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2/5 UNGASS 2016 member states - The 'die-hards' of the regime

  • Benjamin-Alexandre Jeanroy
  • Apr 6, 2016
  • 12 min read

​Through the analysis of the current respective domestic situations of Russia, as-well as of Indonesia and Singapore - both of which have a significant influence regionally and globally on the public stance of the ASEAN - we will intend to see how the “die-hards” of the current IDCR regime shape the policies of their peers and how they have replaced others - namely the U.S. - in their fight in order to maintain the status quo. While for example countries such as “Sweden remains heavily prohibitionist, as does Japan. Pakistan and Iran want to maintain the death penalty for drug offences” (Dunt, 2016), other most vocal countries remain at the core of the prohibitionist advocates.

  • Russia

Russia currently finds itself in a peculiar position, having taken the torch of probably the most vocal advocate of the prohibition paradigm, supplanting de facto its long lasted political and ideological opponent. Most particularly, by having taken the place of the U.S. in leading the fight against drug control policy reform, Russia finds itself at a cross road “as the country is confronting one of the world’s fasting-growing heroin addiction and HIV infection rates, primarily driven by its more than 1.8 million intravenous drug users.” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015) Indeed, by banning the use of methadone, buprenorphine or any sort of needle-exchange facilities, the country has taken a hard stand against any harm reduction approaches, which as we will see in further articles in the case of Southeast Asian countries, can have disastrous health-related consequences.

Paradoxically, “Russia nominally decriminalized possession of illicit drugs in 2005.” (Levinson, 2008) And Article 228 of the Russian’s penal code indicates that “possession of less than a ‘large amount’ of illegal drugs face only administrative sanctions” (Ibid.). But as the threshold amount determining what is or not a “large amount” of a certain products have oscillated back and forth from ineffectually low to slightly higher amounts, it seems reasonable to consider “decriminalisation in Russia an inconsistent and effectively unrealised policy.” (Ibid)

Additionally, if in other parts of Europe, drug-related corruption may have not significantly affected public institutions - although large sums of money are being laundered through banking institutions everywhere on the continent - Russia finds itself at a particularly distinct situation. As such, despite “highly repressive policies and no smaller amount of drug money laundering in its banking sector” (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2015), the country is highly afflicted by a structural-level of corruption, directly linked to the global illegal drug trade and which has its ramification in the highest spheres of Russian power.

In parallel, many believe that Russia is currently using its public prohibitionist stance on drug control to further extend its influence, as for the cases of its global lobbying calling for the intensification of eradication of Afghan poppy production as we have seen in the 'securitization processes article, (Foreign Policy, 2010) or the nomination of UNODC Executive Director, Yuri Viktorovich Fedotov, the first Russian born diplomat to currently hold the position. In this regard, as pointed out by Helena Forrester (2015), “Russia could be looking to build an international coalition to whip up support for ending access to methadone in the run up” towards UNGASS 2016. According to Russian state Duma sources, this coalition could include certain Middle Eastern countries which already oppose any kind of Opioid Substitution Treatment (OST). Other ex-Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (which have already banned OST), and Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Kazakhstan may also be influenced by Russia in order to join this policy bloc. Other countries of the region, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which are already greatly affected by injection drugs use and related transmission rates could also be impacted by the results of such policy ban as they are already in the case of their respective separatist regions currently under Russian influence (1).

  • The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

As we we will see in a later article focused on ASEAN countries, several nations of the regional organization have adopted, to a different degree, harm reduction policies for a number of years, despite the official prohibitionist public stance of the regional organization. But, this is exactly because the ASEAN has shown in the past its dedication to apply to the letter the international prohibition directives by transposing them on a regional scale - as well as formulating its own - that the regional organization is worth considering alongside the interventions of its member states in a high-level summit such as UNGASS 2016. However it should be noted that it can remain quite challenging to want to observe and describe the public stance of the Jakarta-based organization as it happens to be the “only regional organization without observer status at the United Nations.” (ASEAN-UN, 2000)

Nevertheless, by observing the policies and the public stances taken by some of the most powerful members of the organization, namely the city-state of Singapore and Indonesia, we might be able to understand why the organization officially keeps outdated rhetoric such as the proclaimed goal of a 'drug-free ASEAN' by 2015. Observing the conduct of other countries of the region in regard to UNGASS 2016 is also important, but reveals to be less pertinent for our analysis. In the case of Thailand for example, despite a current move to reform the national drug law framework, an observation from scholar James Windle (2015) can help shed light on the country current views: “It is unlikely that Thailand will propose, or even support, more liberal reforms of the three previous United Nations drug control treaties at the 2016 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem. Thailand is more likely to support the status quo, and potentially even stricter supply side interventions”. Similarly, in the case of the Lao PDR, a UNODC source (2) considers the country as probably staying “mostly quiet” during the Special Session, or eventually to “side with Vietnam and/or China if called upon.” The source further added that it is worth noting that “both countries are slightly more pragmatic than Singapore” in terms of drug policy reforms. The mention of Singapore here is quite relevant as we will see.

