Introduction to the Introduction

In the 2010’s decade amidst numerous experimentations and alternative drug policy alternatives in many heterogeneous geographical locations, “Asia stands out as a region that has been slow to discuss alternatives.” (Baldwin, 2013) The continent, and the ASEAN countries most notably, are often described as a regional space with highly orthodox application of the U.N. drug control conventions. In this regard, as the regional organization is on the verge of redeveloping its drug control strategy, (2015 drug-free ASEAN), advocacy is more and more focus on intending to re-shape the regional strategy more in phase with reality. More precisely, we will focus here on the Lao PDR’s context.

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic is a “sparsely populated, submontane, wet tropical country.” (UN Laos, 2010) More then fifty ethnic and sub-ethnic groups inhabit the country, speaking an estimated 66 vernacular languages and dialects, while mostly using the ‘phasa lao’. Most of its inhabitants live of the production of their agricultural activities. In its actual governmental form, the country came to existence in 1975, after a long-endured ‘secret’ war which was closely tied to the Vietnam and Indochina wars. In 1986, the government, following the Chinese and Vietnamese examples, started very slowly to open its economy to the market forces. Gradually a few market-oriented activities started to take form in the 1990’s alongside the premises of “international aid”.

But because we live in such an interconnected world, no drug policy works in a vacuum, and “spill-over” often affects other countries. This is particularly pertinent in regard to drugs as they are often “predominantly articles of international commerce” (Caulkins, 2015) such as cocaine, heroine, alcohol and cigarettes; with one very specific conspicuous exception being cannabis. In regard to currently illicit drugs, fingers have been pointed in all directions. So-called “consumer countries” versus, “transit” and “production” countries, placing the blame on anyone but them. This controversy is greatly loosing significance as the clear distinction in between such activities are getting increasingly blurrier.

By its very nature - as we will see in further articles - estimation of the drug trade is very difficult to make. Some estimates it at more than 3% of the world trade (Klein, 2008. p. 119), with an annual estimated “gross criminal product” of more than US$1 trillion (Jojarth, 2009, p. 7). What is certain is that because of the illicit drug trade, some criminal organization have now resources exceeding those of small countries. By taking an unprecedented advantage over transportation and communication modern capacities, these networks have created not only a transnational system parallel to the global economy, but a system integrally imbricated in the way our neoliberal economy now currently functions. As noted by Willem Van Schendel and Abraham Itty (2005), “Drug traffickers (…) have refined networking to a high science, entering into complex and improbable strategic alliances that span cultures and continents.”

In an effort to solidify and internationally codify the complex range of control abused substances policies, the current IDCR was established in 1961 with the drafting of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which rapidly became not so single anymore. The regime has since promulgated and created global norms which have aimed to prohibit and regulate the production, trade and use of certain specific substances. It has notably intended to do so by creating scheduling processes of varying legal controls. The 1961 regime, through its most important multiple four schedules (Schedule one being the most restrictive) has intended to “provides a framework with which to improve, as the Convention promises, the ‘health and welfare of mankind.’” (Umana, 2012) Focused on criminal justice strategies, it has been argued that the regime has often focused on law enforcement strategies over harm reduction and public health policies, negatively affecting the daily lives of billions of people around the world, most notably in its failure to provide essential medicine to most of humanity.

This “is not a radical stand.” (Transform, 2009) As we will intend to show, as other have done, it is the prohibitionist model which is ultimately radical and far away from the reality on the ground. Because it is exclusively based on a pseudo-moral judgement against certain drugs and drug consumers, and not on a scientifically, evidence-based approach aiming at reducing harms, the current regime is far from achieving its proclaimed goal. Indeed, as argued by Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara (2015), “it is possible to assert that the drug control system has been applied asymmetrically, with the development of a punitive approach that has come down hardest on the weakest links in the chain.”

A 2013 study (1) by the International Centre for Science in Drug Policy (ICSDP, 2013) and published in the British Medical Journal has showed that “despite a tremendous increase in seizures, prices actually fell for most illegal drugs over the past 20 years—while purity (has) increased.” (Montaner & Werb, 2013) This raise important questions about the the actual effectiveness of global law enforcement strategies in order to reduce illicit drug supply. Over half a century of global prohibition, illegal drugs have actually become cheaper, more potent, while being more easily accessible to all, despite the tremendous funds invested in order to intend to do the very opposite. Very recently, this was confirmed by UNODC in the World Drug Report (WDR): “The magnitude of the demand for drugs has not changed substantially at the global level.” (UNODC, 2015)

As noted by the King County Bar Association (2005) “The motivating impulses behind drug prohibitions have often been unrelated to concerns over the effects of the drugs themselves.” Supporters of a repressive anti-drug policy attribute the present shortcomings to a lack of financial resources and gaps in implementing strategies. However, more and more researchers argue that repression often does more damage than the drug itself. In this regard, one very important aspect of drug policy reform concern its necessary de-politicization. The issue should not be owned neither by “conservative” nor “progressive” political groups, as it should be the common goal of all to move toward meaningful reforms in lights of the shortcomings attached to the current IDCR.

