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4/4 UNODC - How the agency used data to promote its agenda and how it is (slightly) better now.

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • May 13, 2016
  • 28 min read

According to Marc Twain (1907, p. 471), himself claiming to quote Benjamin Disraeli: “there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” In this regard, drug statistics could present an easy way for researchers to uphold a classical case of anti-statistical statement. However here, we will merely intend to convey “how statistical information can be presented in such a way to support any view.” (Battin, 2007) Because well presented data often holds significant impact on the public and policy makers, the question surrounding the validity, trustfulness and accuracy of the numbers produced by the institutions of the current International Drug Control Regime (IDCR) needs to be critically assessed.

As researcher David Bewley-Taylor (2015) explained, the current IDCR “has been developed on the basis of two interconnected tenets: a widespread belief that the best way to reduce the world drugs problem is to minimise the scale of - and ultimately eliminate - the illicit market; and a conviction that this can be achieved by relying on prohibition-oriented and supply-side dominated measures.” In this respect, the international community relies heavily on statistics produced by UNODC, which has notably invested in the collection, analyzation and publication of information, based on quantitive domestic questionnaires, “perceived to contain reliable, valid (..) and comparable data from different countries.” (Uhla & al., 2015)

But what is probably equally important to understand, as mentioned by researcher Benoit Martin (1) is that international organizations need to produce data in order to remain credible and relevant (2). International organizations are pressured to do so, notably by signatory member states. This is particulary relevant for UNODC which struggles to legitimize its action and to prove its value and relevance as a drug control agency in the midst of growing insatisfaction over the results of the current regime. Additionally we can somehow observe a schizophrenic component which defines the member states attitude towards data. When for example Brazil, referring to the 2015 World Drug Report, “thanked UNODC for this important document, but questioned some data from Brazil ” (CND, 2015), we can arguably recognize a the constant need for country to ask for more data through the U.N. system, while often be the first to criticize the results if the data do not meet expectations or/and interests.

What we probably need to underline here is that by being established under the drug control conventions, UNODC is intrinsically linked to specific forms of data mining and consideration. The need to find consensus among the member states, especially the major donors, makes the agency “lends itself to inertia rather than challenging the system it operates within” (Transform, 2012), and a fortiori, the data it produces. In this regard, what is equally important to acknowledge is, if the contents of international agencies existing data collection systems “often include vital statistics, service activity data, survey data, expert opinions and complex calculations based on the former data, they are commonly used for quick and simple ad hoc conclusions by policy analysts, the media, researchers and politicians." (Uhla & al., 2015) Additionally, "They are sometimes used as primary data by scientists to perform secondary analyses which are used for conclusions often beyond the objectives of the original data collection plan.” (Ibid.) If it is not necessarily intended by the analyst of the agency, the latter cannot ignore that their findings will be used by the mainstream public. Similarly, many actors of the field, including journalist, policy makers and researchers trustfully use and too often base their conclusion and secondary analysis on such data.

Although, the intention is not here to criticize all data collected by UNODC, maintaining a critical point of view remains fundamental in order to correctly asses the efficiency of the current IDCR. Indeed, as pointed out by several researchers “a blind trust in these (aggregated) data is unjustified.” (Uhla & al., 2015) As noted by Alex Stevens (2011), “sociological frameworks need data and analysis in order to apply them to the actual practice of drug policy.” But many data collection systems used by international organizations are part of positivist economic methods, which tend “to abstract from individuals to create homogeneous multitudes of agents who respond to stimuli according to probabilistic rules that are set for them within the model.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, as assessed by Jack Young (2004), “these rules are sometimes derived as generalisations from behavioural surveys that are of questionable value in understanding people's actions and motivations in performing illicit, hidden and stigmatised behaviours.”

Because UNODC often keeps on conceptualizing human behaviors as agents merely obeying probabilistic rules, similar to the infamous homo economicus, policy applications formed upon such data can only need to be critically assessed. We argue here that such ‘homo drogus’, often based on wrongful measurements (3), can be used by unscrupulous policy maker actors in order to further advance, on the domestic and global scene, a more prohibitionist-oriented agenda (4). In respect to this, we need to assess the 'holy' book of the IDCR, namely the UNODC World Drug Reports, and their impact on analysis of illicit drug use, production and traffic.

