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9/9 Post UNGASS 2016 - Conclusions

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Apr 17, 2016
  • 9 min read

While the OAS scenarios give us a deeper and longer outlook on what could come out of the UNGAS 2016, the pathways proposed by Cindy Fazey offer us current solutions that could be taken for reforms and which could theoretically be undertaken by countries during the Special Session. Finally, the possibilities to reform without changing the entire conventions do exist and should be considered by State Parties. The complexity of the conventions reform should present an important part of upcoming discussion, but arguably subservient to the broader political discourse (which is one of the reasons why it will be absent in the debates of the upcoming Special Session). In this regard, “until sufficient political will exists, substantive reform of the UN drug conventions will not be possible, despite growing recognition that the current drug control regime is not working.” (TNI & IDPC, 2012) For this to happen, the political calculus “will need to shift so that the cost-benefit analysis for individual States moves decisively in favour of proactive engagement.” (Ibid.)

Consequently, we could argue that the so-called “Vienna consensus” underlines the desired universal adherence of the U.N drug Conventions, but is far from actually being as such. Many State Parties have already made reservations and subsequent declarations of interpretations that differ from the mainstream acknowledgement. As such, it would seem rather important for the CND to release the complete list of the countries having made such moves toward exception from the conventions, “as well as a list of all States that silently ignore parts of one of the conventions, to nuance the ‘Vienna consensus’ that presupposes a wide agreement regarding international drug control.” (TNI & IDPC, 2012)

Legitimately, and in regards to this information, we could ask why the upcoming Special Session should matter to us. First, we could answer, because of the constraints caused by the three international drug control conventions that ties the hands of local, national and regional governments to partake and experiment in alternative context based policies. But aside from this obvious point, it is fundamental to understand that this situation affects all of us, in different manners—some more harshly than others. Farmers, women, indigenous communities, so-called addicts in the Global South, and people living in the most impoverished and vulnerable areas in the Global North, remain the voices that have been silenced for decades in regard to this topic but nonetheless the most affected by it, and therefore the most needed to be heard. The fact that the prospect of such Sessions do not look so bright (or at least not to the expected and needed level of reaction) can only prove to be further disruptive for these populations.

If many solutions could be found within the limits of the current legal framework that are not widely adopted by member states during the Session, the integrity of the current regime could ultimately be at stake. With no real enforcer, the regime now only relies on the compliance of its signatory members which is already proven to be crumbling. The need for like-minded groups, could further lead to denunciation and abandonment of pre-existing agreements.

But what seems even more problematic remains the limitations that have been laid upon the upcoming Special Session despite calls from numerous actors to do the very opposite and consider all available options. In this regard, the way UNGASS 2016 will go on is similar to the way UNODC and the rest of the drug control institutions have behaved and formalized norms in the past decades. Despite noticeable evolutions, the IDCR remains highly reproductive of its inherent flaws and shortcomings. The risk here is then for the U.N. to become increasingly irrelevant.

Arguably, “For decades, the UN has acted as the enforcement mechanism for the war on drugs” (Dunt, 2016) and to this extent, UNODC and the rest of the IDCR institutions remain deeply entrenched within the prohibition paradigm. Although there has been significant improvement over the years in the conduct of their actions, the latter remain enclosed within a framework that cannot allow them to envision any other way of actually proceeding. As such, one could wonder, if despite the work and dedication from many individuals within the U.N. system, structural constraints might mean that these very initiatives and programs could act as a fundamental agent for positive change, transformation, and emancipation. We argue here that it is ultimately not the case.

The current drug control regime perpetuates social misery, injustice, countless human rights violations, and the destruction of communities. The cost of preserving the status quo remains unacceptable, particularly in Southeast Asia, and agents of the current system perpetuate this status quo despite the potential for reform within. The structural barriers to achieve and protect the health and well-being of mankind are just too solid to make this goal a reality on the ground. Because the Global North is increasingly losing any legitimacy or authority over other countries who no longer need their financial support nor their subsequent colonial influence, these countries, notably in Southeast Asia, look with disdain on the recommendations of institutions which appear as being relict of weak colonial powers.

