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3/7 Southeast Asia & drugs - Myanmar

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Jun 20, 2016
  • 10 min read

According to the 2015 UNODC World Drug Report (WDR), Myanmar has produced over 57 800 hectares of opium poppy in 2013 (UNODC, 2015). More than double the surface of the lowest recorded production year in 2006, representing roughly 870 tonnes of raw opium worth about $500 million (Ibid). These remain estimates, extrapolated from field observation by UNODC.

While decades of civil war and military rule have stimulated drug production and consumption, and marginalized ethnic communities.” (Kramer, 2015), the production of illicit substances has not been limited to plant-based cultivation such as opium and concern primarily in truth, vast quantities of methamphetamines and refined-heroin, which are for the vast majority, exported throughout the region and to the rest of the world. Principally located in the Northeast States of the country, illicit drug production and trade have fostered both the power of government-backed militias and of different other military groups involved in the trade.

Drug-related corruption, just as in the case of the Lao PDR, remains an indefectible part of the country’s economic functioning, while making some of its citizens immensely rich (1). Since the country began to re-open itself to the world in the 2000’s, the trade has witnessed a surged, especially since 2006. Today, this has made Myanmar, the world’s second opium and heroin producer after Afghanistan, and the region’s biggest methamphetamine supplier.

While the process of turning illicit profit into legitimate business ventures is not something that is particular to Myanmar, in this very case, funds do play a significant and particular role in the country’s economy. Benefits of the drug trade are heavily laundered internally and can be traced back to several infrastructures and commercial investments, especially in the country ex-capital city Rangoon. One infamous example among others, is the construction of the latest international airport terminal, undertook by a society called Asia World, which “was started by one of the country's premier drug kingpins.” (2) (Times of India, 2015)

The company was created by individuals from the ethnic ‘Kokang’ Chinese group, who traditionally live in the Northern parts of the country. For decades, members of this group were almost exclusively involved in two trades: tea and opium. Today, travelers and citizens of the country can witness the success story of the business group, now officially involved in infrastructural constructions (roads and hydroelectric dams) and own the country’s biggest hubs (ports and airports) and most luxurious hotels such as the Sule Shangri-La in downtown Rangoon. Until he was later arrested in Thailand, for many years, Lo Hsing Han, Chairman of the conglomerate, was free to conduct his business, as he was used by the military junta as an intermediary between the government forces and the Shan rebel militias. In 2007, Wikileaks (2007) released U.S. diplomatic cables, from which we notably learned that the drug lord had “been given a heroin "concession" by the government in exchange for helping to arrange ceasefire agreements with rebels.” (Times of India, 2015)

Historical background

Today, the vast majority of poppy plantations, heroine refinement and methamphetamine production facilities of the Southeast Asian region are located in Myanmar, more precisely “in the interlocking regions controlled by the local armed forces in the Shan State” (Tian & al., 2011) and the Kachin State.

Traditionally, Myanmar has a long and chaotic history of drug production. In the Northeastern part of the country, opium cultivation was firmly embedded within local settings and still plays a significant role, along with trade and consumption. According to Reid & Costigan (2002), there is a trace of the trade dating back to the 16th century and “by the 17th century influences from both the Chinese and the Dutch East Indies Company saw the production of opium in Myanmar increase, in line with growing demand and its profitability as a trading commodity.”

After annexing the Southern regions of the country, “the British started importing large quantities of opium and established a Government-controlled monopoly.” (Baldwin, 2013) It was only in 1878 that the British Opium Act restricted the consumption of the substance to registered “dependents”. By 1906, the trade of the commodity became illegal in the country. Finally in 1921, the sale of opium in state-sponsored shops was ultimately prohibited. Nevertheless, neither of these legislations had a significant impact on reducing consumption and production (Spencer & Navaratnam, 1981).