  • World Drug Reports (WDRs)

The importance of the WDR cannot be underlined enough in light of what can be found in the 2009 Political Declaration, which is one of the core membrane of the current IDCR and of the 2016 Special Session UNGASS on the “world drug problem”. The Declaration heavily relied on the WDRs, as well as on the INCB annual reports, to claim that “some progress had been made, through positive achievements, at the local, regional and international levels.” (UNODC, 2009b) Using a pre-examined scheme, the Declaration follows up by declaring that "there are still considerable challenges, as well as emerging challenges, to efforts to sustainably reduce, or at least effectively contain, illicit drug production, trafficking and consumption.s.” (Ibid.) Again here, tenants of the drug policy status quo proclaim success while advocating for more efforts in the light of unforeseen shortcomings.

But to understand how the member states, through UNODC were able to come to this questionable conclusion, we need to take a small step back in time. As many observers have pointed out, the figures on which UNGASS 1998 was based, laid more heavily on wild guesses – probably politically motivated – than solid estimates. One of the most important was published in the first WDR in 1997 and stated that: “Many estimates have been made of the total revenue accruing to the illicit drug industry – most range from US $300 billion to US $500 billion. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the true figure lies somewhere around the US $400 billion. (…) a US$400 billion turnover would be equivalent to approximately eight percent of total international trade.” (UNDCP, 1997, p. 123-124) The history surrounding this figure is enlightening if we wish to understand how UNODC can be pressured to use unreliable data, which in return can be and was used to the cord by advocate of the prohibition paradigm at the time and onward.

Economist Thomas Naylor traced back the origin of the first global illicit drug market estimate to the end of the 1980’s. It was supposedly first mentioned by researcher Carlos Resa-Nestares which declared: “the global drug trade may run up to $500 billion a year, more than twice the value of all U.S. currency in circulation. The American market, the world’s biggest for these drugs, produces annual revenues of a least $100 billion at retail – twice what U.S. consumers spend for oil.” (Thoumi, 2005)

However, it is only when UNDCP (the ancestor of UNODC) was first pressured to come up with a number for the global illicit drug trade that this estimate started become recognized and accepted as a scientific fact. As noted by Naylor (2002), “the $500 billion figure was the result of 'research' attempted by the United Nations agency responsible for coordinating the global assault on drug trafficking – when the “boss” was desperate for a quick number before a press conference after which that figure received widespread publicity and put UNDCP in a delicate position since it had to justify it.”

After this figure was made public, the UNDCP “Research section revised in more detail the data it had available and concluded that such a number was exaggerated and could not be used in the 1997 World Drug Report.” (Thoumi, 2005) The number was too high and it needed to be reduced in order to avoid criticism. To remedy this potential embarrassment, the U.N. drug control agency “decided to lower it somewhat and came up with $400 billion.” (Thoumi, 2005) The primary protocol found by the researcher behind the process that came up with this figure was the use of an array estimate survey made in different countries around the globe, which resulted in a $335 billion result. This estimation was then rounded up to $400 billion. The official explanation given by the 1997 WDR, remained quite basic (5), no solid explanation being given to Thomas Naylor when he investigated in Vienna as to how they pondered the figure, nor the reason why they did not choose to close it up to $300 or $350 billion.

Another way of somehow explaining the $400 billion figure can be found in the 1997 UNDCP “Economic and social consequences of drug abuse and illicit trafficking” technical document (UNDCP, 1997a) that covers a large range of issues (6). At the time of the report, UNDCP also claimed that the illegal transnational drug trade accounted for 8% of global economic exchanges, roughly $410 billion in 1997 (7). But arguably, this explanation also remained hardly credible. Indeed, as Fransico Thoumi (2005) explained, the result is "clearly a comparison between apples and pears” (8), and not only this but ”also bananas and an assortment of tropical and temperate zone fruits, an aggregation of incomparable elements.” (Ibid.)

