4/9 Post-UNGASS 2016 - Potential outcomes?

Jacob Bercovitch (2007) in his book “Mediation Success or Failure: a Search for the Elusive Criteria” asserts that mediation by official state leaders and international organizations has only a 4% rate of success. Because officials are individuals, moved by personal decisions, and often have other considerations to take into account than the sole problem at hand, solutions can easily (and often do) escape them. For these reasons, possible outcomes are often different than potential prospects that should be expected after more than fifty years of global failed policies. As such, several topics are potentially more likely to come through at the end of the Special Session, such as the lack of consensus between major actors (but not necessarily the recognition of it); the redefinition of a “balanced approach”; the opportunity for reflection; but also the support for the status quo. In this regard, such developments will be heavily linked with the meaningful participation, or not, of other non-member states actors.

The lack of consensus

As noted by Martin Jelsma (2015), “present divides in global drug policy preclude any significant progress on a new UNGASS political declaration through consensus-driven negotiations.” As such, if consensus is the way debates are conducted within the CND, there is arguably very little chance that this process could achieve anything truly meaningful during the Special Session. Three important causes resulting in a lack of consensus have been identified by Vanda Felbab-Brown and Harold Trinkunas (2015). In the first place, the drug market is a “truly transnational phenomenon that is dynamic and adapts to government responses.” As such, both the trade in itself, as-well as the counter-narcotics governmental policies put in place “generate intense cross-border spillover effects.” The second cause is linked to the “uneven distribution of costs and harms associated with drug production, trade, and drug policies” which makes particularly difficult the formulation of a single approach that would fit all countries. Finally, as we have just seen, “major players in the treaty regime disagree significantly over the relative balance of law enforcement, punishment, and harm reduction in their approaches to drug policy.”

For the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (2012), “it is the primary producer and transit regions carrying the greatest cost burden of the war on drugs that are leading the calls for reform in the international arena.” But again, this is not really a consensus and we will beg to differ, as many “producer” (1) countries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, Laos or even Morocco, have not shown - for different reasons - the slightest interest in challenging the status quo in international fora. Nevertheless, it is true that some nations in the Americas, which are among the world largest “producing” countries of plant-based illicit substances, are at the forefront of efforts calling for real shared “responsibility for the problems related to demand for drugs.” (Ibid.) This again is only an example, among many others, which shows that even low denominator consensus will be extremely hard to achieve during the upcoming Special Session.

These factors highlighting the lack of consensus, both “increase the likelihood that UNGASS 2016 will end in stalemate" (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015) as-well as potentially “waste an important opportunity to move toward more effective and human-rights-focused policies.” (Ibid.) In this regard, it is important to note that if this were to occur in reality, it could curtail efforts to rectify current policies on a long term as well as intensify the existing fragmentation of the global drug control system.

Three possible outcomes

• A truly more balanced approach

Although the concept of a 'balanced approach' was probably one of the very few positive outcomes of UNGASS 1998, it has arguably been emptied of any meaning by the stakeholders as demand reduction efforts are nowhere equivalent to the sums and energy invested in supply reduction measures. The recognition of such facts and a true engagement from parties to invest on a much more equivalent basis towards demand reduction could be an actual outcome that this UNGASS could deliver.

Several countries, especially among the Latin American region, have for several years now sought a more 'balanced approach' to the current drug control policy regime. These countries have noted that the Global North has for a long time fueled “the global illicit drug trade through its seemingly insatiable drug habit.” As previously seen, some countries in the Global South, including Latin American nations such as Brazil and Argentina, are now themselves becoming widely perceived as consumers countries.

Nevertheless, this evolution does not absolve the responsibility of the Global North in regard to the present situation. In this regard, Latin American countries demand that the Global North:

- demonstrate the political will to substantially work towards tackling illegal drug demand;

- as-well as reduce the availability of illegal drugs precursors;

- tighten control over small-arm trade which provides organized crime unlimited access to powerful weapons;

- impose effective state regulations over tax havens and illegal financial schemes enabling drug-money laundering;

- and finally to provide alternative livelihood opportunities for the Global South small producers which remain highly dependent on the cultivation of illicit crops.

All of these topics, which “had been largely neglected in the design of the UN drug control regime” (Jelsma, 2015), are currently some of the most urgent that the member states should be discussing during the drafting of the UNGASS 2016 Outcome document.

• An important opportunity for global reflection

As we have seen, several analyses have concluded that a substantial revision of the conventions is most unlikely to be discussed at UNGASS 2016 (2). Putting aside this potentially significant shortcoming, the Special Session still “presents an important opportunity for learning among Member States, the sharing of evidence, a careful examination of policy effectiveness, and identifying policy innovations.” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015)

Several countries, “weary of reliving the motions that led to the disappointing Ministerial Statement in 2014" (Jelsma, 2015), are currently considering turning the upcoming Special Session “into a global moment of reflection rather than launch into an exercise that would result in a similarly hollow consensus document.” (Ibid.) Such a scenario could provide a genuine opportunity for an open debate “in which all options for the future could be discussed and a process agreed upon to prepare for a next high-level meeting to be convened in 2019 or 2020.” (Ibid.) By that time, it is highly probable that the drug policy realities around the world would have further evolved, potentially allowing for an even more favorable context “for a reform-oriented agenda and outcome.” (Ibid.)

