6/9 Post-UNGASS 2016 - A potential inter se agreement
- Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
- Apr 15, 2016
- 4 min read
Questioned by The Guardian (2013), Damon Barrett, Deputy Director of the charity organization Harm Reduction International, stated that in regard to U.N. high level meetings "the differences have been there for a long time, but you rarely get to see them. It all gets whittled down to the lowest common denominator, when all you see is agreement”, while in reality "the idea that there is a global consensus on drugs policy is fake.” Specifically designed to fit the current circumstances, an inter se agreement between like-minded countries interested in beginning an exchange on how to make the international drug control framework “fit for purpose again” (Jelsma, 2015), could represent an attractive option for pro-reformers. Such agreement could, over time, “evolve into an alternative treaty framework to which more and more countries could adhere" (Ibid.) and could represent in the meantime a more spacious way to maneuver within the treaty regime “while avoiding the cumbersome process of unanimous approval.” (Ibid.) For example, the decision to remove specific substances controlled under the 1961 Convention, such as the coca leaf or cannabis, from national schedule listings as well as the global current scheduling system, could be done by a CND single majority vote and therefore should not require consensus.
Similarly, rescheduling substances controlled under the 1971 Convention requires a two-third majority vote which could prove much harder to achieve than for the 1961 Convention’s controlled products, but still easier than attempting to reach wide consensus.
The Organization of American States (OAS, 2012) for example, has requested “the initiation of a procedure to revise and amend the treaty system in order to allow more flexibility for national experimentation with regulatory models of control” and has called other countries to acknowledge “the differences of opinion about the way forward” which should “not be negotiated down to a new consensus.” (Ibid.) Similarly, for most U.N. treaties including the drug control conventions, the General Assembly can adopt amendments by a simple majority vote. As such, like-minded countries could ratify specific amendments, and/or retract from certain treaty provisions (1).
However, it seems that like-minded countries, are as of now, individually undergoing the widespread adoption of more pragmatic policies “increasingly moving away from both the spirit and letter of certain crucial prohibitive aspects of the conventions as they stand.” (Transform, 2009) If these trends follow on, as one could imagine they would, a crisis point may be reached “where the tensions between treaty commitments and actual policy implementation will mean, a more substantial recasting of the conventions would be required for the overall system of drug controls to be preserved.” (Ibid.)
Although lack of consensus is probably going to be one of the fundamental components of the upcoming Special Session, the pertinent question should rather be if this reality is to be recognized by actors implicated in the debate. If advocacy is arguably moving away from a polarized debate in between 'legalization' and strict prohibition, the question as to whether actors will start having debates about “shared principles and aims, exploring options and potential outcomes, critiquing the failings of the drugs war and explaining in clear practical terms how phased moves towards regulation could bring benefits to individual countries and to the wider global community" (Transform, 2009) is an entirely separate question.
Similarly, if “Injecting realism” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015a) into the discussion seems to be a necessary requirement to advance in the debate and implement more efficient policies, the overall aim of the Session should be to evaluate the costs and benefits of the current IDCR, as well as intend to strengthen and not erode the legitimacy of international agreements. Indeed, U.N. Special Sessions “are precious—and costly—political opportunities for the international community to discuss key global challenges and to agree on more effective policy responses to protect the welfare of humankind" (Jelsma, 2015) and such an opportunity should not go to waste.
Finally, the elasticity of the current regime is decided by the U.N. Member States choices and given flexibility on the drug control treaties. As pointed out by researchers from the Brookings Institute, “breaking away from a standardized global drug policy also comes with costs, in terms of spillover effects and weakened treaties, which need to be weighed.” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015a)
(1) Notably by “using the Bolivian route of withdrawal from a treaty followed by re-accession with a reservation, when the validity of certain provisions are questioned on the basis of a legal conflict with other obligations.” (Jelsma, 2015)
(Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015a) V. Felbab-Brown & H. Trinkunas, 2016: The UN's Year to Take On Drugs, April 27, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/2016-the-uns-year-take-drugs-12739, Accessed: 11/12/15.
(Jelsma, 2015) M. Jelsma, "UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy, Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016", Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Jelsma--United-Nations-final.pdf?la=en, Accessed: 22/08/15.
(OAS, 2012) Organization of American States, Scenario For The Drug Problem In The Americas 2013-2025 by the Scenario Team appointed by the Organization of American States under the mandate given to the OAS by the Heads of Government of Member States, Meeting at the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena De Indias, www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Scenarios_Report.PDF, Accessed: 29/10/15.
(The Guardian, 2013) J. Doward, "Leaked paper reveals UN split over war on drugs", The Guardian, Novermber 30, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/30/un-drugs-policy-split-leaked-paper, Accessed: 02/12/15.
(Transform, 2009) S. Rolles, Transform Drug Policy Foundation “Talk About”, After the War on Drugs - Blueprint for Regulation, UK, 2009, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation, Accessed: 11/12/15.
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