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3/4 UNODC - How did the organization evolve over the years ?

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • May 11, 2016
  • 31 min read

As the readers may already know, drug policy debate often provokes deep emotional reactions among implicated individuals. One of the reason is notably due to the fact that debates are attached to the beliefs of one-self, and not necessarily to the actual knowledge of each individual. “For this reason the positions most people take about how to deal with drug production, trafficking and consumption are conditioned by their belief systems. The debate about mind-altering drugs reflects those beliefs to a point that it can be asserted that such debate is really a surrogate for other unspoken debates about fundamental cultural differences.” (Thoumi & Kamminga, 2004) Indeed, often disregarded, local and cultural beliefs are still important components of multilateral policy formulation. And these differences are fundamental in order to comprehend the way UNODC has evolved in term of drug policies over the years.

For example, we can list here, three unspoken seeds of conflict in the drug policy debate between the U.S., the Latin American continent, and the E.U.:

  • Opposition between so-called U.S. 'puritan' values and European 'pragmatism', both political spaces often finding themselves in opposite policy choices and positions;

  • Conflict between U.S. 'individualism' and concept of indigenous community based approach in the Latin American countries;

  • Internal confrontations among these geographic groups, in between different agents of the illegal drug traffic, including small farmers and traffickers on one side; and the political elite of the Global North on the other. The small farmers group notably “know that they have been exploited, that drugs provide upward mobility channels in highly stratified societies, and that for the first time in centuries, because of drugs, they have political power.” (Thoumi & Kamminga, 2004)

These tensions, and the current institutional capacities of UNODC has lead some observers to argue that the agency “has now shifted its objectives towards stabilising or containing drug markets” (Sur, 2015; see also: UNODC, 2009b), and not simply anymore “eradicating” illicit drugs and trafficking. These changes can be observed in regard to the attitudes of the agency towards to the current International Drug Control Regime (IDCR), the effects of the regime on human rights, and in concern to its position on the death penalty for drug-related crimes, harm reduction services and the principle of decriminalization.

  • The ambiguity in regard to the current IDCR

Mid-way through the decade period after UNGASS 1998, a 2003 midterm review of the proclaimed “drug-free world” goal was conducted by UNODC. As it became evident that the commitment was still far-off from being completed, the agency released a report called ‘Encouraging Progress Towards Still Distant Goals’ (UNODC, 2003), which intended to alleviate the difficulties of the agency to reach its objectives. Similarly, at the 2008 ten year finish line, UNODC declared that the regime had made “significant progress over the past 10 years” while mentioning —in an quite prodigious euphemism—that “in a number of areas and regions, Member States have not yet fully attained the goals and targets agreed in the Political Declaration.” (ECOSOC, 2008a)

In the 2008 World Drug Report (WDR), UNODC recognized for the first time the “unintended consequences” of the current approach to illicit drugs, including: “the creation of a lucrative and violent black market”; a focus on law enforcement which has diverted resources from health-oriented approaches; the geographic displacement of illicit drug-related issues; the “pressure on the market for one particular substance (which) has (..) promoted the use of an alternate drug” and the “use of criminal justice system against drug consumers (which) increased their marginalisation.” (UNODC, 2008) However, despite this recognition, it should be noted that in the same report, the agency has intended “to hide failures behind a bad history lesson.” (TNI, 2008) Indeed, “instead of a clear acknowledgement that the 10-year UNGASS targets have not been met the WDR decided to go back 100 years into history claiming success in comparison with Chinese opium production and use in the early 20th century.” (Ibid.) (1)

Similarly, at a March 2009 CND Session, former UNODC Executive Director (ED), Antonio Maria Costa presented a paper on “Organized Crime as a Threat to Security: Tackling a disturbing consequence of drug control”. Within it, he acknowledged potential negative consequences of the current regime, by arguing that the IDCR had created "a criminal market of staggering proportions.” (UNODC, 2009g) However, he followed by calling for stronger measures, and warned that the international community must deal with this issue as “the crime and corruption associated with the drug trade are providing strong evidence to a vocal minority of pro-drug lobbyists to argue that the cure is worse than the disease, and that drug legalization is the solutionthere is no need to choose between health (drug control) and security (crime preventionagainst crime, not in favour of drugs.” (Ibid.) Costa further asserted that In this regard "there is no need to choose between health (drug control) and security (crime prevention)” and that the international community needs to be "against crime, not in favour of drugs.” (Ibid.) In light of these declarations, one can only wonder how such a prestidigitation trick was to be performed; recognizing deep flaws within the current framework while advocating for the pursuit of the very regime that created the issue intended to be tackled in the first place.

