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3/5 UNGASS 2016 member states - In between two chairs

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Apr 6, 2016
  • 9 min read

 

The “ambivalence” group is made up of countries and nations regroupment which, in the case of Brazil for example, are principally going in reverse vis-a-vis other countries of their respective region, and in the case of the African Group and African Union, have publicly proclaimed divergent positions. In their cases, hypotheses can at best be wishful guesses and caution should remain the main trend in regard to their past declarations.

  • Brazil

On the side of Latin America, one country curiously seems to have chosen not to partake in the growing experimentation movement towards alternative drug control policy that can be observed throughout the region. Brazil, the most economically developed country on the South American continent, somehow seems quite reluctant, as observed during the UNGASS preparatory meetings, to join other neighboring countries in their fight for meaningful reforms. Brazil’s position on the international scene is even more surprising considering the current practices and legislative evolutions that are taking place domestically in the Portuguese-speaking country.

Back in 2006, Brazil's Supreme Court partially decriminalized drug consumption, notably “by providing alternatives to prison sentences, such as rehabilitation and community service.” (Gagne, 2015) However, the judgement has only been partially enforced (1). Accordingly, in 2015, a ruling of the Supreme Court intended to challenge the constitutionality of Article 28 of the Brazilian Drug Act (Law 11.343) which still allowed the placement in detention of suspected consumers. The Public Defense Office of Sao Paulo claimed during the court hearing “that the punishment for users own consumption goes against constitutional principles, especially the inviolability of intimacy and privacy and criminal principles of causing a relevant damage to society.” (Zanone, 2015) The ruling is still pending at the time of writing. Another development relevant to the discussion around cannabis regulation is the recent reclassification by Anvisa, the Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency, of cannabidiol (CBD), a non-psychoactive active ingredient present in cannabis with a potential wide range of medical benefits (Leaf Science, 2014). Early 2015, the derivative of the cannabinoid plant had “ceased to be prohibited in Brazil and (…) joined the list of medicines approved for therapeutic use, but subject to control.” (Zanone, 2015) This, however does not equate to full decriminalization, nor regulation of the substance for recreational purposes.

As shown above, legislative changes in the country in regard to drug control policy were almost exclusively initiated by the Judicial power though the Supreme Court, and not by Executive nor Legislative branches. This can lead us to discern a possible lack of leadership on the matter from Brazil federal decision makers. Coupled with the elitist tradition from the Rio Branco Institute regarding the formation of the Brazilian diplomatic apparatus and the current political chaos unveiling in the country in the midts of vast corruption schemes implicating the national political elite, the absence of legislative debate on the matter, could potentially explain the somehow refractory position of the country in the U.N. arena, despite domestic evolutions. The ambivalence of Brazil is to put in perspective with Brazil’s own drug wars and drug control policies, which similarly to the U.S., have disproportionately negative impacts on the most vulnerable and disfranchised members of their society, in this case, the Afro-Brazilian and indigenous communities.

  • The African Group / The African Union

“Africa’s drug landscape is constantly evolving” (Bloom, 2016) and the African continent and the countries that composes it, form quite a challenge for any researcher looking at shedding light on drug policy reform in the continent. Very few analyses have been conducted and it remains quite difficult to discern national or regional shift in policies. West Africa for example, has become a formidable hub for drug trafficking, and in parallel, a growing center of illicit drug consumption, “as cartels exploit weak security systems, and collaborate with locals to use the region as transit route for exporting illicit drugs to Europe and North America.” (Dogbevi, 2016) As such, the 2015 WDR estimates that the region has generated some $900 million in annual profit for criminal drug networks and also became a “final destination” rather than merely a transit route for the illicit products (UNODC, 2015). The region is experiencing profound drug phenomenon changes and political leadership is slowly, but now actively looking for other policy options in the face of intense negative consequences.

Consequently, a regional consultation, held in Accra, Ghana, from January 19 to 20, 2016, was organized by the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI). The summit intended “to fashion out workable and functional ways of dealing with the issues.” (Dogbevi, 2016) The final concept note of the consultation (WACSI, 2016) stated that several actions had been undertaken at the regional level and across the continent to truly “balance” the drug policy approach, notably by using as a guideline the African Union Plan of Action on Drugs 2013-2017 (African Union, 2013).

Some of the most noticeable changes there are currently undertaken by Senegal. The country is now paving the way in West Africa for publicly funded harm reduction services, with its successful opioid substitution treatment (OST) and needle exchange programs (Gomes, 2016). By funding such programs, the country is joining other countries of the continent such as Tanzania, Mauritius and Kenya (Hinkley, 2015) which have all developed similar initiatives.