Our world, in the daily life rhythm of many, is indeed a world of suffering, that we unfortunately tend to exclusively analyze as such. But drugs are not limited to harms and should be recognized as such. While the “use and abuse of dependence-inducing intoxicants can create enormous harms” (Caulkins, 2015), legitimately raising the question in terms of public health, of wether a substance, in its production, sale and consumption should be made available to the public, focus should not be limited as such. Depending of the substances, there is vast literature in regard to the question at the national, regional and global level. If we consider that the default position of modern economies for goods and services is to be legal and subject to various taxes and regulations processes, exceptions are often made if the substance in question is perceived to be carrying potential harms to one self and to other third parties. Questions of “morality” often kick in and therefore the exceptions are mostly culturally linked.

What is also very important to realize is that we are all consumers of drugs, illicit or legally, morally or culturally accepted. As noted buy the Transform Drug Policy Foundation (2009), “our refusal to acknowledge this comes from a deep-seated fear that ‘we’ might become, or be seen as, one of ‘them’.” Allied to the comfortable reassurance than what is legal, can not be inherently bad, and vice-versa, we often fail to note that what should be of importance is the use, and potential abuse and misuse that we make of them. As the global prohibition framework do, we also often tend to focus on the substances themselves, rather than on the way theses substances are acquired, consumed and for which reasons. Similarly because of this narrow vision, we often overlook the way society treats people who may suffer from potential abuse and addictiveness. The question here is not to minimize the harms causes by certain drugs, some substances being potentially of very dangerous. But it is often not the ones we consider, and when we do, we usually tend to overlook the cultural bias with which we consider one drug over another (such as alcohol and cigarettes versus illicit drugs, or the absolute artificial difference in between crack and powder cocaine users). In reality, most of the harms caused by drug used, such as crime, HIV and blood-born transmission, violence, overdose) are often linked with the way current drug policies allow these harms to happen.

Said very simply “high rates of incarceration and harsh sentencing have not achieved the objective of a “drug-free” society anywhere in the world.” (Tokatlian, 2013, p. 1) And there is several underlying premises that are at the core of the current regime and which are now facing growing challenge:

• the drug phenomenon is due to the existence of drug supply, therefore actions must be directed towards areas of production;

• this phenomenon is a security threat rather than a public health one, and therefore emphasized must be directed upon law enforcement and military strategies;

• since this phenomenon requires special attention, “any alternatives to the “iron fist” approach” (Tokatlian, 2013) are to be discarded.

These premises gave life to a set of public policies including:

• the focus on drug trafficking organizations;

• the forced eradication of illicit crops;

• the criminalization “of the whole chain related to the drug business” (Tokatlian, 2013);

• the demonization of any form of drug policy alternative;

• the militarization of the effort in the Global South.

As such, while the current drug control regime is “often justified as a crime-control measure” (Cleveland, 2005), it could actually be argued that the conflicts it creates generate much more violence and crime than it controls. Well reviewed by David Rasmussen and Bruce Benson (1994) in their book The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War, the relationship between drugs and crime is often not as self-evident as many would like to and make believe, first of them being UNODC. A vast number of researches and analysis, have also argued that so-called “War on Drugs”, upon which we will discuss the term in this first introductory set of articles (and explain why we will not be using the term in this thesis), has failed dramatically in its objectives, and has done so in numerous ways. As journalist Charles Bowden (2010) has described, it is not so difficult to realize that the drugs that were available in the 1970’s are still very much here, in larger quantity, better quality and cheaper price. Despite actual reduction in (some) illicit drug production (notably cocaine), and the repetitive and ongoing arrests of drug kingpins and drug shipments bust, the agencies in charge of the ‘fight’ against illicit drug supply have “been unable to prevent the growth of complex transnational drug trafficking networks and protect millions of individuals from harm.” (Gautreau, 2012) This war has been lost. Some would even argue - the present author included - that it was lost before even starting, And yet, the regime that created this very situation still last. Much like the “war on terror”, this conflict “is framed as a response to an exceptional, existential threat to our health, our security, and indeed the very fabric of society.” (Transform, 2012a) Consequently, we keep on portraying drug addiction as an “evil” we must destroy, which the international community as a moral duty to “combat” because it represents a “danger of incalculable gravity”, allowing governments to warrant a set of, otherwise, publicly unacceptable measures. This rhetoric is not exaggerated as you can find it written in black and white in the 1961, 1971 and 1988 U.N. conventions (See preambles of UN Convention, 1961; and for discussion see: Lines, 2010).