In regard to these past years development, it could be argued that UNODC has started a mild, more truthful appreciation of the harms caused by the current system, but in no case has it questioned nor critic the regime itself, nor its own decisive role in perpetuating these harms. Although the agency has started to follow the policy examples of other U.N. agencies, notably in the case of human rights implications as we will see, UNODC still firmly believes in, and defends the current prohibitionist framework.

  • The symbol of human rights

As argued by several researchers, despite forming the legal basis of IDCR, the three international conventions on drug control “were developed and have been interpreted in a vacuum from human rights law, and the principal organs of drug control have carried out their mandates with little reference to human rights norms, and little regard for their own human rights obligations.” (Barret & Nowak, 2009) Despite the fact that each year, state members of the U.N. General Assembly, consensually adopt a resolution stating that “countering the world drug problem (must be carried out) in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular with human rights” (UNODC, 1998), the negative human rights impact of current national and international approaches to drug policy "has been and continues to be substantial. Moreover, there is little recognition among member states of the paradox of inserting human rights rhetoric into an existing policy framework that exacerbates human rights risk.” (Barret & Nowak, 2009)

Fo years, the U.N. drug control agency has been accused by human rights organizations to contribute to the violations of these very rights in countries where the organization co-jointly implemented programs with oppressive regimes. It was only with the publications of the UNODC 2008 “Fit for Purpose” discussion paper, which contained one of the first calls from the agency to “humanize our drug control regime.” (ECOSOC, 2008), that UNODC officially re-stated its position. The paper notably requested less emphasis on repression and a stronger focus on human dignity and health. Navigating through Russian and U.S. pressures on one side and the need to present an 'integrated and balanced approach' on drug control on the other, UNODC formally recognized for the first time in this document the fundamental importance of the human rights component by declaring that “the Charter of the United Nations takes priority over all other instruments.” (ECOSOC, 2008)

It could be argued that in all the range of its activities and in close collaboration with other U.N. agencies, UNODC possesses sufficient expertise to support countries in their drug control operations, in compliance with international human rights norms. As such, researchers Damon Barrett and Manfred Nowak (2009) proposed that “Progress must begin with the incorporation of human rights into strategies and in project documents, something that is not currently systematic in UN drug control activities and strategies. This includes adding human rights abuses as identified risks, including human rights treaties ratified by the relevant state as well as national human rights laws in the ‘legal context’, and incorporating clauses requiring specific human rights outcomes.” But in order to accomplish this, UNODC must act upon those claims in order to build normative standards and not limit its rhetoric and actions to hopeful declarations such as “the need for drug control policies (to be) balanced, comprehensive and integrated, with a focus on health and carried out with respect for human rights.” (UNODC, 2015, p. 5)

The agency remains arguably quite reluctant to do so, notably because human rights perspectives and advocacy are often seen as a double standards schemes and neocolonial so-called universal values, pushed by Global North countries that do not posses anymore the financial capacities to force up these demands on others. This is particularly the case with Southeast Asian countries where the human rights argumentative in regard to drug control policy has proved to be quite ineffective in the region.

Accordingly, one of the most pressing drug-related human rights issue in the region remains the current state of affairs of drug-related capital punishment that are still being carried out in Southeast Asian nations. UNODC has been accused in the past, and still today, of indirectly helping foster and perpetuate these policies.