Over the years, the quality and the tone of the WDRs varied greatly. In regards to the 2008 WDR, published after the UNGASS on the topic of the same year, the Methodology Chapters of the WDR - which are often located at the very end of the reports - greatly contrasted with the definitive declaration of member states during the Special Session, and the overall tone of the 2008 WDR. Christopher Hallam and Dave Bewley-Taylor (2010) explained: “the methodological section frankly acknowledged the wide-ranging limitations of the data, and urged caution in interpreting them. This contrasted with the confident tone and definitive claims of the Executive Director's preface.“ (9) This is not particularly surprising but is necessary to be highlighted as the WDRs "embodied one of the broader conflicts which course through international drug policy: the tension between scientific rigour and political utility”.” (Ibid.)

Years passing by, the UNODC Research Section often had to struggle with finding data supporting the current drug policies while reporting the actual market-trend analysis, notably in regard to UNGASS 2008 and the 'containment' theory. As explained by Martin Jelsma (2015), “with all the graphs in the reports consistently showing upward or at best stable trends, UNODC resorted to smoke and mirrors to obfuscate the finding that over the course of the decade the world drugs situation had not improved by any means of measurement or indicator. Under political pressure to provide countries with some form of evidence that the international drug control system was working, UNODC constructed the “containment” hypothesis, first presented in the 2006 edition of the World Drug Report.” (10) (Jelsma, 2015)

Taking on the example of opium production in early century China, the agency asserted that this side of the drug trade had significantly decreased if one would to compare it with the beginning of the century. The 2006 WDR further intended to prove that the current regime had allowed the containment of illicit substances at a level far under the global markets of other legal drugs such as tobacco and spirits. We can observe there another schizophrenic side of the current IDCR personified by the U.N. drug control agency. Indeed, while recognizing that data does not “indicate the imminent elimination of the global illicit drugs market, UNODC maintained that the international drug control system was a nonetheless significant success story when looking at it from a historic perspective.” (Ibid)

The 'containment' assertion was further expanded by the 2008 WDR. Former UNODC Executive Director (ED), Antonio Marica Costa, described the current IDCR as showing “impressive achievement” and “undeniable success” over the past 100 years, notably pointing out the difference in the number of users among the world population in between different illicit and licit drugs. The preface of the report finally concluded that in the “absence of the drug control system, illicit drug use may well have reached such levels, with devastating consequences for public health.” (UNODC, 2008)

Arguably, only recently UNODC has shown better care and modesty while presenting its findings. Jean Luc Lemahieu, Director of UNODC Policy Analysis and Public Affairs observed at the launch of the 2015 WDR that “global data collection is not as robust as it could be.” (CND, 2015) In their counter-analysis of the 2015 WRD, IDPC (2016a) further noted: “the resulting representation is deeply flawed and offers only a tentative and partial snapshot of illicit drug production, distribution and consumption around the world.” This is notably due to the fact that what the Report is trying to capture is fundamentally a social phenomenon hidden from outsiders eyes due to its its illegality and stigmatizing character.

In keeping with a very recent trend, the 2015 WDR has shown a more moderate tone and relatively little political content. In addition, the latest Report “acknowledges to a greater extent than ever before the depth, uncertainty and complexity of the ‘world drug problem’, as well as the ongoing provisionality of its own analyses.” (IDPC, 2016a) Moreover, and this is where it concerns us particularly, it has shown impressive means to be transparent “regarding the construction of the data sets utilised in reporting and analysing its domain of inquiry.” (Ibid.) Contrary to what had been done in the past, the 2015 WDR's Preface has not attempted to insinuate the data contained in the Report into some ideological narrative which would suit the agenda of the UNODC headquarters as-well as of the major donors.

However, the WDRs, today as of yesterday, most heavily relies on national self-produced and assessed data (11). The way these data are collected remain problematic. These processes need to be analyzed if the estimates are to be put into context.

  • The way the data is collected

At the UNODC Vienna headquarters, co-exist today two branches working on the WDRs and data collection: the 'research' and the 'statistic' Sections. Historically, it is the former that has dominated the work on producing publishable data for the agency. But in the last years, this section has been somehow marginalized and the more statistically oriented bureau has taken over most prerogatives on data mining and analysis (12). Traditionally, this section heavily relied on quantitative forms and data compiling.