  • Singapore

Alongside Brunei Darussalam, the city-state is one of the top funders (3) of the ASEAN, and therefore has a decisive say on how the ASEAN decides to “relay” the global agreements on drug control. The speech given by Mr Masagos Zulkifli, Second Minister of Singapore for Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs at the “36th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drugs” on August 24, 2015 can give us a distinctive glimpse of the country’s views on the matter of drug control. In regards to UNGASS 2016, the minister declared that the ASEAN members “anticipate that some countries will use this opportunity to push for more liberal drug policies, such as the decriminalisation of drug consumption and the legalisation of cannabis” and added that the ASEAN “cannot allow these countries to dominate the agenda.” (ASEAN, 2015) Here, the Singaporean Minister allows us to confirm the importance of some geographical regroupments, or at least the need to publicly present a united front for the concerned countries. In brief terms, the proclaimed vision of the Southeast Asian organization can be summarized by the final words of his declaration: “The threats to our vision of a Drug-Free ASEAN come not just from drug syndicates but also from those advocating for a more liberal drug regime at UNGASS 2016.” (Ibid.) By notably placing alongside “drug lords” and drug policy reformers, this speech allows us to realize the extent to which the philosophical differences on the subject remains quite high between U.N. member states.

However, the countries of the region, are far from having the same experience and views on drug policy reforms. This fact is worth remembering when following the word of the previously mentioned speech: “It is important that we make our ASEAN position clear at UNGASS 2016, as we are the only regional bloc that has maintained a drug-free focus in our policies.” (Ibid.) Aside from pointing out the sense of pride and martyrdom encompassed in the words of the minister, it is worth noting that this declaration shows a clear determination - from certain members of the ASEAN -, to present what is clearly wanted to be perceived as a shared view on the matter. But nothing could be more uncertain. The real question remains as to which extent, the financial capacities of a few members of the ASEAN would be able to influence the position of the organization member states during the upcoming Special Session? For the author, it seems unlikely that Southeast Asian member states would be solely grounding their position on the ASEAN philosophy on the matter. But this does not necessarily mean that it won’t be without influence as the economic and political integration of the ASEAN member states increases.

The position of the Singaporean Foreign Minister remains quite striking, especially when considering that ASEAN countries in general, such as Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia, while being major producers, transit and increasingly consumer countries for illegal drugs, do not remotely experience the same level of violence associated with the drug market, the associated prohibition and law-enforcement counter-response, that Latin American countries and other parts of the world are currently still facing. Many advocates there that this is exactly because of this prohibitionist stance that direct violence is not similarly present. Indeed, as explained by Vanda Felbab-Brown and Harold Trinkunas (2015), “coupled with strong cultural stigmatization of drug use, the public in these countries tends to be indifferent or outright opposed to drug policy reform.” As such, these countries’ political elites do not need to force their diagnosed remedies on a population, which in vast part, still sees drug related issues through a distinct moral prism. Authorities have, as a consequence, \\\ an easy time selling the narrative explaining that this is exactly because the countries of the region continue to uphold such a “hawkish” vision of drug control that related violence have been somehow successively avoided.

  • Indonesia

Because Indonesia is by far, the largest population and the highest GDP nominal of the ASEAN (4), its influence within the organization cannot be overlooked. The country’s current drug control legislation “is based on an overly strict interpretation of the UN drug conventions and outlines harsh penalties for illicit use, possession and supply of controlled drugs.” (Baldwin, 2013) Additionally, as indicated by several researchers, despite the 2009 review of the drug law in the light of HIV transmission rates, using drugs remains a crime in the country (Lai & all., 2013).

Like many other countries in the region, as noted by scholar Siddharth Chandra (2002), Indonesia’s modern relationship to drugs can be traced back to colonial monopolies set up by European states between the 16th and 18th centuries. At the time Indonesian “Dutch-controlled opium was estimated to make up half of all government revenue that was generated from the Dutch East Indies Colonies.” (Baldwin, 2013; see also Rush, 2007) In 1895, the Dutch introduced the first Indonesian drug control policy, the Opium Regie, which banned the production of opium in the territory. As recalled by Dr Robert Cribb (1988) by 1904, the colonial authorities decreed that all opium sold in Indonesia, must be purchased abroad and processed in Batavia (ex-Jakarta) “through a Dutch-controlled monopoly.” The product was then distributed to dependent citizens thought a network of government licensed establishments. (5) The Opium Regime aimed at curbing consumption by forbidding use of opium in certain areas, designated to be “drug-free”, pre-developing a widely popular concept among today’s Southeast Asian drug control policy makers. The legislation also forced consumer wishing to partake in the program to be registered on a centralized listing. While this policy was proven to be quite unsuccessful – in fact some historians argue that opium use increased by more than 30% at the time (Chandra, 2002) – “parts of the policy, such as compulsory registration now underpin modern responses to drug use in the country.” (Baldwin, 2013)