  • Still operating within drug-related death penalty country enforcers

If on paper, UNODC “provides legislative advice toward ensuring that punishment is proportionate to the offence, avoiding mandatory minimum sentences and allowing courts to consider relevant factors in sentencing, such as the criminal history of the offender and the seriousness and nature of the criminal conduct” (CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015; see also UN Tokyo Rules, 1990, 7.1 & 8.1), in practice, very little requires countries to follow the advice of the agency. While UNODC now clearly advocates for the abolition of drug-related death penalty offenses (2), recalling that the capital sentence “should not be imposed for drug offences or other crimes that have no lethal or other extremely grave consequences” (3) (CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015), it has not had very tangible consequences on the conduct of the agency in theses countries. For example, UNODC’s organizational strategy for 2008 to 2011 stated this particular desired outcome: “Enhanced capacity to respond effectively utilizing special investigative techniques in the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime, organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking” (UNODC, 2007 p. 6). However, it seems plausible to think that in countries requesting capital punishment for drug-related offenses, “an increase in successful drug prosecutions will likely result in an increase in death sentences and possibly even in executions.” (Lines & al., 2010) In this regard, it could be argued that the agency, through its technical assistance to countries still applying capital punishment for drug related offenses, is indirectly responsible for these executions.

In a 2010 document presented at the 53d CND Session, UNODC explicitly declared its opposition to death sentences for drug related offenses: “As an entity of the United Nations system, UNODC advocates the abolition of the death penalty and calls upon Member States to follow international standards concerning prohibition of the death penalty for offences of a drug-related or purely economic nature.” (UNODC, 2010) It goes without saying that such commitment and the repercussion in policy change it should engaged need critical assessment. Arguments in favor of the practice, involving the principle of state sovereignty regarding national laws and penalties, or the non-ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (OHCHR, 1966), forget to acknowledge the responsibilities of state donors and UNODC civil servants “to take effective measures to ensure that they are not engaged in activities that contravene international human rights law (…) and against capital punishment in all circumstances.” (Lines & al. 2010)

But this has not always been the position of the U.N. agency. Capital punishment is, in fact, recognized in the official commentary to the 1961 Single Convention as a “permissible substitute control” if state parties decide to take more stricter measures than provided by the treaty (UN Convention, 1973, pp. 449–450, para. 2). However, it could be argued here that this disposition is outdated in regard to human rights international obligations, as it fails to meet the requirement of “most serious crimes”, upon which the death penalty is solely internationally recognized as permissible by the ICCPR (4) (OHCHR, 1966, Art. 6). Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly has in numerous occasions, declared that “International co-operation against illicit trafficking should be carried out in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other principles of international law, and in particular with full respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (5) Nevertheless, in recent years, the death penalty for drug-related offenses has been and is still being carried out in several countries (6) within which UNODC is actively engaged.

In a 2010 article for the International Harm Reduction Association, several authors have asserted that UNODC is “actively actively involved in funding and/or delivering technical assistance, legislative support and financial aid intended to strengthen domestic drug enforcement activities in states that retain the death penalty for drug offences.” (IHRA, 2010) It could be argued that if these activities proved to be successful, it would result in “increased convictions of persons on drug charges and the potential for increased death sentences and executions.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, specific death sentences could be directly linked to drug enforcement activities funded by the U.N. agency and other international bodies. As noted, “donor states, the European Commission and UNODC may therefore be complicit in executions for drug offences in violation of international human rights law and contrary to their own abolitionist policies and UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty for all offences.” (Lines & al. 2010)

Typically, the death sentence is mainly applied in certain countries for drug trafficking, cultivation, manufacturing and/or importing/exporting but is not limited to these offenses. Severe disparities exist within the definition of drug related offenses among the most prohibitionist countries, which for some can include capital punishment for personal possession and simple consumption. Here again, the debate has proven to be particularly relevant “as the UN’s lead agency on drugs, UNODC (should be) uniquely placed to advocate for an end to the death penalty for drug offences internationally.” (Lines & al. 2010) However, as we have seen, it could be argued that the position of UNODC regarding the death penalty for drug related offenses has only slowly evolved in recent years.

The tension to be found here evolves around the argument advanced by retentionist countries that drug related offenses can be considered as a “most serious crime” (7), while most countries, public international lawyers, and concerned U.N. agencies, including both the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC, 2013a) and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (UNHRC, 2007a), have declared that drug related offenses do not constitute a “most serious crime” and that countries applying such sentences find themselves in violation of international human rights law.

