top of page
Search

1/4 UNODC - How the agency came to be? The rise of UNDCP

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • May 9, 2016
  • 10 min read

Although unaligned with other U.N. agencies, in recent years, UNODC - the U.N drug control agency - has slowly been evolving from a strictly law enforcement and punitive approach, to a slightly more human rights and harm reduction oriented take on. Unequal in their reach and geographical applications, changes can nonetheless be observed within the agency throughout different settings and locations, at the national, regional and global levels.

The official drug control mission of The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is described by its current Executive Director, Russian diplomat Yury Fedotov, who declared in the 2014 World Drug Report (WDR) that “sustainable success in drug control required firm international commitment. A balanced and comprehensive approach addressing both supply and demand should be backed up by evidence-based responses focusing on prevention, treatment, social rehabilitation and integration.” (UNODC, 2014b) In light of these words, in this first and next set of articles, we will be focusing on the past and current work of UNODC, through the analysis of the Lao PDR Country Office programs. Other drug-related U.N. institutions will also be further discussed.

UNODC is described by the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) as “the guardian of the drug control and crime conventions.” (CND 58th Session, Item 8, 2015) In this regard, the role of the agency in bending and creating international norms in relations to the International Drug Control Regime can not be under-estimated. Although the organization activities mainly reflect the power relations of the member states which fund it, the active role of its personnel should not be overlooked. This is why analyzing the premises - which have allowed the creation of the agency in the first place - is fundamental, as-well as to closely observe its financial situation, and the way it has evolved throughout the years. Indeed, the organization is arguably slowly evolving, which is not today, without creating tensions within.

This is particularly important to observe as none-standing this observable policy evolution, in 2015, several U.N. Special Rapporteurs (1) have published separate statements “expressing concern about how the UNODC is cooperating with repressive regimes.” (Vice News, 2015b) One of the points of friction is linked to the fact that in some instances, the U.N agency drug control cooperation could be enabling capital punishment for drug related offenders. Reprieve, a human rights activist group has notably linked UNODC programs to more than 3,000 death sentences in Iran and Pakistan (Reprieve, 2014).

On the general level, it is imperative to understand that if a whole field is dominated by punitive measures, then, even indirectly, “a message gets sent to governments.” (Vice News, 2015b) This message can be summarized as such: the most effective way to deal with drug-related issues is to be as 'harsh' and 'tough' as possible. This message becoming contagious, countries can easily copy one another. Punitive approaches can then serve as a pretext for violating human rights of citizens which oppose their government policies. In this regard, the conduct of the U.N. agency in the Lao PDR as well as its relation with the national Southeast Asian government is particularly enlightening.

So what is UNODC ?

As declared by its official website, the agency “was established to assist the UN in addressing a response to the interrelated issues of illicit trafficking in and use of drugs, crime prevention and criminal justice, international terrorism, and political corruption.” (2) To many, linking such heterogeneous tasks can nevertheless seem rather natural. This is a premise that can tell much about the way we deal, and have dealt for a long time with certain drugs . In this regard, we will be examining the organization’s principal dual mandate — to handle drug use and fight international crime — which many critics have said about to have led it for decades to conflate the two. This fundamental point will be central to our analysis. The issue of funding and the influence of donors will be also studied, which we will intend to link with the way the agency has changed throughout the years.

What it was before: The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)

The analysis of UNDCP history, funding, staff and policy guidelines, can help us understand the foundations of UNODC and what it has become today.

  • History

Set in in Vienna, the creation of UNDCP in 1991 by a U.N. General Assembly (1990) Resolution, intended to solve the conundrum of having three existing U.N. entities, located in three different cities and “with differing but overlapping responsibilities for policy and implementation in the drugs field.” (Fazey 2003) These bodies were:

  • The Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), established by the 1961 Convention and which merged together two pre-existing structures;

  • The Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND), created by the League of Nations in order to administer the drug control system. It previously acted as secretariat for the the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and was responsible for the preparatory conferences on international drug control;

  • The United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), set up in 1971 “at the instigation of the USA to ensure action in the field and ran programmes and projects to suppress the growing and trafficking of illicit drugs.” (Fazey, 2003)

The administrative work force of these three institutions merged to form the UNDCP which would serve the directives and as secretariat of the INCB and CND.

Another institutional change came to place in 1997 as the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP), previously called the U.N. Crime Branch, merged with UNDCP to become the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) - the subsequent entities becoming the United Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in September 2002, while the 'drug' division remained at the core of the newly formed organization.

This new merger was notably enacted in reaction to an internal scandal implicating the Executive Director (ED) of the ODCCP in office at the time from September 1997 to December 2001, the Italian sociologist Giuseppe “Pino” Arlacchi. As noted by researchers Fransisco Thoumi and Jorrit Kamminga (2004), in the late 1990’s UNDCP “experienced a deep managerial crisis that led to the resignation of its executive director in 2001. The crisis was triggered by perceived misuse of funds and abuse of authority at the highest levels.” For the authors, under new leadership, the agency would undergo organizational reforms proposed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) (3), which “aimed at enhancing governance and transparency and establishing clear priorities. (Furthermore) “these changes aim(ed) to regain credibility and attract funding.” (Thoumi & Kamminga 2004)

The reform led to the 2002 merger and the ODCCP - the drugs and crime department of the U.N. - became the UNODC. As the sheer divide between 'drug' and 'crime' related activities grew and crystallized “the following decade was characterized by further politicization of the Vienna UN institutions and retreat into ideological positions increasingly more isolated from the rest of the UN system.” (Jelsma, 2015) Since then and under intense self-inflicted pressure, the Vienna drug control triumvirate composed of the UNODC, INCB, and CND intended to uphold the fragile multilateral policy status quo. These reforms were considered as an improvement at the time, but may have omitted to address bureaucratic issues and misconduct that were likely to repeat in the future.

