. To the contrary of other countries in the region, the programs were largely internally funded and therefore not as dependent on foreign donors. Initially rather ideologically prohibition-centered, the programs have become over the years more adapted to the reality on the ground.

As noted by scholar James Windle (2015) “Paradoxically, Thailand is a model of humane drug crop suppression through alternative development, and it is one of only a handful of countries to have suppressed illicit opium production.” In this regard, the country has resolved internal contradictions inherent to AD programs. Projects are not entirely standardized and focus precisely on identifying the reasons why farmers grow illicit crops as food security microeconomic components can differ significantly. The projects are long-term and steady, at least a decade long. Often in other countries, these conditions are not met, because international dedication and budgets for AD from international donors vary greatly from one year to another. Another condition, the projects in Thailand are not thwarted by illicit crop forced destruction operations that would occur too soon and aggravate the poverty reduction goal that the projects intend to aim at.

As intended, the policy steadily eradicated all opium production from the country. This had two significant consequences for Thailand and the region as noted by researcher Simon Baldwin (2013). The first was an increase in opium poppy production in Myanmar and Lao PDR, which still managed to flow across the Thai border in order “to fulfil the needs of thousands of Thais dependent on opiate-based drugs.” The second, and it is particularly important for drug policy reform advocates, shows that “with a declining supply of (locally produced raw) opium, many Thai smokers shifted to injecting heroin which fuelled a rapid spread of HIV in the past two decades." (1) An estimated "5% of the national population aged 12-65 – approximately 2.5 million people – used illicit drugs in 2007" (Assanangkornchai, 2008), with over 40,000 people injecting illegal drugs. Again here, a classic case of the 'iron law' of prohibition.

Second Act: Shift in consumption and health-related issues

Health hazards precipitated a renewal of Thailand’s drug policy which was fostered by the acknowledgement from the authorities of the relationship between HIV transmission and injection drug use. However, when the Thai government did begin to act on the matter, “it turned to detoxification-based drug treatment as its principal approach to HIV control among people who use drugs over harm reduction.” (Celentano, 2003). Because of the lack of cooperation (and results) from the Thai government, civil society became increasingly involved in the matter.

These organizations are now working in order to develop harm reduction practices, which often lead to confrontation with the central government. One notable example can be found with the CHAMPION-IDU program led by the non-profit Population Services International (PSI) and local authorities. The program was notably “designed as an HIV prevention project supported by the (UN) Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). An additional opioid overdose prevention and management component – the Servicing Communities with Opioid Overdose Prevention (SCOOP) project – was integrated in 2013 to address the growing needs of project clients.”(PSI, 2014)

Similarly to what happens in many other countries of the region, the most important threat to health associated with drugs in Thailand still remains the high HIV transmission rate among substance injection users, often caused by crackdowns on traditional opium consumption patterns. As such, it is interesting to observe that amid political turmoil that have seen several governments unconstitutionally ousted and the establishment of the current military dictatorship, Thailand has maintained a constant in regard to the “drug-free” objective set in 1998 by UNGASS and the ASEAN. Focusing primarily on law enforcement and compulsory treatment, the country has for decades deliberately forsaken harm reduction practices.

Another layer is to be accounted as today,“patterns of drug use in Thailand shifted significantly from isolated pockets of opium and heroin use to the much more prevalent use of amphetamines (locally known as “Ya-Ba”)." (Thomson, 2010) These changing patterns of drug use notably led to the third phase of Thailand’s drug policy response: the ‘war on drugs’ or rather the Thai 'war on people'.

Third act: Thailand's drug war

In 2003, the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, under orders from the King Rama IX, initiated a plan meant to rid drugs (at least some of them), from “every square inch of the country.” (Voices, 2011) The campaign, publicly known as the 'Thai War on Drugs' "included extra-judicial killings and continued unofficially long after the initial three month timeframe." (Baldwin, 2013) In the first three months of the campaign, estimations made by Human Rights Watch amounted to some 2800 extrajudicial killings (HRW, 2008). In 2007, an official investigation found that more than half of those killed had no connection whatsoever to drugs (The Nation, 2007).

Apart from the thousands who lost their lives, thousands of others were forced into coercive "treatment" for drug addiction. Even more simply ended up in jail. Today, Thailand has the sixth largest prison population in the world. The vast majority being held consist of the most economically vulnerable portion of the population and are often sent there for drug law violations. (Hart, 2016) The country has also the highest rate of female incarceration in the world. 80% of them because of methamphetamine law violations. (Ibid.)

Among other consequences, the Thai drug plan (2) increased sentences for drug possession, expanded the compulsory centers programs initiated in the 1990’s and created targets “blacklist” of suspected citizens while “awarding government officials for achieving targets and threatening with punishment those who fail to make the quota." (Baldwin, 2013)

The royal injunction also paved the way for the military to take over the police in all drug related matters, which was arguably humanly disastrous, but in the eyes of the Thai authorities, particularly efficient. Well trained and funded, the army and the subsequent institutional move allowed for a massive diversion of the external traffic coming in the country to other trade roads (notably through the Lao PDR). Ultimately, this did not stopped illicit drug to get into the country as the Thai military hierarchy has nonetheless its price. However, it remains fairly high compared to national military authorities in other countries of the region (3).

Between June 25, and July 7, 2015, four public debates were held in the capital which revealed deep divide in between actors involved in the field. During one of the meetings called "Methamphetamine and 19 years of law enforcement policies: Results and fairer solutions.” held on July 6, Justice Minister General Paiboon Khumchaya stated in front of an audience composed of prosecutors, senior law enforcement officers, public health officials and judges that “Thailand's war on drugs had failed.” (IDPC, 2015l) He further stated that “eradication of illegal drugs is a counter-productive policy goal, and one that should no longer be pursued.” The minister ultimately recognized that such policies have led to “systemic police corruption, and prison cells overcrowded with non-violent offenders” which were “mostly drawn from the ranks of the poor and impoverished.” (Ibid.)