Consequently, the agency has become increasingly vocal regarding this topic during the past years, including in high level speeches by the agency ED and in the WDR. However, as described by researchers Rick Lines, Damon Barrett and Patrick Gallahue, it could be argued that several steps still need to be undertaken by UNODC in order to achieve in practice such commitment:

  • Technical assistance and capacity-building and other support for drug enforcement should be conditioned to “the abolition of the death penalty for drug-related offences, or at the very least evidence of an ongoing and committed moratorium on executions.” (Lines & al. 2010);

  • “A formal and transparent process for conducting human rights impact assessments (8) as an element of project design, implementation and evaluation should be developed and implemented as part of all drug enforcement activities.” (Ibid.) In that aspect, UNODC has formulated the possibility to create such a tool (9) during the CND 53rd Session (UNODC, 2010 para. 59), but has not taken steps to implement it to date;

  • Finally, “UNODC – working in conjunction with the OHCHR, non-governmental organisations, government representatives, international experts and affected communities – should develop guidelines (10) on human rights and drug control for use by international and bilateral donors, implementing agencies and national governments.” (Lines & al. 2010)

As observed, the issue of the death penalty remains quite vivid and potentially controversial for the agency. Recent UNGASS 2016 preparatory meetings have shown that many countries still argue that this question should be decided by national interest and domestic considerations. Debates reflecting this trend has been ongoing during CND sessions. This creates a situation where the agency has to decide between its international and public commitments, and continue its programs in countries that still execute individuals for drug-related offenses. This conundrum can be found elsewhere, notably in the case of harm reduction services.

  • Harm reduction approach in the discourse

While a specific article will be dedicated dedicated to the topic of harm reduction, we will focus here on the position and evolution of UNODC in regard to the question. If it can be argued that, “harm reduction is the most successful drug policy response of the last 40 years approaches – it is a practical, feasible, effective, safe, inexpensive and cost-effective approach” (IDPC, 2015e), many U.N. member states are still highly opposed to the practices. The conduct of UNODC over the years has not helped clarify the situation, which has in return arguably led to the creation and sustainment of drug-related harms for vulnerable segments of the worldwide population (11).

For the agency, the beginning of the new century was identified by strong pressures coming from both U.S. Clinton and Bush Jr administrations against any form of treaty flexibility and drug policy reforms, including in regard to harm reduction policies. Highly dependent on funding as we observed, pressures from this particular country, could not be easily disregarded and UNODC started removing any references to the topic of harm reduction practices and policies from its publications. (TNI, 2005) Both the UNODC ED Antonio Maria Costa (who had replaced Arlacchi) and the INCB President at the time, Philip Emafo started to publicly challenge the legitimacy of harm reduction (12).

The arrival of Barrack Obama to the U.S. presidency, although not publicly, allowed for at least, a removal of the country's long-standing behind the scene pressure on the subject. However, this is in no way to be understood as a public recognition of the concept, neither by the U.S. administration, nor by UNODC, especially when considering that countries have taken the driver seat of the U.S. as the new orthodox guardians of the regime. Consequently, present during a 2015 panel of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNODC Deputy ED, Aldo Lalé-Demoz, recognized that “public health considerations have not been prominent enough in international drug policy and the criminal justice system” and that “access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care for people who use drugs is far below what is needed.” (IDPC, 2015a)

This common position resonated quite strongly among drug policy advocates given that a 2001 UNGASS on HIV/AIDS had adopted a Declaration of Commitment declaring that “harm reduction efforts related to drug use” and “expanded access to [...] sterile injecting equipment” should be ensured by 2005. (UN General Assembly, 2001) However, internal pressures remain strong within UNODC. This was for example demonstrated by the fact that a 2002 UNODC legal memorandum, which explicitly defended "the legality of harm reduction measures, (...) was kept secret from member states." (Jelsma, 2015) upon request of the INCB.. The conclusion of the memo notably asserted that it “could even be argued that the drug control treaties, as they stand, have been rendered out of synch with reality.” (INCB, 2002)

In March 2014, UNODC presented two significant documents related to the topic:

  • a ‘Contribution of the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the high-level review of the implementation of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem’ (UNODC, 2013);

  • and the ‘Drug Policy Provisions from the International Drug Control Conventions’ (13) (UNODC, 2014).