As we will see, the debate today is falsely polarized in between a simplistic dichotomy: “legalization” versus “prohibition”. This is not coming from nowhere as noted by scholar Sanho Tree (2009): “Title VII in the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 says the office shall ‘take such actions as necessary to oppose any attempt to legalize’ drugs currently deemed illicit. Drug czars who respond otherwise would be fired, in all likelihood. This is because drug warriors have spent years co-opting the term, making it so radioactive that many voters think legalization means “anything goes” free-market anarchy. To them, the term evokes images of selling heroin in candy machines to children.” In this regard it is crucial to understand that drug policy reform does not equate loosing control over these, potentially, harmful substances. Quite the contrary. It only means that currently we have given up the possibility to regulate potentially harmful substances, over moral justifications, and allow an entire industry to be driven underground. It is equally important to realize that in our modern framing of the issue, we have deliberately chosen not to acknowledge that drugs exists and are consumed. Lessons from the disastrous U.S. alcohol 1920’s prohibition have still failed today to be understood. Because of this moral, blinded stance, we have fallen into a chaotic scheme, from which we are now paying the heavy price, some arguably much more than others.

One of the reason why the regime has not changed in the last fifty years is the very firm believe that any “changes to drug policies could erode the system and put its legitimacy at risk.” (Garzón & Pol, 2015) In this regard the thesis argue that proponents of this argumentation are not entirely wrong. But this is precisely why questioning the very basis of the current regime is important. If reforming such system may cause the regime to crumble down entirely, then the system may very well not be solid enough to withstand reality and society evolutions. However, what we are advocating here is not about drastic, immediate change. These need to happen gradually, “closely monitored through intensive policy research that comprehensively documents health and other outcomes.” (Transform, 2009) But in order to start bridging the gap in between prohibitionist intended outcomes and what is currently happening, we must be able to recognize those dreadful outcomes and not shy away from them. We must debate them publicly and frankly in the open, without prejudice, fear of legal or moral retributions “in order to find a common language we can all share.” (Ibid.)

What needs to be fought off, and actually reversed, is the way the discourse of prohibitionist intervention is framed; as if a very specified strategy was presented as self-evident (Elshtain, 1992, p. 257). Scholar Axel Klein (1996; 2008) has argued that in no other policy areas, the positions of policy makers are so out of synchronization and understanding with a major part of the population. “Nor has there been such a steady, if not exponential increase, in any form of behaviour that policy-makers have tried systematically, and often brutally, to eliminate” (Robinson, 2001), as there has been in drug policy reform debate. In this regard, as described by Alberto Melucci (1996) "Whether wittingly or not, the debate on the significance of collective action always embraces the issue of power relationships, and on closer examination derives its energy from defending or contesting a specific position or form of dominance.”

---

(1) The study has “reviewed indicators of drug supply in consumer markets such as Europe, the United States, and Australia, and drug seizures in those areas in addition to drug-producing regions such as Latin America, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia.” (Montaner & Werb, 2013)

• (Baldwin, 2013) S. Baldwin, "Drug policy advocacy in Asia: Challenges, opportunities and prospects. Cambodia - China - India - Indonesia- Lao PDR - Malaysia - Myanmar - Phillipines - Thailand - Vietnam", International Drug Policy Consortium, 2013, http://www.aidsdatahub.org/sites/default/files/publication/drug_policy_advocacy_in_asia_2013.pdf, Accessed: 12/05/15.

• (Bowden, 2010) C. Bowden, “Murder City: Ciudad Juarez and the Global Economy’s New Killing Fields.”, Democracy Now, April 14, 2010, http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/charles_bowden_murder_city_ciudad_jurez, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Caulkins, 2015) J- P. Caulkins, After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2015, Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Caulkinsfinal.pdf?la=en, Accessed: 22/09/15.

• (Cleveland, 2005) M. M. Cleveland, “Economics of Illegal Drug Markets: What Happens If We Downsize the Drug War?” in Drugs and Society: U.S. Public Policy, J. M. Fish, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005, http://www.mcleveland.org/publications/Economics_of_Illegal_Drug_Markets.CV.pdf, Accessed: 18.12.15.