It should be noted that, as we have seen before, many countries do not possess permanent representation in Vienna and can only often be institutionally present through regional regroupment representation. This situation has a great influence on the conduct of African countries in regard to global drug control policy making as major donors of the African Group remain able to substantially influence the conduct of the rest of the countries of the U.N. political regroupment. For example, during the 58th session of the CND held in 2015 for the preparation for the Special Session, the African Group was vocally “critical of the movement toward decriminalisation and legalisation, believing that such misguided policies will hinder the ongoing efforts to combat illicit production, trafficking and abuse of drugs and also the balanced approach which Member States have committed to in the global fight against the world drug problem.” (IDPC, 2015a) During the CND Intersessional meeting on October 15, 2015, representatives from the same group presented the position of their respective countries. Among them, South Africa insisted that “the Treaties are the fundamental pillars for the Outcomes document” for UNGASS 2016 (CND Blog, 2015a), underlined “the importance of law enforcement in eradicating drugs and drug abuse” (Ibid.) while it “strongly condemns any form of legalisation as it is against the spirit of the Conventions.” (Ibid)

Again, as observed in previous articles, countries, such as South Africa here, are able to bend the meaning of blurry drug control concept, stretching it to the point of complete reversal: “The public health approach should be with law enforcement to prevent drug abuse and ensure safety and security.” (CND Blog, 2015a) One could only wonder how a concept such as a public health approach could be defined as the exact opposite approach it intended to curve (in this case, a more law-enforcement oriented approach). The position of Egypt during the Intersessional was much clearer, although filled with the same reasoning. The North African country declared then that “the Conventions are the cornerstone of drug control” and that “in reference to differences in perspectives, (we should) avoid discussions dragging on issues that ‘we know where they will end.” (CND Blog, 2015a) This declaration is surprisingly candid for such a forum, but it clearly states, where others would maybe only imply it, that even remotely discussing the idea of treaty reform, of even the topic of harm reduction, is completely out of the question. Additionally, it should be noted that in March 2016, South Africa officials publicly announced an institutional cooperation with Russia, the RAADD (short for Russia-Africa Anti-Drugs Dialogue). The alliance of these two countries - with Indonesia, Singapore and Middle-Eastern countries - allow us to perceive potential future coalitions of the last remaining advocates for full-scale prohibition.

However, in 2014, several African ministries overseeing drug policy control met around the topic “Drugs Kill, but Bad Drug Policies Kill more” (CND Blog, 2015d) and came up with several recommendations, most notably “to scale-up evidence-based and human rights-based services for people whom use drugs.” (Dogbevi, 2016) The meeting also highlighted the need for the continent’s nations to come up with a Common African position for the upcoming Special Session.

Only very recently, in January 2016, this demand was finally met. Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the African Union published the Common African position (CAP) (African Union, 2016). The Common Position emphasized the need for integrated, comprehensive and sustainable alternative development programs; the recognition that “risky injecting and sexual behaviour among drug users are major public health concerns owing to the high risk of infection with HIV, Hepatitis B and C, and Tuberculosis;” and reaffirmed its concern over the disastrous consequences of the current drug control regime which has put more than “80 per cent of the world’s population” with “either no, or insufficient, access to controlled drugs for the treatment of moderate to severe pain.” (African Union, 2016) Perhaps most importantly, the document makes specific reference to harm reduction services, which are defined as being integrally part of “a balanced and integrated approach.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the Common position recognizes that “the consumption of drugs and drug addiction must be considered as public health problems that have socio-economic root causes and consequences” and that “the integration of the drug treatment and prevention services within broader health programs should become an imperative for all Member States.” (Ibid.)

However, the situation relating to the position of several African countries remains extremely ambiguous as the South African diplomatic mission in Vienna - which chair the African Group in the city -, has formally submitted a very different, arguably much more reactionary position from the group to the CND. Several delegates from other African delegations have publicly questioned “why a document from the minority ‘African Group’ (AG) in Vienna was submitted instead of the AU’s ‘Common African Position’ (CAP)” (Cullinan, 2016) which regroup many more countries. As explained by several sources, the document seem to have been pushed by the Egyptian delegation which was put in minority during the deliberation of the CAP. Contrary to the CAP document, - which was forwarded to UNGASS but not officially presented to the CND (2) - the AG document does not mention harm reduction, nor decriminalization, and focus heavily on renewed support for law enforcement and prohibitionist views on drug control. Furthermore, the document seem to have been submitted without the knowledge of the African Union representative delegation in Vienna.

It should be noted that, legally, there is “no formal relationship between the African Group in Vienna and the African Union Commission” (Cullinan, 2016) which arguably creates confusion as to the public position of a great number of the African member states, only two month before the beginning of the Special Session.

Specific positions of countries described here, are as we have seen, quite complex to summarize and remain “ambivalent” to the most. However, due to their numbers and heterodoxy (in the case of the African countries), and economic weight (in the case of Brazil), their position should be closely observed and further analyzed in order to evaluate their respective influence during the upcoming Special Session.

 

(1) But “If Brazil were to fully decriminalize drug possession, it could lead to a considerable reduction in the country's prison population, which is at nearly double the maximum capacity for inmates, according to government figures. In addition to frequent use of pre-trial detention, Brazil's harsh drug laws have greatly contributed to overcrowding.” (Gagne, 2015)

(2) On receiving the CAP, AG members who are also AU members (i.e. everyone except Morocco) “collectively decided that the draft CAP could not be forwarded to the UNGASS Board because the Group felt that there were was a need for further consultation on some of the elements contained in the CAP.” (Cullinan, 2016)

 

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