5/9 Post-UNGASS 2016 - Meaningful participation?

• Civil Society

The CSTF (2015), has highlighted in its Recommendations for the “Zero Draft” of the Outcome Document for UNGASS 2016, with several expectations for concrete outcomes from the upcoming Special Session around a number of key-topics, including: “harm reduction; the use of greater data in decision-making; re-evaluating indicators of policy success, the increased use of a health-based approach; improved access to controlled medicines; and greater civil society involvement.” In this regard, the IDPC (2015h), has specified in its recommendations for the “zero draft” of the UNGASS Outcome Document, four distinct demands:

1. Member states should “agree upon a concerted UN-wide effort and action plan to close the gap in the availability of, and access to, controlled substances for medical use”;

2. The U.N. should “set up a technical working group to review the headline objectives of the international drug control system, with a view to agreeing a new and comprehensive approach in 2019”;

3. Alongside the need for “an expert advisory group to review contemporary tensions within the UN drug control architecture”;

4. the international community should establish “a robust mechanism through which best practices and experiences can be shared between governments and professionals.”

These recommendations echoed the CSTF’s and further added that the UNGASS Outcome Document “concisely states the current state of progress in achieving drug control objectives, and the challenges that need to be addressed in the future.” (IDPC, 2015h) If it is true that since the previous UNGASSs on the topic, “global civil society, affected populations, and the academic community have become more active and better organized on drug policy issues” (Jelsma, 2015), there also has been some improvements in regard to the mechanisms allowing more inclusive participation from relevant actors, as the creation of the CSTF has shown. But these improvements “still do not live up to the established practices of most other branches in the UN family.” (Ibid.) As such, support of the CSTF from member states could still greatly be improved, especially in regards to funding. Recommendations highlighted above might not be of consequences if they are not officially reviewed by member states and if nations remain the sole and unique decisive voice in the process.

• Special advisory group

As noted by Martin Jelsma (2015), “special advisory groups played a useful role in both UNGASS 1990 and 1998, in spite of the political restrictions imposed upon their mandates and composition.” This specific mechanism could be used by the U.N. Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly (1) to further discuss crucial topics that will probably not be resolved during the upcoming Special Session such as “UN system-wide coherence on drug policy; harmonization of drug control with human rights and development principles; inconsistencies of the treaty regime regarding scheduling criteria and procedures; securing the availability of controlled drugs for medical purposes; and the increasing legal tensions with evolving policy practices, especially with regard to cannabis regulation.” (Ibid.) The group’s main task would in summary be to provide recommendations “to better deal with these contentious and difficult issues following UNGASS 2016, in preparation for the next UN high-level review in 2019.” (Ibid.) Contrary to past UNGASSs and a result of the evolution of U.N. standards for such initiative, the composition of the group could enable broader and more meaningful participation from other U.N. agencies, academics, civil society organizations, and concerned populations (such as farmers and drug consumers).

• U.N agencies and system wide coherence

Lessons learned from past Special Sessions on the matter have shown us the necessity of having meaningful and relevant involvement with other U.N. agencies (and not just from the Vienna based agencies). The near monopoly of the Vienna triumvirate over drug control issues within the U.N. after UNGASS 1998 has indeed “proven to be an obstacle to a more system-wide coherent approach.” (Jelsma, 2015) In regard to more marginalized concerned agencies, such as UNAIDS and the WHO (2), member states have in the past restrained the scope of the health perspective into the formulation of drug control policies, despite the fact that the WHO is mentioned several times in the UN drug control conventions. As such, a “more holistic and balanced approach at UNGASS 2016” (Ibid.) could only be achieved through the meaningful involvement of all concerned agents. In this regard, the U.N. System Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking (3) which is jointly coordinated by UNODC and the U.N. Department of Political Affairs, could play a decisive role in this process, “given its special mandate to facilitate contributions of all relevant UN departments in the UNGASS process.” (Ibid.)

Additionally, because “There is an urgent need for the UN drug agencies to operate within the UN principles and norms from which they have been historically isolated” (Transform, 2009), notably by realizing a progressive shift towards a more important role for relevant U.N. agencies such as the WHO and UNAIDS, the upcoming Special Session could be used for better system-wide coherence which has been lacking for the past fifty years on the topic.

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(1) Currently the position is held by Mr. Mogens Lykketoft from Denmark.

(2) Despite its comparable mandate to the INCB under the drug control conventions.

(3) The Task Force was established in 2011 and is comprised of 14 U.N. entities: UNODC (Co-Chair); UNDPA (Co-Chair); DPKO; DPI; UNEP; UNAIDS; ODA; OHCHR; PBSO; UNICEF; UNDP; UN Women; World Bank; and WHO.

• (CSTF, 2015) Civil Society Task Force Recommendations for the “Zero Draft” of the Outcome Document for UNGASS 2016, Vienna NGO Committee On Drugs, NYNGOC - New-York NGO Committee On Drugs., 2015.

• (IDPC, 2015h) International Drug Policy Consortium, IDPC recommendations for the “zero draft” of the UNGASS Outcome Document, Advocacy note July 2015, https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-advocacy-note_Recommendations-on-UNGASS-zero-draft_ENGLISH.pdf, Accessed: 11/12/15.

• (Jelsma, 2015) M. Jelsma, "UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy, Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016", Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Jelsma--United-Nations-final.pdf?la=en, Accessed: 22/08/15.

• (Transform, 2009) S. Rolles,Transform Drug Policy Foundation “Talk About”, After the War on Drugs - Blueprint for Regulation, UK, 2009, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation, Accessed: 11/12/15.