• (Elshtain, 1992) B Elshtain, “Epilogue: continuing implications”, in B. Elshtain (Ed), Just War Theory, New York, New York University Press, 1992, p 276.

• (ICSDP, 2013) International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, “The temporal relationship between drug supply indicators: an audit of international government surveillance systems”, British Medical Journal, 2013, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/michaela/pages/50/attachments/original/1431530908/BMJO_2014_Study.pdf?1431530908, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Garzón Vergara, 2015) J. C. Garzón Vergara, “Tough on the Weak, Weak on the Tough Drug Laws and Policing”, Latin American Program, Wilson Center, September 2015, https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/Tough%20on%20the%20Weak%2C%20Weak%20on%20the%20Tough.pdf, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Garzón & Pol, 2015) J. C. Garzón & L. Pol, “The Elephant in the Room: Drugs and Human Rights in Latin America”, The SUR file on drugs and human rights, April 2015, http://sur.conectas.org/en/issue-21/elephant-room-drugs-human-rights-latin-america/, Accessed: 02/12/15.

• (Gautreau, 2012) G. L. Gautreau, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, Paterson Review of International Affairs, 12: 61–83, 2012, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau_Human_Security_and_War_on_Drugs.pdf, Accessed: 11/03/15.

• (Jojarth, 2009) C. Jojarth, Crime, War and Global Trafficking: Designing International Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

• (King County Bar Association, 2005) King County Bar Association, Effective Drug Control: Toward A New Legal Framework - State-Level Regulation as a Workable Alternative to the “War on Drugs” , Drug Policy Project, Seattle, 2005, https://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/EffectiveDrugControl.pdf, Accessed: 02/12/15.

• (Klein, 1996) A. Klein, “The Geopolitics of Drugs”, Geopolitical Drug Watch, Boston, MA, Northeastern University Press, 1996.

• (Klein, 2008) A. Klein, Drugs and the World, London, Reaktion Books, 2008.

• (Lines, 2010) R. Lines, “‘Deliver us from evil’? – The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 50 years on”, International Journal on Human Rights and Drug Policy, vol. 1, 2010.

• (Melucci, 1996) A. Melucci, Challenging codes, Collective Action in the Information Age, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

• (Montaner & Werb, 2013) M. Montaner & D. Werb, “Here’s Why Drug Policy Reform Is Gaining Momentum”, Open Society Foundations, October 29, 2013, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/heres-why-drug-policy-reform-gaining-momentum, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Rasmussen & Benson, 1994) D. Rasmussen & B. Benson, The economic anatomy of a drug war, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1994.

• (Robinson, 2001) D. A. Robinson, Drug Trafficking and Human Security in Guinea-Bissau, School of Communication and Arts, Edith Cowan University, 2001.

• (Transform, 2009) Transform Drug Policy Foundation “Talk About”, After the War on Drugs - Blueprint for Regulation, S. Rolles, UK, 2009, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/resources/publications/after-war-drugs-blueprint-regulation, Accessed: 11/12/15.

• (Transform, 2012a) Transform Drug Policy Foundation, “The War on Drugs: Undermining Human Rights”, Count The Cost, Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2012, http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Human_rights_briefing.pdf, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Tree, 2009) S. Tree, “The Drug War has Failed. What’s Next?”, Institute for Policy Studies, October 1, 2009, http://www.ips-dc.org/the_drug_war_has_failed_so_whats_next/, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Tokatlian, 2013) J. G. Tokatlian, “Latin American and the drug use issue: searching for a change”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Ressource Center Report, NOREF, December 2013.

• (Umana, 2012) F. Humana, Our Unscientific Drug Control Regime, Foreign Policy In Focus, September 19, 2012, http://fpif.org/our_unscientific_drug_control_regime/, accessed: 29/10/15.

• (UN Laos, 2010) United Nations, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, “Report on Implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (2001-2010)”, 2010, http://www.un.org/fr/conf/ldc/pdf/laos%20pdr.pdf, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (UNAIDS & UNODC, 2015) The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS & the United NAtions Office for Drugs and Crime, “Drugs and HIV : The state of the response in Asia and the Pacific”, Third Regional Consultation on Compulsory Centres for Drug Users in Asia and the Pacific, Manila, Philippines, September 21-23, 2015.

• (Van Schendel & Itty, 2005) W. Van Schendel & A. Itty, “Introduction: the making of illicitness”, in W. Van Schendel & A. Itty (Eds), Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1-37, 2005.

#UnitedNations #Conventions #Internationallaw #1961 #Single #1988 #UN