While the independence was gained from the Dutch and the Japanese in 1945, it was not before 1971 that the country issued its first drug control policy ordinance. A new drug control agency, the National Intelligence Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Intelligen Nasional – BAKIN) was created by President Suharto (6) while his vision for a “New Order” was materializing. The agency was instructed “to eradicate counterfeit money” and “prevent illicit drug use”, “smuggling”, “juvenile delinquency” and “subversion” (Badan Narkotika Nasional, 2013), as well as “to conduct surveillance of foreigners.” (Baldwin, 2013) The first modern Indonesia Anti-Narcotics Agency was created in 1997, just before the fall of President Suharto. Replaced in 2002 by the Badan Narkotika Nasional (BNN), the agency (7) was only provided with an operational budget in 2003.

One significant component of the current national drug control framework (8) is linked to the 2009 Narcotic Law, which alongside Government Regulation #25/2011, required “the compulsory reporting of all people dependent on drugs over the age of 18.” (Baldwin, 2013) People are further encouraged to self-report (9) and can be anonymously denounced by any citizen. We would argue here that these regulation procedures, just as we will observe in Lao PDR in further articles, provides an opportunity for the Indonesian authorities to divert consumers away from a costly and bureaucratic criminal justice system towards either community health centers (CHCs), but perhaps more certainly towards the country’s numerous compulsory treatment centers. The country has launched in 2011 a national policy and strategy for a “Drug-Free Indonesia by 2015.” Potentially facing a massive HIV outbreak (Al Jazeera, 2016), and having more than 70% of the entire prison population as low-level, non-violent drug offenders (Ibid.), Indonesia is currently developing policies that could potentially be even more drastic laws (10). Due to their increasingly draconian take on drug policy, Indonesia has proven to be a hard liner worthy to be closely observed during the upcoming Special Session.

“These are the bizarre and unholy alliances of the global drug war.” (Dunt, 2016) For these three countries, among many others, the current IDCR do not need to be revised, upgraded or reformed. On the contrary, they would certainly argue there that it needs to be reinforced. But as much as ideology is crucial in our current analysis, one should not forget that U.N. multilateral agreements are based on low denominator consensus, and political maneuvers remain common. Predicting their conduct or that of similar countries is not an easy task and should not prevent reform advocates to keep lobbying and engage in debate with these countries in light of their own potential issues with the current IDCR. Similarly, we will observe in the next part, ambivalent countries, of which the conduct remains quite contradictory and somehow over-shadowed by political considerations.

(1) Soon after the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in 2014, Russia “halted drug treatment schemes there that gave heroin addicts alternatives, such as methadone, leading to some 100 overdose deaths.” (Al Jazeera, 2016)

(2) Interview with a UNODC consultant on 16/10/15.

(3) With a GDP Nominal per capita of $51,162, Singapore is one, if not, the most financially powerful member of the ASEAN group. (IMF, 2014)

(4) $878,198 millions (IMF, 2014)

(5) Which were over 800 at their peak in the 1930s.

(6) Suharto was designated as “the most corrupted leader in modern history” by the civil society organization Transparency International (2004, p. 11).

(7) “The Chief of the Indonesian police headed the BNN until the new narcotic law was released in 2009. Since then, the BNN has functioned as an entity tasked with coordinating 25 relevant government institutions in formulating and implementing national policy on drugs. However BNN recently received greater funds and has started to conduct activities, including operating rehabilitation programmes and law enforcement activities, which overlap with the mandate of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the MoH – thereby causing some tension between the agencies.” (Baldwin, 2013)

(8) The legal framework for drug control is contained in the 1997 Law on Narcotics and the 1997 Law on Psychotropic Substances. The Narcotics Law was updated in 2009 (#35/2009). The law maintains the death penalty for some drug offenses and makes it a crime for parents or guardians to fail to report children who use drugs in their care to authorities.

(9) “Failure of a person who uses drugs to self-register can result in penalties ranging from a fine of Rp2 million (US$ 200) to six months’ imprisonment. Under regulation #25, the failure of family members to report a relative who uses drugs may result in penalties ranging from a fine of Rp1 million (US$ 100) to three months’ imprisonment” (Lai & al., 2013).

(10) Potentially “Force-feeding drug dealers their own narcotics until they die.” as proposed by the Indonesia's National Narcotics Agency (Al Jazeera, 2016).

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