Not long after the independence in 1948, a civil war broke out “largely due to disagreements between the central government and ethnic minorities calling for self-determination and autonomy.” (Baldwin, 2013) Increased political instability during the following decades only further entrenched the autonomy of the Northeastern regions as groups opposed to the central government fought for self-determination. This is important to recall in order to understand how today, massive portions of Myanmar still remain independent from the central power.

On an important scale, all parties of the conflict have been involved in the illicit drug traffic in order to fund guerrilla wars. Or maybe, it is the other way around. What is known is that a ceasefire was negotiated during the 1980’s but with “little effect on reducing the opposition armies’ involvement in illegal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal logging, gambling and human trafficking.” (Chalk, 2000)

Alternative Development and opium poppy production

Traditionally, opium poppy production has remained “low tech” and village based, in dispersed areas with an altitude above 800m. As observed, “customarily, opium poppy cultivation in North Myanmar is a slash-and-burn agriculture. Poppy farmers slash or burn trees in the mountains and then plant opium poppy in assorted parcels. The planted parcels are often changed in the next year in order to recover the soil fertility.” (Tian & al., 2011)

Farmers mostly come from non-Burmese ethnic groups and live in remote, mountainous area. UNODC, notes that these conditions, often “lead to severe poverty.” (UNODC, 2008b) Low food security, evolving around the trio poppy–maize–rice food cropping system, is a crucial part of the survival context. The international agency further notes that, “surplus opium, which is not needed for medicinal purposes or consumed by addicts in their own household, is sold to alleviate food shortages, as most households are not self-sufficient.” (Ibid)

Since the ceasefire was signed in the 1980's, international donors have intended to create alternative development programs in the North and East regions of the country. But living conditions for farmers remain difficult, as the components needed for successful AD activities such as roads and communication infrastructures are still lacking. Additionally, the time needed to grow alternative crops - 3 to 7 years - often limits the options of the farmers when forced eradication are implemented. AD programs worked to an extent and up until 2006, national opium production decreased by 80%, but only to be eclipsed by the rise of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) (Tian & al., 2011), as-well as heroin production.

It should be noted that heroin production, and consequent related consumption, had a profound effect in the country, as in the rest of the countries of the region as we will see in the next articles. Indeed, in regard to drugs, what really triggered the beginning of a change in policy practice was the spread of HIV rate transmission, which rose dramatically due to injection forms of drug use. A classic case of the drug prohibition 'iron law' is there to be witnessed as opium smoking was banned, heroin injection arose.

The situation forced the government and international donors to re-evaluate their drug policy approach towards more health-oriented responses. However, despite this, "legal reform in Myanmar is convoluted and a painstakingly slow process. While there is some indication towards a willingness to consider alternatives to existing drug policies, the main laws that shape drug policy in the country have not been updated for over a decade.” (Baldwin, 2013)

Methamphetamine (ATS)

Controlled by dozens of armed factions split along ethnic lines, the Shan and Kachin States remain the heartland of Southeast Asian ATS production. Narco-militias, some directly founded by the Burmese central army, have emerged in order to fight off guerrilla rebels in the hills. Providing tacit approvals for producing drugs in the area, the central government remains indirectly linked to the biggest illicit drug market of Southeast Asia (3).

According to UNODC, coming only second after the heroin trade in terms of value, the ATS market is exponentially getting bigger each year (4). Actively becoming the center of the global methamphetamine production and trade hub, Myanmar is only surpassed worldwide by Mexico and Canada.

Current legal framework

The current drug law framework is comprised of the 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law (5), the century old Burma/Myanmar Excise Act (6), the Control of Money Laundering Law and two National Plans: The 5-year Drug Eradication Plan, 1999-2014 (extended in 2012 to 2019) and the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS 2011-2015.