If member states are to follow the injection of the U.N Secretary General (UN SG, 2013), UNGASS 2016 should not avoid legitimate questions in regard to the shortcomings of the current IDCR which have been raised by several U.N. organizations, member states and civil society. As such, another important opportunity lies in the need to distance the current debate away from the 2009 Political Declaration whose goals remain to “eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably (…) the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plant”, as well as “drug demand”, “drug-related harm”, “drug trafficking”, “the diversion of precursors”, and “money-laundering” by “2019” (UNODC, 2009b). According to the latest UNODC World Drug Report (3), these goals are not, and cannot be met, and therefore the UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document “must reflect this reality.” (IDPC, 2015h)

Furthermore, despite the current state of affairs, UNGASS 2016 could also endorse the principle of treaty interpretation flexibility, which could represent “important achievements of the global meeting.” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015) This does not necessarily mean treaty reform, but could simply allow the opportunity for what is often granted in many other multilateral agreements. This could be a viable option that seems to be more and more accepted even by the most uncompromising actors of the regime, such as the INCB.

• Supporting the status quo

On the other side of the ideological spectrum, countries defending the status quo have proposed that the CND “produce a short, concise and action-oriented document” which would be adopted by the member states during the Special Session and which would consist “of a set of operational recommendations aimed at strengthening the implementation” of the 2009 Political Declaration and Action Plan (ECOSOC, 2015a, para: 5). As noted by Martin Jelsma (2015), “this would eschew the consideration of ‘new approaches’.” Policy experimentations such as regulation and treaty reform would be off the table meaning that the Special Session “would just rubber stamp existing drug control strategies with perhaps a few marginal adjustments.” (Ibid.) The current, final draft of the Outcome Document seem to reflect that position.

In regards to these specific outcomes endorsed by countries supporting the status quo, the CND agreed in March 2015, to define the intended outcomes of the Special Session, in slightly more broad terms, and calling for member states at the end of UNGASS 2016 to ratify a “short, substantive, concise, and action-oriented document comprising a set of operational recommendations, based upon a review of the implementation of the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action, including an assessment of the achievements as well as ways to address longstanding and emerging challenges in countering the world drug problem,” and obviously still “within the framework of the three international drug control conventions and other relevant United Nations instruments.” (CND, 2015b, para: 5)

Each of these parameters could potentially lead to an outcome where nothing would actually change. These three potential outcomes are therefore all equally possible and will be highly dependent upon the meaningful participation of other non-member state actors to the preparation, the debate, and the aftermath.

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(1) As we have noted in previous articles, a country is now rarely solely “producing” illicit narcotics.

(2) “Controversial issues like cannabis regulation and treaty reform are unlikely to appear prominently on the UNGASS 2016 agenda” (Jelsma, 2015). See also Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015

(3) The Report states that “According to the most recent data available, there has been little change in the over-all global situation regarding the production, use and health consequences of illicit drugs” (UNODC, 2015)

• (Bercovitch, 2007) J. Bercovitch, “Mediation Success or Failure : a Search for the Elusive Criteria”, Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7(2), 289-302. 2007.

• (CND, 2015b) Commission on Narcotic Drugs Report on the fifty-eighth session (5 December 2014 and 9-17 March 2015) Economic and Social Council Official Records, 2015, Supplement No. 8, E/2015/28 , E/CN.7/2015/15, United Nations, New York, 2015, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_58/E2015_28_ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION.pdf, Accessed: 10/12/15.

• (ECOSOC, 2015a) The United Nations Economic and Social Council, Draft Resolution Submitted by the Chair: Special Session of the General Assembly on the World Drug Problem to be Held in 2016, E/ CN.7/2015/L.11, February 9, 2015, www.undocs.org/E/CN.7/2015/L.11, Accessed: 17/12/15.

• (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015) V. Felbab-Brown & H. Trinkunas, "UNGASS 2016 in Comparative Perspective: Improving the Prospects for Success", Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/FelbabBrown-TrinkunasUNGASS-2016-final-2.pdf?la=en, Accessed: 04/12/15.

• (IDPC, 2015h) International Drug Policy Consortium, IDPC recommendations for the “zero draft” of the UNGASS Outcome Document, Advocacy note July 2015, https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/IDPC-advocacy-note_Recommendations-on-UNGASS-zero-draft_ENGLISH.pdf, Accessed: 11/12/15.

• (Jelsma, 2015) M. Jelsma, "UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy, Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016", Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Jelsma--United-Nations-final.pdf?la=en, Accessed: 22/08/15.

• (Transform, 2012) Transform Drug Policy Foundation, The Alternative World Drug Report - Counting the cost of the War on Drugs, UK, 2012, https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016//Contributions/Civil/Count-the-Costs-Initiative/AWDR.pdf, Accessed: 02/10/15

• (UN SG, 2013) United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Statement, Secretary-General’s remarks at special event on the International Day against Drug Abuse and illicit Trafficking, New York, 26 June 2013, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6935, Accessed: 17/12/15.

• (UNODC, 2009b) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on international cooperation towards an integrated and balanced strategy to counter the world drug problem, Vienna, 2009, https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf, Accessed 10/10/15.