These results are notably focused on such metrics because the IDCR has always put an overly focus on law enforcement oriented policies. Consequently, the potential issue with the way UNODC collects data is in part due to the fact that international drug policies are based on this very data, which is supposed to be rigorous, partial, and complexly interpreted. Additionally , we must recall here that drug related data collected by UNODC has always primarily focused on certain metrics, “with a narrow focus on: arrests and prosecutions (drug dealers, traffickers, and in some cases users); seizures (unprocessed and processed drugs including amphetamine-type stimulants, cannabis, coca, cocaine, heroin, opium, and precursor chemicals required for manufacture); hectares of drug crops eradicated (cannabis, coca, and opium poppy); and drugs processing laboratories destroyed in traditional producer states.” (Bewley-Taylor, 2015)

Several ways exist for the organization to collect data. Each of them carrying varied and inherent difficulties due to the intended task to collect information on the overall chain of the illegal drugs trade. Which is by nature, uneasily observable. Two main mechanisms are at the core of the agency work on data collection: the prominent Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) (13) and the Biennial Reports Questionnaire (BRQ), collected each year from member states to assess the progress made in order to achieve the objectives set by UNGASS 1998 and subsequent U.N. Political Declarations.

UNODC’s WDRs are “built almost entirely around data gathered from country Annual Report Questionnaires (14) – a system that is highly problematic.” (Transform, 2012) In the 2011 WDR, UNODC recognized that the “data gaps and the varying quality of the available data (is due to) irregularity and incompleteness in ARQ reporting by Member States.” (UNODC, 2011b) The Report further acknowledged that “submitted questionnaires are not always complete or comprehensive.” (UNODC, 2011b) In relation to this welcomed candidness, the Transform Drug policy Foundation (2012) also argued that member states, because of such data collection practices, would possess an incentive to “inbuilt bias against reporting failures or poor performance, a problem assumed to be most acute in states or regions of most concern.” (15)

Similarly, as noted by the IDPC (2016a), many countries “are irregular in returning their questionnaires, which leaves gaps in the data and can give a misleading picture of drug trends. In addition, returned ARQs are often incomplete and subject to limitations and biases.” Other issues with ARQs are numerous, including how and who should fill up the questionnaires within national governments, crystallizing the tension between law enforcement and public health ministries, but also between 'expert groups' and 'democratic participation' orientations. We must note here that the definitions and role of what an 'expert' might be and be of use, can also be problematic. As explained by Christopher Hallam and David Bewley-Taylor, in their 2010 article, “for many Parties, “experts” are those who complete the forms—that is, the bureaucrats who submit the data to the UN. This is despite the fact that they may have no training or skills in constructing social-scientific data.” (2010)

In consequence, ARQs and UNODC WDRs “remains skewed towards process measures (such as seizures) rather than outcome measures” (Transform, 2012) and do not proceed to explore the “alternative sources of information available (from academic research or NGO “grey literature”, for example).” (Ibid) Furthermore, the bias in UNODC data collection can arguably be seen as widening due to the response rate of the often limited range of what countries are being asked and choose to report. Measures such as seizures, and arrests prevail, while equally, perhaps more useful informations such as drug mortality, institutional violence, youth consumption or HIV and Hepatitis B prevalences rates among injecting users, are considered as potentially embarrassing for the reporting country and often disregarded.

Indeed, what is perhaps more troubling than the current methodological challenges faced by UNODC, and other U.N. institutions in gathering data on illegal markets and practices, is what is not being collected. As pointed out by the Transform Drug Policy Foundation: “The ARQs themselves are not drawn up by the UNODC independently, but rather agreed by consensus of the member states at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, with the questionnaires remaining inadequate in their thematic coverage of drug policy impacts. While there have certainly been improvements (…), substantive impact areas of drug policy are not included – impacts on human rights compliance, development and conflict, stigma and discrimination, environmental impacts, and so on.” (Transform, 2012) As such, the civil organization explains that “many states would not be keen to volunteer such sensitive information because it would reflect poorly on them.” (Ibid.) Several observers have also noted that the data collected is primarily coming from Global North countries.