Both documents accentuated in length UNODC’s recent evolutions in rhetoric regarding the fact that drug policies need to be understood through the prism of public health, rather than a strictly criminal justice one. Maybe, most importantly, the documents stated that the international conventions on drug control provide sufficient flexibility to formulate policies in such fashion. But as an IDPC analysis document rightfully stated: “the paper is also restrictive in that it seeks to contain calls for the international conventions to be revisited or in any way amended.” (IDPC, 2014) Both documents also endorse “depenalization” of drug possession offenses, but miss the opportunity to support the concepts of “decriminalization”, and regulated markets, as well as any forms of amendment to the conventions. However, they remain important as they formalize an important message finally carried on by UNODC: “the international drug conventions need to be interpreted differently in order to support an approach that is based on public health and human rights, rather than on crime and repression.” (IDPC, 2014)

Similarly to the other pre-mentioned topics, the evolutive position of UNODC remains difficult to translate into acts, as the agency still carry on programs in countries that refuse to acknowledge the principle of harm reduction. As we will see in further articles in the case of the Lao PDR, the U.N. organization finds itself increasingly pressured in the international arena to publicly defend the concept. Within the agency, internal contradictions remain strong, as the case of decriminalization can show us.

  • Embracing Decriminalization?

In a breakthrough leaked document in October 2015, UNODC stated that: “Member States should consider the implementation of measures to promote the right to health and to reduce prison-overcrowding, including by decriminalising drug use and possession for personal consumption.” (UNODC, 2015a) As clearly declared, the paper intended to “clarify the position of UNODC to inform country responses to promote a health and human rights-based approach to drug policy.” (Ibid.) It notably explained that “decriminalising drug use and possession for personal consumption is consistent with international drug control conventions and may be required to meet obligations under international human rights law.” (Ibid.) Drafted by Dr Monica Beg, chief of the HIV/AIDs section of the UNODC in Vienna and initially set to be unveiled on October 18, 2015, at the Harm Reduction International Conference (14) in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, the briefing paper never officially made it out.

Steve Rolles, senior policy analyst at the nonprofit Transform Drug Policy Foundation explains: "We think what happened is that a member state got wind of this and put pressure on UNODC to withdraw or delay it, so they are trying to cover their tracks a bit. But the problem that UNODC are going to have is if they are going to challenge any of the points made in the brief, they won't be able to deny or refute them because all the analysis is very carefully constructed legally and is stuff that other UN agencies have already said.” (Vice News, 2015) Anonymous sources from UNODC headquarters in Vienna told the investigating journal that their suspicion fell upon the U.S. as to which country had put pressure on the agency to back pedal in a heist.

This fact can create a certain perplexity as to the actual fragile international policy stand that this country currently finds itself into. Tension in-between U.S. states and the Federal government in regard to cannabis market driven regulations will notably be of interest in a later article. The fact is that 2016 remains an important date. With UNGASS but also U.S. presidential and congressional elections, an hypothesis could be made that the Obama administration, especially the State Department, does not wish to get involved into anything that would necessitate further declaration or commitment from their part. Nevertheless as the article reminds us, “the US would be one of only a handful of countries — including Russia and possibly China — that hold such weight in the international drug policy arena.” (Vice News, 2015)

Fingers have also been pointed towards Japan. Indeed, it has been reported by other sources found by the author of this article within UNODC that the country's representative in Vienna may have directly “stormed in(15) the office of UNODC ED Yuri Fedotov. Such action from a country that never truly had a firm public position within the international scene in regard to this topic can lead to even greater observers’ perplexity. But this may matter not. Whichever country pulled the strings, we ought to remember that the UNODC paper represents a careful choice of words, reflecting the traditional “behind the curtain” ” negotiations between countries, especially between major donors. Therefore, it could arguably seem quite vain to stop the publication of the briefing paper as it was published in the most U.N. style pondered form possible.