Current legislation

The current illicit drug legislative framework is grounded in laws drafted in the 1970’s. It includes the 1975 Psychotropic Substances Act (4), the 1976 Narcotics Control Act (5) and the 1979 Narcotics Act (6). These three laws represent the “cornerstones” of the Thai drug control policies and “criminalises production, consumption, possession, and sale of a number of controlled substances.” (Baldwin, 2013) These laws further prohibit the use of heroine and cannabis but not entirely of opium, which remains allowed to be used on medical prescription.

For other products, people can be coercively tested on “reasonable” suspicion of consumption. In 2002, was enacted the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act which created a mechanism to divert caught consumers from the penal system to compulsory drug centers (7).

In 2010, the Harm Reduction National Strategy was drafted, but was, for different reasons (8), ultimately put on indefinite hold for several years. (Baldwin, 2013) In 2013, the Office of the Thai Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), launched its 2013-2014 Drug Control Strategy, which included “a few lines in support for harm reduction services." (Ibid.) It mainly included programs directed to law officers to raise their awareness on harm reduction practices and encourage them to work with civil society service providers.

In February 2014 another draft was released but did not officially refer to “overdose prevention or naloxone provision.” (Thailand, 2014) It also excluded all needle and syringe programs (NSP) services. In 2015, the fifth draft of Thailand new drug law, still did not refer to decriminalization, nor mention the foreclosure of the compulsory drug centers. However, to date (June 2016), progress seem to finally break through. The current document is the sixth and last of the drafts which are scheduled to be completed before the final document is to be submitted to the Thai parliament.

A Fourth Act?

On June 16, 2016, during a public meeting on the results of the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), Thai Justice Minister Paiboon Koomchaya proposed that 'Ya Ba' be taken off the dangerous illicit narcotics list “as current measures to suppress the drugs have failed.” (Bangkok Post, 2016) Thailand Supreme Court president Veerapol Tungsuwan was also a speaker at the meeting and echoed Paiboon's opinion. The Thai Justice Minister further added that the “world has fought a war on drugs over the past 28 years, but achieved little.” (Bangkok Post, 2016) However, amidst probable internal and public pressure, Paiboon Koomchaya later softened his stance and declared that “de-listing ya ba is just a proposal.” (Bangkok Post, 2016a)

it could be argued that while Thailand “has promised to stop the violence associated with its much criticised “war on drugs”, the Government continues to advocate for a tough-on-drugs approach and people who use drugs remain marginalised” in the country. (Baldwin, 2013) Although Thailand has successively eradicated opium poppy production and sustainably improved the livelihood conditions of farmers due to long term AD commitment, the country remains deeply entrenched within a prohibitionist paradigmatic approach.

Thailand is perhaps one of the most spectacular examples of actual results out of drastic drug control law enforcement. At least in the short term and in the case of certain drugs. In turn, this might explain why drug policy advocacy in the country grow stronger everyday, as the latest developments seem to indicate, and so despite harsh environmental conditions. However, political turmoil has rarely been greater, leading the possibility for sustainable policies to be implemented increasingly perilous.

On a side note, it should be noted that the different Acts of Thailand's drug policies have had other meaningful consequences. Indeed, the harder it became “to get a drug across the borders, the greater the financial rewards - and thus the greater the incentive - for doing so.” (Kleiman & al., 2011) Consequently, consumption and trade for commodities with endless demand has not stopped the country from keeping its rank as a major trans-regional hub. But that's not all. The drug phenomena is not static. It is global and ever-evolving. With the rise of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) - synthetic drugs mainly produced in China - already well in the way, other product may sensibly change the Thai drug environment. Recently, observers have seen the arrival of a rather 'new' product, in perfect line with a country thriving to succeed in a global capitalist system: cocaine. With the start of the involvement of Mexican cartels in this newly, promising market, prohibition will probably still have its repercussion in the country for several years to come.

1) See also: Celentano, 2003.

2) The policy has received severe critics from the international human rights community (see Pearshouse, 2009), “as well as the Independent Committee for the Investigation, Study and Analysis of the Formulation and Implementation of the Narcotic Suppression Policy (ICID)” (Baldwin, 2013) which was a posteriori established by the Thai Government.

3) Interview, UNODC consultant, 02/11/2015.

4) The Psychotropic Substances Act (1975), outlines the different controlled illicit drugs.

5) The Narcotics Control Act (1976), enacts the criminal sentences for the use and trade of controlled narcotics.

6) The Narcotics Act (1979) lists controlled substances which were not listed under the 1975 Act.

7) To be eligible for diversion, one must be accused of its first drug consumption offense and “only be arrested for consumption and possession, consumption and possession for disposal, or drug consumption and disposal. Non-completion or unauthorised exit (escape) from compulsory treatment orders attracts punishment. Under the special law on rehabilitation, the decision to prosecute or commit a person dependent on drugs to 'rehabilitation' is made by an authorised committee.” (Baldwin, 2013)

8) Drafted by the Office of the Thai Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and the Ministry of Public Health in 2010, “the national harm reduction policy was put on hold after the unfavourable ruling on needle and syringe programmes (NSP) by the Council of State.” (Baldwin, 2013) Thailand’s Council of State, the government’s legal advisory body, had indeed finally ruled in 2011 “that NSP provision would be illegal as it ‘promoted drug use’.” (IDPC, 2012a)

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