In this regard, analysis of how institutions, notably the other U.N. drug control organizations, but also national organizations, collect and analyze data on the three principal areas of drug-related policies, consumption, trade and production can help us understand how they can use these data to further advance their, often ideologically motivated agendas.

  • Illicit drug consumption

In June 2014, a day before the infamous “International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking”, UNODC launched its Integrated Drug Information System (IDIS), “a web-based application that collates and analyses information on drug use extent and patterns, (and expected) to provide early warning signs on new drugs being used (as well as) information about the changing trends in drug use patterns over time, geographic locations and across population groups.“ (UNODC, 2014d) While we can probably recognize the upgrade this mechanism represents over precedent ways of gathering data on consumption, one could also argue that this specific illicit drug trend still probably remains one of the most difficult to asses by authorities. After all, who would want to willingly admit to something that is currently, mostly still illegal in most parts of the world to the very authorities in charge of enforcing this prohibition? What is really left to count?

In the 2015 WDR, UNODC declared acknowledging “the difficulties in measuring indicators related to illicit drugs” (UNODC, 2015) but nevertheless estimated that “almost a quarter of a billion people between the ages of 15 and 64 years used an illicit drug in 2013.” (17) (Ibid.) Accordingly, the agency confirmed that in 2014 “there has been little change in the overall global situation regarding the production, use and health consequences of illicit drugs.” (Ibid) However, despite range of seemingly precise estimations, UNODC recognized, that “new data remain insufficient to determine if substantial changes have occurred in the magnitude of drug use globally. Information is available only for western countries and does not reflect the situation in the highly populated regions of Asia and Africa.” (Ibid.)

In the Lao PDR, data on drug use is based on what village chiefs report to their respective district and province. For several reasons, it seems they would often underreport the cases they encounter. The first obvious reason is that they can not possibly know of all the cases happening within their jurisdiction, even when relying on a citizen reports and denunciations. Secondly, the more drug use village chiefs report, the further away they will be from acquiring the desired “drug free” status which we will discussed in further articles.

These comments are applicable to many other places in the world as officials underestimate the actual rate, because it is hidden, or because it will get them into trouble. Paradoxically , the contrary, over-exaggerating trends because the policies demand it, also exist. In light of this information, we can reasonably question the way the ARQs are being used to self-measure domestic consumption trend (16).

As explained by researcher Rachel Caspar (1992, p. 93), “whether the subject of interest is prevalence, frequency, or quantity consumed, questions about the quality of self-reports of drug use are inevitable. The usefulness of the data obtained from a survey is reduced if some sampled individuals fail to answer one or more questions on the survey (nonresponse) or give incorrect answers (inaccurate response). In particular, nonresponse and inaccurate response may lead investigators to draw incorrect conclusions from the data provided by a survey. Response problems occur to some degree in nearly all surveys but are arguably more severe in surveys of illegal activities. For example, some individuals may be reluctant to admit that they engage in illegal behavior, whereas others may brag about such behavior or exaggerate it. It is widely thought that nonresponse and inaccurate response may cause surveys such as the NHSDA and MTF to underestimate the prevalence of drug use in the surveyed populations.”

However, perhaps more importantly than the number of people potentially using an illicit substance - and where the estimates of most international organizations lack sensible information - is the numbers of people suffering from abuse, problematic use and potential addiction. This is arguably two very different things, important to consider today as an increasing number of countries engage towards the road of decriminalization. In this regard, the 2015 Global Drug Survey, a civil society initiative which surveyed around 100 000 voluntary people all around the world from November to December 2014 has somehow found very different results (18) in drug consumption. Similarly difficult to assess, and sometimes prompt to manipulation and ideological recalibration, is the estimation of the illicit drug market and trade (19).

  • Illicit drug trade

In comparison to the arguably dubious numbers used by UNDCP its first estimate of the global drug trade, the UNODC 2003 projection, by building on commentaries and reviews, has shown improvement in scientific rigor. However, while showing improvement in transparency and methodology, the numbers still remained criticizable. Quantified to “US$13 bn [billion] at the production level, at $94 bn at the wholesale level (taking seizures into account), and at US$322bn based on retail prices and taking seizures and other losses into account” (UNODC, 2005a, p. 127), the estimation remained arguably far off from scientific standards applicable in other markets. The point here is that estimation of a prohibited trade remains by definition extremely perilous and often unreliable.

