2/7 Scheduling - The international system
- Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
- Apr 28, 2016
- 5 min read

Drugs, whatever the kind, if abused, can potentially create severe harms to individuals and societies. For this proclaimed reason, the international community created a revised scheduling system under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This international system has greatly influenced domestic means of classification, each different and therefore never perfectly aligned with the international framework. Understanding this arguably outdated system, remains crucial as “the global classification has still tremendous influence on the possibility for drug reforms.” (Nutt & al., 2010)
The observation of the history of the U.N. drug conventions is quite enlightening in regard to the topic. Indeed, the 1961 Single Convention notably focused on "narcotic substances” and the substances targeted were “plant-based drugs at that point in time largely cultivated in ‘Southern’ countries with a long history of traditional uses of the organic raw materials.” (Jelsma, 2003) The placement of these plants under the strictest schedules (notably the infamous Schedule 1) (1), but not of the precursors that allow them to be transformed into manufactured psychotropic substances, “was done not on the basis of scientific studies, but under the assumption that narcotic drugs should be considered hazardous unless and until proven not to be.” (Sinha, 2001, p. 26) On the other side, during the preparation and debates around the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances - which aimed at controlling chemical precursors - the focus was mainly on substances synthetically manufactured by the pharmaceutical industry of the Global North. This time, “the burden of proof was completely reversed” (Jelsma, 2003) and, “unless there was substantial proof that a substance was harmful, (the guidline was that) it should remain uncontrolled.” (Sinha, 2001, p. 27)
At that point, four different schedules operated in both the 1961 Single Convention and the 1971 Psychotropics Convention (2). Later on, the 1988 Trafficking Convention started applying scheduling to other chemical precursors (3). The result became a division of labour between the conventions, which allowed the WHO to recommend the classification for narcotic precursors, while the INCB was put in charge of psychotropic precursors.

Source: (TNI, 2014a)
What is probably important to realize here is that the historical development of the IDCR conventions, notably the 1961 Single Convention, “remains embedded in its title and the conception of the class of drugs it is meant to regulate” (TNI, 2014a), namely so-called “narcotic” drugs. The term refers to a medicinal vocabulary which describe a substance that tends to induce sleep and drowsiness; yet the hallucinogen cannabis and the stimulant cocaine are scheduled under this convention. Similarly, the term “psychotropic” used by the 1971 Convention, is even more - if possible - elusive in its claims to scientific meaning. The term refers sometimes to substances that affect the central nervous system. However, it could be argued that this could also fall under the criteria of the 1961 Convention. Another misleading element is to be found in the substances scheduled under the 1971 Convention, including the narcotic buprenorphine, the stimulant amphetamine and the entheogen LSD. Essentially, “psychotropic” becomes an administrative term, scientifically meaningless, and which posses “conflicted and uncertain reference outside the Conventions.” (Horwood, 2010)
We could argue here that the somehow unclear definitions adopted then was done so intentionally, giving in fine, ultimate power “over which substances require(d) what form of international regulation” (Umana, 2012) to the WHO, but especially to the CND, both agencies currently in charged of “narcotic” scheduling (4). Several analysts have also argued that the INCB has frequently, "overstepped its mandate by recommending controls for essential medicines and other substances” (TNI, 2014a), upon which it has no legal authority (5). This situation creates de facto, a parallel regime within which the CND and the INCB are calling upon governments to schedule substances at the national level, that are currently not being classified at the international level.
The principle of drug scheduling is not something that appeared naturally all over the world. It was progressively imposed on the international scene, and subsequently, each country started to develop its own scheduling process, more or less modeled on the international system. National legislation are theoretically dependent of international scheduling as they need to align themselves with such configuration if signatories of the conventions. On the other side, they can also prohibit substances that are not currently placed under international control. This configuration is the central topic of the next article, regarding ketamine and China.
(1) Schedule I: “Such a scheduling means that the substance can be used for medical purposes only under direct governmental supervision, and in very limited situations.” (IDPC, 2015)
(2) It should be noted that the 1971 Convention is “generally the more lenient in its controls. This came about as a result of the political manoeuvring underlying the treaty's design, which saw the developed countries lobbying on behalf of their domestic pharmaceutical industries; it also reflected their cultural preference for scientifically produced synthetic drugs, as opposed to the more raw and untreated plant-based materials still in use in the developing world.” (TNI, 2014a; See also: Bruun & al., 1975; McAllister, 2000)
(3) The 1988 Convention applies two different “tables classifying direct precursors of psychotropic substances and their salts (Table 1, which includes ephedrine, lysergic acid and others), and reagents, solvents and their salts that can be utilised in the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (Table 2, comprising acetone, ethyl ether etc.).” (TNI, 2014a)
(4) As clearly described by the TNI (2014a), “conflicts between expert groups assembled to provide guidance on the classification of substances on the one hand and those making the political decisions on the other have arisen at national levels as well as in the UN system.”
(5) In 2012, the WHO Expert Committee’s report noted that it “may be argued that de facto over the years, a situation of international control has emerged without any scientific assessment of the situation, due to both CND resolutions and the INCB continuous pressure on Member States”. It also clearly stated “that according to the international drug control conventions the CND has no mandate to conclude to international control without a WHO recommendation and the INCB has no mandate at all” (WHO 2012a, p. 36).
(Bruun & al., 1975) K. Bruun, L. Pan & I. Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1975.
(Horwood, 2010) G. Horwood, “TNI expert seminar on the classification of controlled substances”, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 2010, http://www.tni.org/files/100304Final%20Expert%20Seminar%20Report.pdf, Accessed: 25/01/16.
(IDPC, 2015) W. Scholten, "Ketamine secured for medical and veterinary use!", International Drug Policy Consortium, March 18, 2015, http://idpc.net/blog/2015/03/ketamine-secured-for-medical-and-veterinary-use, Accessed: 25/09/215.
(Jelsma, 2003) M. Jelsma, "The Unwritten History of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs", Transnational Institute, International Journal of Drug Policy 14, 181/195, January 2003, http://www.tni.org/article/unwritten-history-1998-united-nations-general-assembly-special-session-drugs, Accessed: 02/12/15.
(McAllister, 2000) W. B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An international history, London and New York, Routledge, 2000.
(Nutt & al., 2010) D. J. Nutt, L. A. King, L. D. Phillips, on behalf of the Independent Scientific Committee on Drugs, "Drug harms in the UK: a multicriteria decision analysis", Lancet, 2010; 376: 1558–65, Published Online November 1, 2010, DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)61462-6, http://www.fcaglp.unlp.edu.ar/~mmiller/espanol/Variedades,%20politica/drogas_Journal.pdf, Accessed: 10/09/15.
(Sinha, 2001) J. Sinha, "The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions” Prepared for the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs, Law and Government Division, Canada, 2001.
(TNI, 2014a) C. Hallam, D. Bewley-Taylor & M. Jelsma, “Scheduling in the international drug control system”, The Transnational Institute, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies No. 25, , June 2014, https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr25_0.pdf, Accessed: 30/01/16.
(Umana, 2012) F. Humana,"Our Unscientific Drug Control Regime", Foreign Policy In Focus, September 19, 2012, http://fpif.org/our_unscientific_drug_control_regime/, accessed: 29/10/15.
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