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2/7 Southeast Asia & drugs - The ASEAN 'drug-free' goal

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Jun 15, 2016
  • 8 min read

In July 1998, a month after the UNGASS 1998 on the “world drug problem” and the signature of the Political Declaration on Drugs (1) (UN General Assembly, 1998), the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, convened in Manila, Philippines for the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. During this assembly meeting, representatives from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2020 (ASEAN, 1998). The agreement, to which all members committed, outlined a broad strategy aimed “to eradicate illicit drug production, processing, trafficking and abuse by the year 2020 in ASEAN.” (UNODC, 2008a)

Presented as a threat to the “security and stability” (Ibid.) of the region, country representatives, agreed in 2000 to advance the targeted date to 2015 (ASEAN, 2000), “yet without specifying expected outcomes or providing an ad-hoc menu of quantitative benchmarks.” (Chouvy, 2013) As noted by Mauro Anastasio (2014) “to say that the plan is ambitious would perhaps be an understatement, particularly when considering the success of prohibitionist policies to date. Indeed, with the self-imposed deadline rapidly approaching, drug production and distribution in Southeast Asia is in fact on the rise, (…) in spite of increasing efforts by authorities in the region.”

Additionally, at the regional level, country members have adhered to the regional ACCORD Plan (2) through the ASEAN framework but also to several “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) which intent to strengthen institutional cooperation on the topic. Alongside the creation of national “Task Forces” (3) (ACCORD, 2005), four operational segments are part of the ACCORD Plan of Action:

  • Engaging civil society through “advocating on the dangers of drugs”;

  • Reducing use “by building consensus and sharing best practices in demand reduction”;

  • Reinforcing regional security by improving “law enforcement cooperation”;

  • Eliminating or reducing significantly illegal production “by boosting alternative development projects”.

The latest agreement, the “ASEAN Work Plan on Combating Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking and Use (2009-2015)” aims to “eliminate syndicates involved in the production and trafficking of drugs by strengthening law enforcement measures, and to reduce the prevalence of drug use” (ASEAN, 2009), notably through educative programs targeting youth. Heavily inspired by UNGASS 1998, these multilateral operational understandings are operated under what is called the “ASEAN way”, and have produced mitigated results, to say the least.

The “ASEAN way”

The concept of “the ASEAN way” is important in order to comprehend how the regional organization functions, as it “refers to a working process or style that is (both) informal and personal.” (Seah, 2009, p. 199) For researchers Masilamani and Peterson (2014), policy makers in the organization “constantly utilize compromise, consensus, and consultation in the informal decision-making process. While the doctrine of ‘quiet diplomacy’ is ambiguous, it above all prioritizes a consensus-based, non-conflictual way of addressing problems. Quiet diplomacy allows ASEAN leaders to communicate without bringing the discussions into the public view. Members avoid embarrassment that may lead to further conflict.” As we will see, this is a process that is widely used in the region, and which will later prove to be particularly relevant in the case of the Lao PDR.

In relation to drug control policy, this notably concerns the public perception that the ASEAN can seemingly give to the outside eyes. In this regard, the position of the regional organization and of its members may not be as solid and unified towards the status quo and strict prohibition as it may seem.

Results

Eighteen years ago, “governments in Southeast Asia agreed to try and rid the region of illicit narcotics, yet with the self-imposed deadline fast approaching, the chances of this are non-existent with both production and trafficking on the rise.” (Anastasio, 2014) Official reactions to the absence of desired results are quite interesting to observe for those interested in understanding where the ASEAN currently stands on the topic.