What Francesco Thoumi (2005) called "probably the most serious attempt" to estimate the global illicit drug trade was done in 1999 by economist Peter Reuter which was tasked by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (20) to assess the global illegal economy. The estimation he and his team came up with was a potential range in between $45 and $280 billion. This number strikes by its wide estimation range in comparison to the seemingly more round and precise number with which the international community has based reasonings and policies for the past decades. This figure was notably found using data from a broader scope than sole police reports.

Today, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) still considers, statistics on drug seizure, to “offer valid indirect indicators of drug trafficking trends.” (CND 58th Session, Item 7, 2015) This can only further concern drug-policy observers as to the capacity of the most important body of the IDCR to correctly asses the illicit drug market. Although it can be argued that UNODC has positively changed in regard to the way it collected and used illicit-drug data, including in regard to the global drug trade, this cannot be said for the other institutions of the U.N illicit drug control regime.

Finally, probably slightly easier to measure, but still prompted to questionable claims, the topic of production of illicit drugs.

  • Illicit drug production

The principal sources of information for the CND on the “illicit cultivation of crops and the production of plant-based drugs are the latest UNODC illicit crop monitoring surveys.” (CND 58th Session, Item 7, 2015) As we will observe in further articles on the case of the Lao PDR, the monitoring and data collection made by the agency of illicit-drug based plants - in this case the opium poppy - are relatively reliable (21) because it is done directly by the agency once a year, through helicopter surveillance. But this does not necessarily equate to exact validity of the estimates (22).

Whether it is the case for coca or opium, growers can adapt and render the data unreliable. In the case of cannabis, the plant is grown literally everywhere on the planet. Furthermore, modern indoor and hydroponic capacities virtually allow the plant to be undetectable. In the case of synthetically produced illicit drugs, and the derivative from the natural plant based, a valid estimate remains still extremely difficult to make and can only be done based on law enforcement seizures (23). Ultimately, the cases and rise of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) make the production analysis processes almost impossible if the market operate underground,

To conclude this article we will similarly say as Francisco Thoumi and Jorrit Kamminga (2004) that “in the past UNODC and its predecessor organizations have not been transparent in handling evidence and at times they have actually manipulated and twisted the evidence to portray a mistaken vision of the drug phenomena.” Furthermore, “many important issues discussed and polices questioned informally by its staff, have been taboo to discuss openly.” (Ibid) As UNODC rightfully declares: “It remains a challenge to globally quantify (the illicit drug) phenomena.” (CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015), especially on the demand side, where the agency acknowledges that “global estimates have a very high level of uncertainty.” (Ibid.) Indeed, because “dynamics of illicit drug markets remain largely hidden in illegal activities” (Ibid.), the UN drug control unsurprisingly, but candidly recognizes that they “are difficult to measure.“ (Ibid.) In this regard, we must recognize that the 2015, latest, WDR is “a welcome effort to move mainstream discussion beyond a moralistic and pharmacologically deterministic approach – that is to say a perspective that takes no account of complex and varied environmental conditions.” (IDPC, 2016a)

As we have observed, several tensions exist between the use and collection of data by UNODC, notably in between scientific rigor and political interests (24). As noted by Christopher Hallam and David Bewley-Taylor (2010),”in some ways these stem from structural conditions: the UNODC's role as both centre for research and dissemination and a prime outlet for moral and political messages targeting drug use.” Furthermore, these problems are also encountered within other international drug control forums such as the CND, “where political commitment to the abstemious project of the drug control conventions clashes with the public health and cultural realities of a twenty-first century in which drugs have become a normalised part of the social landscape across large tracts of the globe.” (Ibid.)