  • Funding and staff

From 1991 and 2002, UNDCP capacities vastly fluctuated, which notably impacted the position of UNDCP ED by restraining its attributes. For example, while the ED still had the possibility to indicate policy orientation preferences, “funds will only come from the donors based on policy laid down by the CND and what they wish to fund.” (Fazey 2003) The executive office was not the only one to be affected by the recent changes, and ultimately, funding greatly influenced the operating regime of the agency.

UNDCP finances, much like today UNODC’s, come under three captions:

  • General purpose funds allocated to the discretion of the ED, either for personnel or programs purposes;

  • Soft earmarking funds directed to a general sector the donor wishes to contribute to;

  • Hard earmarking funds granted to specific projects on which the donor has usually a say in the drafting and execution. The share in funding of this last category has over the years regularly increased to the detriment of the two others. It can be argued that it has significantly restrained the options of the ED and the, already limited, independence of the organization.

Added to the pressure on the Vienna Headquarters from U.N member states to partake in more programs while allocating less funding and staff, tensions arose when non-major donors states asked UNDCP to help them pay for field projects. Additionally increasing pressure from the New York based General Managers “to cut staff posts paid for directly by major donors because this is inappropriate for UN staff, who are supposed to be beholden to no individual or group of Member States. At the same time, major donors press the UNDCP continuously to cut staff paid for from the fund, so as to save on costs.” (Fazey 2003)

This underlines the importance, power and role of the major country funders. Another example can be found for example in the case when the CND approves a resolution necessitating funding, it first has to be approved by the New-York Secretariat Office, or donors must be solicited. Therefore, as the former Chief of Demand Reduction for UNDCP, Cindy Fazey (2003) asserts it: “de facto, international drug policy and implementation are controlled by the donors, as nothing new can be paid for, or staff employed to do the work, without their consent.”

Additionally to funding issues, internal political power plays by and on the agency personnel added to the already somehow tense situation. For example, in order to avoid having to serve in national 'punishment postings' (such as Lao PDR, but also Nigeria, Vietnam, Latvia, or Myanmar), staff members with family obligations and financial engagements, would be unlikely to challenge the frameworks she or he works in. Job insecurities remain high today and do not encourage inside debate, nor critical judgement as understandably “people are often more concerned with politicking to keep their jobs than actually doing them.” (Fazey 2003)

  • Policy guidelines

If the CND remains today the body in charge of defining policy guidelines for UNODC’s, the influence of major country donors within the Commission limits significantly the range and scope of the debates engaged during CND sessions, further impacting UNODC, and then UNDCP policies. Although, it could be argued that it is quite legitimate for national countries to give directives and influence the policy guidelines of a U.N. agency - by definition the U.N. agencies represent the interest of sovereign member states -, another is the disproportionate influence money can give to the most powerful members.

In this regard, most of the major donors of the drug control agency were and are still almost exclusively from the Global North, including Western Europe (4), but also from the U.S., Japan, Australia and Canada. Twice a year, behind close doors in Vienna, representatives from the major country donors met with UNDCP senior staff and revised undergoing projects. At this point, most of the money went to programs intended to suppress illicit traffic and reduce supply reduction. This is still majorly undertaken under UNODC.

One of the most staggering examples of donor influence on policy guidelines is perhaps to be found within the first drafts of the future 1998 Political Declaration (UN General Assembly, 1998) produced by UNDCP and which intended to match the U.S. prohibition timetable set up by the Clinton administration. As predictable, signatories of the Political Declaration remained stuck with agreed and unrealistic engagements, while U.S. President Clinton comfortably left office in 2000. This example gives us a small preview on how the U.S., but also other major donors, without exerting pressure, could still very much control UNDPC polices.

The eagerness to follow and please the U.S. and other major donors, lead to somehow chimeric goals and commitments, such as the infamous “A Drug Free World - We can Do It” (UN General Assembly, 1998), slogan adopted by the UNGASS 1998. This mantra, notably reflected the U.S. based 'zero tolerance approach' to illicit drugs, as well as the compliance of UNDCP senior management and their lack of understanding of the current world situation. Indeed, as noted by Cindy Fazey (2003) “the belief of many people in the USA government that there should and could be a drug-free society had been elevated to a global aspiration by the UNDCP.”

As perceived, from the very beginning UNODC, or rather its ancestor UNDCP, was firmly anchored by the will of specific member states, namely, powers from the Global North. This resulted in somehow biased and ideological programs, funding restrictions and lack of staff independence. This has greatly influenced the way UNODC is currently organized, managed and funded, which we will review in the next article.

(1) See for example: OHCHR, 2015.

(2) See UNODC website, UN Drug Control Info http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/un-drug-control/unodc

(3) According to its mandate the “OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.” (UN OIOS, 2014)

(4) Including, in order of funding, Italy, the U.K., Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and the European Commission.


Comments

 

UPEACE

  • Facebook - Black Circle
  • Twitter - Black Circle
  • LinkedIn - Black Circle
  • SoundCloud - Black Circle
bottom of page