Coming back to the actual words of the document. In an unusually harsh critic of the harm caused by criminalization, the paper arguments: “Protecting public health is a legitimate aim, but imposing criminal sanctions for drug use and possession for personal consumption is neither necessary nor proportionate. On the contrary, punishment aggravates the behavioural, health and social conditions of the affected people.” (UNODC, 2015a) The agency had previously conceded that decriminalisation practices were allowed under the current IDCR, “but had only made more vague nods towards the need for decriminalisation being expressed elsewhere in the UN, notably in technical guidance on the HIV responses and occasional public statements.” (Transform, 2015) The paper represented a long awaited volte-face, as the agency not only recognized that such policies are allowed, but that they even represent a requirement for countries “to meet obligations under international human rights law.” (UNODC, 2015a) Furthermore, the paper, quoting the U.N. Committee on Social and Economic Rights (16) stated that punitive laws and policies "are likely to result in... unnecessary morbidity and preventable mortality [and] constitute specific breaches of the obligation to respect the right to health.” (UNODC, 2015a) By applying the logic of decriminalization to the supply side of the drug chain, UNODC further suggested that “small drug related offenses, such as drug dealing to maintain personal drug use or to survive in a very marginalized environment … [are cases that] should receive rehabilitation opportunities, social support and care, and not punishment.” (UNODC, 2015a)

In term of problem-solving approach, this arguably represents a turning point on drug policy reforms. Since the moment where the paper was first leaked on October 19, 2015, by British entrepreneur Richard Branson (17) - a member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy - the U.N. agency claimed several things: First that the 'the briefing is the work of "a middle-ranking official' who was offering a professional viewpoint, rather than an institutional position.” (Transform, 2015) Second that ”the briefing paper on decriminalisation [was] intended for dissemination and discussion at a conference in Kuala Lumpur, [and] is neither a final nor formal document from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and cannot be read as a statement of UNODC policy.” (UNODC 2015b). As it was revealed who actually wrote the paper - a very high ranking official of the organization -, and that the document had every appearance of an official statement by the agency, these claims hold very little weight. But whichever reason is given in the future, the burden now lies with the major donors, holding the rein of the agency, to present a credible counter-reasoning to this argumentative that most people in the field nowadays recognize as simple facts and common sense. As mentioned by Transform (2015), to do this, “they would need to show that criminalising drug use is necessary, proportionate, doesn’t cause ill health, violence and death, and conforms to international obligations towards health and human rights.”

As explained by Ethan Nadelmann, ED of the Drug Policy Alliance: “on the one hand, it’s promising that such a powerful statement strongly affirming the need to decriminalize drug use and possession made it this far in the UN process – that in itself represents a dramatic evolution from previous decades when any talk of decriminalization was studiously suppressed.” (DPA, 2015) On the other hand, it can be argued that it is an example of the incapacity of UNODC to formally enact policies, which are acknowledged and demanded by most, if it interferes with major donors timetable or views on the matter.

But before considering the retraction claims of the agency, as reported by Transform (2015a), “it’s important to be clear this wasn’t really a ‘leak’ in the classic sense. The document was to be presented by the UNODC at the International Harm Reduction Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and an embargoed copy had already gone to select media (the norm for such publication events). When it was then pulled at the last minute, the BBC, which had already filmed a news segment on it, decided to release it anyway. Richard Branson was filmed for the segment (…), and was sufficiently annoyed when the UNODC backtracked, that he broke the story himself on his blog.” So the UNODC’s (non-)announcement is “not some radical departure from what the rest of the UN thinks on this issue – in fact, it is more a case of them falling in line with a well established UN position.” (Transform, 2015a) Accordingly, we could suspect that most personnel of the agency were not too displeased with the so-called leak, and that half-baked excuses were the minimum required to appease a specific member state, which might potentially be a major financial provider of the agency.

The decriminalization move and retraction are again, quite emblematic of the numerous problematic policy stands in which the organization finds itself in the wake of the 2016 UNGASS on the “world drug problem”. It can only leave observers and advocates of drug policy reforms quite perplexed in regard to the future position of the agency on the debate. Overall, it demonstrates the dear need of the agency to gain financial stability and by association, some kind of independence maneuver in order to align, long-awaited public policy stands and actions on the ground.