However, our own responsibility, as citizens, listener public observers and analysts of drug-policy matters which do not necessarily take a critical point of view, should not be disregarded. As Freeman Dyson (2007) rightfully explains often “The public prefers to listen to scientists who give confident answers to questions and make confident predictions of what will happen as a result of human activities. (Political leaders) make confident predictions about the future, and end up believing their own predictions. Their predictions become dogmas which they do not question. The public is led to believe that the fashionable scientific dogmas are true. (…) That is why heretics who question the dogmas are needed.”

arrests, prosecutions, seizures, eradication, and the destruction of drug processing facilities.” (Bewley-Taylor, 2015) The predominant view to collect illicit drug-related data remains as of today on 'precise' measurements, which are useful to both national governments and international organizations to add a still much-needed heartened certainty to a very unstable environment. Nonetheless numeric confidence in the form of the number of arrests, substance seizures and hectares of destroyed crops estimate can still abundantly be found. Actual indicators and data methodology used to measure the efficiency of the current IDCR maintain a focal point on “

UNGASS 2016, was mistakenly seen by some as a potential global platform to anchor more sophisticated protocols indicators in tune with new policy development. Among other things, new metrics needed to move away from simply intending to assess drug flows and focus predominantly on the "measurement of outcomes ” (Bewley-Taylor, 2015) of drug policies. This approach to data mining remains problematic as the 2009 Political Declaration, a document we will further analyze and on which was grounded the 2016 Special Session, contains a pledge from the international community to "eliminate or reduce significantly" (UN General Assembly, 1998) money laundering, demand and production, health and social harms associated with illegal substances, by the year 2019.

Furthermore, it should be noted that studying drug related data 'from the top' can present the liability to forget that this theme cannot be resumed by the contents of official documents, briefing papers and technical assessments produced by bureaucrats and country representatives. As noted by Alex Stevens (2011), “drug policy also consists of the combination of individual interactions that take place within the framework provided by these instruments of power.” Researchers following up on the work of Foucault have demonstrated that power continuously runs and is produced among us through the reproduction of habits, practices and bodily utterances. As such, studying drug use and policies in all its forms, contexts and practices remains fundamental, including in the most disregarded fields.

in this context the first question should always be: what data do we need to make an efficient policy? One way to start, would be to focus on getting more local qualitative data, notably by finding mutually assured processes to include illegal substance users in the pool of questioned agents, without the risk for them to be prosecuted in regard to their activities. Asking the primary subjects affected by such policies should be an evidence, but is often disregarded due to prejudices and fear of repercussion. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is currently undertaking such task by creating anonymous questionnaires. Additionally, collecting such data could prove to be easier and extremely cost-efficient, if handled for example by scholars, university departments and civil society organizations.

Ultimately, we need to accept the use of data range rather than exact numbers. A growing acceptance among countries and international agencies about the concept of “uncertainty”is needed as it remains “an inherent characteristic for understanding any illegal market.” (Bewley-Taylor, 2015. In this regard, UNODC should push towards more accurate findings, and keep the current trend found within the 2015 WDR which acknowledges the complexity and the uncertainty of the topic. As noted by Francisco Thoumi and Jorrit Kamminga (2004), “one important role of the United Nations as a diverse multicultural organization (should) precisely (be) to prevent the manipulation of facts to validate particular cultural or belief based opinions. Otherwise, we will simply see the same wine in new cleaner bottles.”

(1) Cartographer at the Centre for International Research (CERI) from Sciences Po. Paris

(2) Interview 20/15/2015 with Benoit Martin, Geographer at the CERI and Sciences Po. University.

(3) David Bewley-Taylor effectively remarks that the “growing appreciation of the problems associated with measuring an increasingly complex and fluid illicit market has not been accompanied by a systemic appreciation that measurements of success might be focusing on the wrong variables.” (Bewley-Taylor, 2015)

(4) Similarly to what some mainstream medias often report, the preface of the 2003 UNODC document review “Encouraging Progress Towards Still Distant Goals”, assured that “worldwide statistical evidence points to a different reality: drug control is working and the world drug problem is being contained.” (UNODC, 2003)

(5) "With estimates of $100 billion to $110 billion for heroin, $110 billion to $130 billion for cocaine, $75 billion for cannabis and $60 billion for synthetic drugs, the probable global figure for the total illicit drug industry would be approximately $360 billion. Given the conservative bias in some of the estimates for individual substances, a turnover of around $400 billion per annum is considered realistic.” (UNDCP, 1997)