At the 2015 36th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting On Drugs, Singaporean Foreign Minister, M. Masagos Zulkifli made an interesting speech: “We have worked hand-in-hand to align our national strategies towards achieving drug-free societies (…) However, the war against drugs is an on-going fight, and there is still much work to be done.” (Singapore, 2015) Again, we would argue here that such rhetoric is often, repeatedly used by those wishing to maintain the current policy course on drugs. But these same actors are also forced, by empirical evidence, time limitation and growing dissatisfaction, to recognize that the “drug-free” target has not been met. However, this does not necessarily make them change their view on the subject. Quite the contrary, such acknowledgment comes with the same past rhetoric which states that much work still needs to be done and that the current course of action must be upheld and strengthen

One would argue that such reasoning, regularly demanding more investment in the face of undesired results, could in theory, create a situation where “efforts” in order to achieve an unrealistic goal could be demanded ad vitam eternam. Such fantasy could be dismissed if only it did not dreadfully affect so many people in the region. Additionally, the minister’s speech “gave no reason for shunning considerations of reform.” (Lai, 2015)

ASEAN members have repeatedly stated that illegal drug markets and use are a cause for individual “suffering”, which can provoke the weakening of "the social fabric of nations”, as-well as “direct and indirect economic costs to governments”, while entailing “criminal activities which could threaten the stability of states.” (ASEAN, 2012) However, despite enormous financial and human costly investments, the region has not witnessed since 1998 significant decrease in this areas. According to UNODC data (4) - which as we saw, needs to be taken with a grain of salt - illegal substances trends, either in overall use or supply, have not decreased.

At a time when all around the world, governments are slowly starting to recognize the failure of the current regime, the ASEAN countries are still very much entrenched in punitive approaches. After several decades of prohibition, official policies are all aligned on an orthodox application of the current IDCR conventions. Furthermore, drug policy in the region remains quasi-exclusively in the hands of law enforcement agencies, with mostly, very limited input from their social or health department counterparts (5).

Nevertheless, official statements can be deceptive as “there appears to have been a growing awareness amongst countries in the ASEAN region that the existing strategies for dealing with problematic drug use are not only ineffective, but have resulted in damaging consequences. There have been signs of a pragmatic shift in several countries towards health-oriented strategies for addressing dependent drug use and related health problems.” (IDPC, 2012) Impacted by the U.N. drug control conventions (6), the strictly prohibitionist approach was closely followed until the mid 1990’s when, confronted with the premises of HIV epidemic in the region, several initiatives started to be implemented, of various ranges and results. As such, “the advent of HIV saw significant investments from international donors, which dramatically changed how drug use was framed. Almost overnight, (to a certain extent) drug use began to be conceptualised (at least by some) as a health issue rather than exclusively a criminal one, and significant international resources began to flow into the region to prevent HIV.” (Baldwin, 2013)

Let’s observe these potential evolutions, which break from the public unified front given by the ASEAN with the cases of Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam.

 

1) Which intended notably to “promote a society free of drug abuse.” (UN General Assembly, 1998)

2) The ACCORD plan is a regional framework set up to achieve specific interventions in key areas which have been devised in order to counter drug trafficking in the region. It includes China and the ASEAN countries, and lay out the specific policy measures of the “drug-free” vision. According to the 10th AIFOCOM (2013) meeting, “the ACCORD Plan of action meets the global drug control objectives as set forth by the (1998) UNGASS.”

3) “The ACCORD Task Forces meet annually to foster operational coordination through the creation of annual work plans involving the various national level drug control agencies: the Burmese Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC, established in 1975), the Cambodian National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD, established in 1995), the Lao National Commission for Drug Control and Supervision (LCDC, established in 2001), the Malaysian National Anti-Drugs Agency (NADA, established in 1996), the Singaporean Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB, established in 1971), the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB, established in 1976), the Vietnamese Standing Office for Drug Control (SODC, established in 2000), and their other regional counterparts.” (Chouvy, 2013)

4) See: UNODC, 2014; UNODC, 2012c; UNODC, 2011c; and UNODC, 2008a.

5) As correctly stated by Simon Baldwin (2013) “drug policy making remains (in the region) opaque and divided between the more powerful law enforcement and justice ministries that support punitive approaches, and the health ministries which tend more toward supporting harm reduction approaches to managing drug use. While most governments have set up inter-ministerial committees tasked with overseeing drug policy, they are chaired exclusively by law enforcement bodies and firmly embedded in zero-tolerance approaches. These institutional relationships significantly limit the impact that health ministries can have in mediating changes to drug policy.”

6) “National governments, driven by the ethnocentric goal of preventing drugs from entering their own countries, and often with support from international donors, have supported law enforcement-led drug policies since the late 1970s.” (Baldwin, 2013)

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