Despite recent changes in speech and increase use of human rights rhetoric (UNODC, 2008, p. 19), the agency has yet to show changes and enforcement of such statements in their programs, as the cases of decriminalization and harm reduction services have shown us. For years, UNODC’s message on drug policy centered on a very restricted interpretation of the international conventions, one with a focus on law enforcement. This view has been central to the U.N. agency policy development. In response to critics and among the backdrop of unforeseen consequences, the recent public policy changes are indeed welcomed. However, as IDPC notes, “UNODC also need to articulate a strategy for disseminating this new approach to member states around the world in order to modernise national policies in countries that still assume that UNODC wants them to continually toughen laws and policies. UNODC also needs to work hard to ensure that these more progressive statements are not undermined by CND discussions, resolutions and documents, nor by the International Narcotics Control Board.” (IDPC, 2014)

In his closing speech at the CND 58th session in 2015, UNODC ED Yury Fedotov said: “Science and evidence-based practices offer the world the best means of treating drug abuse and ending the misery of millions of people. In moving forward in this area, we must remove the damaging influence of ideology and provide assistance solely on the basis of science and research.policy of denial” (Andreas & al., 1996) was already apparent in the 2006 UNODC WDR report as policy trajectory were continuously renewed, instead of being questioned. As a result, exposed failures of the current framework have been repeated for decades but do not give rise to any revision, if not to the strengthening of means deemed insufficient.” (CND 58th session, UNODC closing remarks, 2015) Consequently, it could be understood that working on drug policy requires a tolerant and broad minded approach, a context based and efficient personnel and the humility to recognize the limitations of any approaches. To meet these requirements, policies based on empirical evidence would need to be constantly re-evaluated while allowing space for new approaches to rise when issues emerge. Understood as a learning process, errors and missteps are too be expected, and so is acting upon them in order to rectify the intended trajectory. However, holding on 'values' guided by existing ideologies (by definition, difficult to be critically questioned), has a tendency to omit this very process. This "

In regard to drug issues, UNODC needs to further integrate the complex consequences of the policies it carries on, as well as recognize the very limited knowledge it possesses regarding this aspect. Associating 'drug' and 'crime' as if it was of a natural order, has conflicted moral and ethical dimensions, and greatly obscured the interplay between economic, political, cultural, scientific, legal, environmental and social factors. Current contradiction in between UNODC public (and 'internal') policy stands and actions on the ground have only highlighted the historical issues faced by the organization in regard to funding and programs implementation.

The agency further need to acknowledge that policies and analysis centered on mind altering substances, still remain quite uncertain and often poorly informed. Researchers Francisco Thoumi and Jorrit Kamminga (2004) have indeed shown that ”many policies are implementing to “fight” illegal activities without knowing what their effects really are. In a field of profound moral and scientific uncertainty, policies are formulated under strong convictions of moral and scientific certitude. A good policy must take into account all these elements if it is going to succeed without having “unintended undesirable consequences ”. Not surprisingly, most of the time today’s policies fail to achieve the results posited by their proponents.” These contradictions can be found in the programs being currently developed and implemented in many Country Offices. The case of the Lao PDR where the author has undertaken an internship for several months can enlighten us in regard to policy evolutions of the organization, and the limitations they contain. This will be at the center of a next set of articles.

(1) The Transnational Institute further notes that the agency, “deliberately overestimates opium abuse in China in the early 20th century (which was) mostly moderate and relatively non-problematic, often for medicinal use.” (TNI, 2008)

(2) In line with UN General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty. See for example, A/RES/69/186.

(3) Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, ECOSOC resolution 1984/50, annex, para. 2

(4) For more information see also: UNHRC, 2005, para 14; Hood, 2002, p. 77; Schabas, 2002, p. 110; Nowak, 2005, p. 11.