(6) “including drug production, seizures, consumption, and the social and economic consequences of drug abuse and trafficking” including “the effects on employment and productivity, determinants of illicit drug prices, effects on balance of payments, on financial systems, on investment and savings, on family and community, health, education, environment, crime, corruption, and dangers for civil society.” (UNDCP, 1997a)

(7) Global trade exchange of goods in 1997 was estimated to $5125 billion in 1997 by the World Trade Organization (WTO). (See: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr98_e.htm). 8% of that number therefore equals for the global drug trade for the same year to $410 billion.

(8) The authors follows up: “Using the cocaine market as an example, one can say that the wholesale cocaine price ready for export in 'Andinia' is about $1,500 per kilogram. The wholesale import price in the United States is around $15,000 to $18,000, and the retail value sold by the gram can reach $120,000. The question is which of these figures should be used in the comparison with global international trade? It is obvious that it should be one of the first two, but not the third one used by UNDCP.” The author follows on by explaining that “If one uses 'Andinia's' export price, the estimate should be about 80 times lower than if one uses the last figure, that is, about 0.1% of global trade. If one uses the United States import price, the figure would be about 1% of global trade. Apparently, none of these two estimates were satisfactory to UNDCP, perhaps because they did not show that illicit drug trade represented a large share of global international trade. Furthermore, any serious estimate should study the difference between wholesale export and import prices that is about 1,000%, compared to about 5% in licit trade.” (Thoumi, 2005)

(9) See Preface of former UNODC Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa, in UNODC, 2008, p. 1

(10) See also, UNODC, 2006, Preface, p. 1,

(11) “What is often striking” notes a researcher working on the use of data by UNODC, is that “the WDR relies heavily on data and on the format they choose to present it. If you withdraw the data and the joint commentaries from the reports, very little things remain.” (Interview 20/15/2015 with Benoit Martin, Geographer at the CERI and Sciences Po. University.)

(12) Interview 20/15/2015 with Benoit Martin, Geographer at the CERI and Sciences Po. University.

(13) The ARQ are notably used by UNODC to collect informations from Member States on drug prevalence, use, sizing and production, as well as on national legal and administrative policy components.

(15) As the UNODC also acknowledged: “much of the data collected are subject to limitations and biases.” (UNODC, 2011b)

(16) “Global and regional trends in drug use are estimated from nationally representative surveys that include questions on drug use, as well as from information gathered through studies that use indirect methods to estimate the number of regular or high-risk users such as problem opioids users.” (UNODC, 2015)

(17) A range comprise in between: 162 million-329 million, or about 1 in 20 people; with some 27 million people (range: 15.7 million-39 million), or 0.6 per cent of the population aged 15-64, “estimated to suffer from problem drug use, including drug-use disorders or drug dependence.” (UNODC, 2015)

(19) “Drug trafficking is a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws. UNODC is continuously monitoring and researching global illicit drug markets in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of their dynamics. Drug trafficking is a key part of this research.” See: UNODC website, Drug trafficking, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html

(20) An “inter-governmental body developing and promoting policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing”. See: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/

(21) As the CND points out, “in South-East Asia, opium poppy cultivation (is) concentrated in Myanmar” (CND 58th Session, Item 7, 2015). And “globally, seizures of opium and illicit morphine remained concentrated in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, while heroin seizures covered a wider geographic area.” (CND 58th Session, Item 7, 2015)

(22) The Transnational Institute says that UN drugs agency’s “monopoly of truth” (TNI, 2014) meant that its “statistics on drug production across the SE Asian region were often taken as gospel, despite them being largely based on guesstimates – and therefore often conservative – rather than reliable scientific data.” (UCA News, 2014)

(23) After observing a “significant increase” in 2012, the CND noted that “global seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants stabilized in 2013.” (CND 58th Session, Item 7, 2015)

(24) Equally, for the Transform Drug Policy Foundation, “current high-level evaluations of drug policy impacts are undermined by the political and institutional frameworks they serve and operate within.” (Transform, 2012)


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