The country officially launched its counter-narcotics strategy in 1999 with the aim to eradicate all illegal drugs production and trade by 2019. In order to do so, “the Government of Myanmar initiated its plan in stages, using eradication combined with planned alternative development programmes in individual townships, predominantly in Shan State.” (Baldwin, 2013) However, while the other Plan focused on AIDS/HIV prevention among population at risk (7), the central government remained unable “to provide quality treatment for drug users. Past political repression and human rights violations by the military government (have notably) caused an international boycott which prevented international donors from providing assistance.” (Kramer, 2015)

In 2015, the country “conducted a relatively open and inclusive consultation on proposed revisions to its (1993) drug law (…) which involved international agencies, experts, representatives of people who use drugs and civil society organisations.” (Sur, 2015) The revisions “included ensuring the provision of evidence-based drug dependence treatment rather than imprisonment for people who use drugs, and reduced penalties to establish more proportionate sentencing for drug offences.” (Kramer, 2015) However, while the concept of harm reduction is increasingly being accepted among top officials of the regime, the country lacks the reach and the political will to implement efficient programs, notably in regions that the central government is not controlling.

The current slow reform process by the current government “includes both a peace process to end the civil war and a review of the country’s drug laws, raising hope for more effective and humane drug policies.” (Kramer, 2015) But currently, the country is still confronted with “high levels of injecting drug users infected with HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C”. (Kramer, 2015)

Notwithstanding the current lingering drug policy reform process, the framework remains “repressive and outdated, with an ineffective focus on arresting drug users and (coercively) eradicating poppy fields.” (Ibid) Perhaps the biggest challenge in the country in this regard remains the “rapid, unpredictable political and socio-economic change that the country is currently experiencing.” (Baldwin, 2013)

Policy making remains in the hand of the military junta, along with opaque, behind closed-doors processes, which hinders the work and contribution of civil society. Furthermore, drug policies remain criminally, law enforcement and supply control centered. Authorities have notably started to share “information at a security centre in Chiang Mai (Thailand) to combat the drugs trade in collaboration with the UNODC and national narcotics authorities, including the US Drug Enforcement Administration.” (MM Times, 2015)

In regard to AD programs, another player of the region is providing aid to Myanmar in this aspect: Thailand. Since the beginning of the cooperation between the two countries, Thailand has invested more than $10 million in projects for more than 50 villages in the Thai bordering region of Mong Hsat, in the Shan State province (MM Times, 2015). This aid is part of broader policy projects initiated by Thailand, making the country, as we will see in the next article, the leading example in the world of successful alternative development programs.

1) “Sean Turnell, an Australian scholar and one of the leading experts on the country's economy, estimates that Myanmar's drug tycoons have annual revenues of around $2 billion.” (Times of India, 2015)

2) Lo Hsing Han, a drug lord once described by the United States as the “kingpin" of the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia.

3) “Rebel groups and pro-government militias alike run covert labs that supply Asia with its favorite illegal stimulant: hot-pink speed pills that offer a twitchy eight-hour high.” (Winn, 2015)

4) See “Trafficking of Methamphetamines From Myanmar and China to the region”, https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTA-EA-Pacific/TOCTA_EAP_c06.pdf

5) “The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law (1993) outlines the penalties for illicit drug use and possession, and mandates treatment for people who use drugs. It states that if people who use drugs do not register with a government-identified facility for medical treatment, they can be imprisoned for three to five years.” (Baldwin, 2013)

6) The 1917 Myanmar Excise Act prohibits “the possession, sale or distribution of hypodermic needles without a license.” (Baldwin, 2013) In 2001, a directive from the Myanmar Police Force Headquarters “was issued to avoid making arrests for possessing hypodermic needles. However, needles are confiscated and submitted to the courts as evidence when individuals are arrested for drug possession or having needles on hand at the scene of a ‘crime’.” (Ibid.)

7) The Plan strived to achieve “universal access to prevention and care, and scaling up effective initiatives through capacity building. The development of national guidelines, partnership between the Government, national and international NGOs and the private sector, and enhanced coordination form the strong foundations of the plan. The most recent operational plan includes a graduated set of targets culminating in 180,000 people who use drugs reached with harm reduction services by 2009, including NSPs and MMT.” (Baldwin, 2013)

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