(5) See Resolutions: UNGA Res. 61/183 (13/03/07) UN Doc. A/RES/61/183; UNGA Res. 60/178 (22/03/06) UN Doc. A/RES/60/178; See also UNGA Res. 46/101 (16/12/91) UN Doc. A/RES/46/101; UNGA Res. 47/98 (16/12/92) UN Doc. A/RES/47/98; UNGA Res. 48/112 (11/03/94) UN Doc. A/RES/48/112; UNGA Res. 49/168 (24/02/95) UN Doc. A/RES/49/168; UNGA Res. 50/148 (9/02/96) UN Doc. A/RES/50/148; UNGA Res. 51/64 (28/01/97) UN Doc. A/RES/51/64; UNGA Res. 53/115 (01/02/99) UN Doc. A/RES/53/115; UNGA Res. 54/132 (07/02/00) UN Doc. A/RES/54/132; UNGA Res. 55/65 (26/01/01) UN Doc. A/RES/55/65; UNGA Res. 56/124 (24/01/02) UN Doc. A/ RES/56/124; UNGA Res. 58/141 (10/02/03) UN Doc. A/RES/58/141; UNGA Res. 59/153 (08/02/05) UN Doc. A/RES/59/153.

(6) Among them China (The Guardian, 2015; Radio Free Asia, 2010), Indonesia (HRW, 2009 p. 263; New-York Times, 2008; Kine, 2015), Iran (HRW, 2015 p. 295; The Guardian, 2011), Kuwait (Amnesty International, 2014 p. 50; Amnesty International, 2014), Malaysia (Malaysiakini, 2005; HRW, 2015 p. 368), Pakistan (Al Jazeera America, 2015 ; Daily Mail, 2015), Saudi Arabia (IHRA, 2010 p. 24; Common Dreams, 2015), Singapore (Amnesty International, 2008 p. 266; HRW, 2015 p. 479), Thailand (Amnesty International, 2003; Asia News, 2009), Yemen (Saba News, 2008; Reuters, 2010), and Viet Nam (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2009 p. 173; Daily Mail, 2014; Sky News, 2015).

(7) In international law, according to Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, for an offense to be considered as a “most serious crime”, it must meet three criteria: 1) Interpretation should be made in the most restrictive and exceptional manner possible; 2) The death penalty should only be considered in cases where the crime is intentional, and results in lethal or extremely grave consequences; 3) It should not be placed upon economic, non-violent or victimless offenses.

(8) For more on human rights impact assessment, see the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Human rights impact assessments – resolving key methodological questions, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/74, February 5, 2007

(9) According to the report: “UNODC will consider using, where appropriate, the Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) as a predictive tool for assessing the potential human rights impact of a policy or programme, with the aim of informing decision makers and affected persons. By helping to identify the nature and extent of the potential impact, the HRIA facilitates the adjustment of the proposed policy, mitigating the negative and maximizing the positive human rights impacts. HRIA is a combined tool for risk assessment, civil society engagement and decision-making, geared towards ensuring, from the outset, that human rights are at the centre of all policy and programmes. This is a relatively new and developing area and not without its difficulties, but one which could be of significant value for UNODC as a mechanism to mainstream human rights and operationalize human rights commitments and responsibilities. To this end, the HRIA includes a wide range of activities intended to identify and manage human rights risk and to evaluate human rights impact, positive and negative, throughout the life of each project.”

(10) The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights can serve as a model. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HIVAIDSGuidelinesen.pdf

(11) UNAIDS ED, Michel Sidibé, speaking during a meeting with other U.N. high-stake holders recalled that “less than one third of countries provide needle and syringe programmes for people who inject drugs” while, “people who inject drugs are 28 times more likely to become infected with HIV than the general population” and that “only 14% of people who inject drugs living with HIV have access to antiretroviral medicines.” (UNAIDS, 2015)

(12) See TNI, 2005, which quotes on the issue Emafo in a December 2002 interview and Costa in November 2004 in a letter to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Charles.

(13) Prepared by UNODC as part of the preparations for the high-level review on the implementation by Member States of the ‘Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem’.

(14) Harm Reduction International Conference. See: http://www.ihra.net/conference-2015

(15) Confidential informant at the UNODC Thailand Regional Office in Bangkok.

(16) U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, UN Doc. E/ C.12/2000/4, adopted August 2000. para. 50.

(17) Finally – a change in course on drug policy By Richard Branson 19 October 2015, http://www.virgin.com/richard-branson/finally-a-change-in-course-on-drug-policy


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