UNGASS 2016 on drug policy comes at the end of Ban Ki Moon’s mandate as U.N. Secretary General, which pushed certain observers such as Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch (2015) to ask if he will ”similarly to his predecessor, be motivated to provide the vision and leadership necessary for real change?” However, one could argue that former Secretary Generals, such as Kofi Annan, have on the contrary been at the forefront of the ideology that drove today the way the world handles drugs. When in office, the latter, never publicly denounced the current trend; rather he actually defended it vigorously. The fact that Kofi Annan is now on the ideological opposite trend is to be applauded, but this in no way absolves him from the past. Therefore, one could argue that what M. Ki-Moon will say or do from now is of little matter. The ball is probably as much out of his hands as it was never truly was in his to begin with. Where Malinowska-Sempruch (2015) is arguably right however, is that Kofi Annan, “had the wisdom to recognize that UN agencies and their complex governance bodies, entrenched relationships and bureaucratic machineries would not be able to deliver what was required.” (Ibid.) Indeed, If one is to recognize that the U.N is much too invested within the prohibitionist paradigm it created and enforced, then the solution should lie elsewhere.

As noted by the IDPC Executive Director Ann Fordham, in this “environment of diplomatic politeness” (The Huffington Post, 2015) which could describe the U.N. fora, no country gets called out directly for breaching human rights obligations in regards to drug policy control, nor would it be called out if it breaches the letter and spirit of the convention as a growing number of countries currently do. Although the upcoming Special Session could be seen as a “moment of global disagreement” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015), it could arguably also provide for an important opportunity to evaluate the efficiency of the current path, as well as a way to shed a light on the shortcomings and side effects of the current IDCR. However, very little can allow us to believe that it would actually be the case.

Regardless of what will come out of the upcoming Special Session, as we will see in later articles on transformative actions, “change must also be driven from below through more active participation of human rights organisations, especially in the countries that have borne the greatest costs of the implementation of drug policies.” (Garzón & Pol, 2015) Although the need seems quite obvious for some, inclusive participation is far from being integrated in the DNA of international policy-making, whether it concerns drug control policy or other areas. In this regard, it remains crucial to give a voice to whoever might be impacted by policies being drafted at the highest political level possible; in our present case, the countless victims of the contemporary IDCR including, consumers and so-called addicts, youth, indigenous communities as well as farmers in the Global South and ethnic minorities in the Global North.

One thing remains certain: “the language of the drug policy debate is illogical and inconsistent” (Kleiman & al., 2011) and the simple observation of the current debate preparation for UNGASS 2016 has shown that member states have allowed themselves to be enclosed within a framework that only lets them choose a pre-agreed, restrictive, and destructive path. The purpose of problem-solving remains arguably conservative as it aims to resolve issues arising “in various parts of a complex whole in order to smooth the functioning of the whole.” (Cox, 1981, p. 208) As such, the perspective of critical theory could allow us to argue that we are living through an era of potentially global structural transformation of which the end of the Cold War is only a minor episode. In this regard, many observers argue that the U.N. will continue to exist long after the structural conditions that allow it to exist and be sustained have perished while the organization continues losing global legitimacy and effectiveness. However, this critical point of view can enable the conception of a potentially consequent role for the international system as the very agent for systemic change; but, this “requires that it dislodge itself from the residual power base which initially supported and sustained it.” (Schechter, 1999)

Similarly, critical theory, which we will develop in the next set of articles, could envision the U.N. system as “an element in a wider social movement for the realization of world order values. In this regard, the United Nations is looked upon less as the outcome of governmental policy at the state level, than as one expression of social movements committed to promoting drastic global reforms.” (Falk, 1993) Such perspective would allow for the value of the U.N. as a “nexus between systemic and anti-systemic (or hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) politics.” (Ibid., p. 14) In this regard, the critical stance and viewpoints, as well as its inclusion of new social movements “not only increases the complexity of one’s vision of the global system, but it provides policy relevant insights as to potential sources of conflict and structural transformation, and new tasks, possibly legitimizing tasks, for the UN.” (Schechter, 1999)

Ultimately, it could be argued that what member states will propose during UNGASS will amount to the best, at “patching” attempts to create the “minimal stability that would allow the current world order, driven by market forces and geopolitical power constellations to step in.” (Fisher & Zimina, 2009) While the technical solutions proposed by agents of the U.N. may have certain merits in term of problem-solving approaches, “they nevertheless leave capitalism unproblematized. Such an approach -ignoring the limitations of reform within the status quo- is ultimately doomed to failure.” (Pugh & al., 2011) For these reasons we will intend now in the next set of articles to critically examine the issues at hands, while proposing transformative actions that could truly and meaningfully help us overcome this mad-man phenomenon.


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