Intro - The triple layers of securitization

The fact that the drug control international system has not achieved its stated objectives of eradicating drug supply and use, as well as its severe ‘unintended consequences’, makes it highly vulnerable to criticism. The most cursory analysis exposes its overwhelming shortcomings, and many observers are bewildered by the prohibition’s longevity. One way to understand such resilience - lasting over more than half of a century - can notably be explained by the international relations theory of “securitization” which forms the foundation of the geopolitical steel that protects the soft drug prohibition centre within. “Securitization” is a theory developed in the mid 1990’s by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (1), in which security is and remains characterized by a sense of survival. This process protects the status quo from criticism and evidence-based scrutiny, and expressly excludes other policy positions. Several researchers have originally outlined this process whereby: “a securitizing actor identifies an existential threat to a referent object and makes it a security issue – in a ‘speech act’ to a ‘specific audience’. The actor then applies an ‘extraordinary measure’ to nullify the ‘perceived threat’.” (Buzan & al., 1997)

This mechanism takes politics beyond the established rules of the orderly apparatus and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Through this practice, the political discourse around drug policy appears to be divorced from other policy issues and its endeavors are not subject to democratic input, nor accountability. Rather, its maintenance is based on achieving support from world leaders in technical and non-democratic forums. In the framework of the Copenhagen School, the “audience” for whom the “speech act” is intended, is not global citizens, but representatives of U.N. member states. This total isolation from the public scrutiny is representative of modern neoliberal bureaucratic governmental institutions, which as its most advanced form, explains in part why the failure of drug policy is so persistent. By virtue of placing on the U.N., the responsibility for the global prohibition, the IDCR has moved beyond national policy making processes and liberal representative democratic norms. Through the years, “securitization” became heavily politically and financially resourced, creating a substantial power base for the securitized status quo and today’s global regulatory institutions.

Analyzing the vocabulary used by the 1961 UN Single Convention on drugs can help us observe the first round of the “securitization” process. As we have seen in a precedent article, having identified in its Preamble that drugs are “evil” and a “danger to mankind” (UN Convention, 1961, Preamble, p. 15), one could imagine how difficult it must have been during the convention negotiations to even remotely question the necessity to prohibit “evil”. Indeed, member states could not have seriously contemplated an alternative to prohibition, even if it had been in their opinion that it could be a more appropriate course of action in order to better protect public health and welfare. Nearly three decades after the ratification of the first convention, the “evil” nature of drugs and of those who benefit from it, remained very much anchored in the public and policy makers’ minds.

What was seen then as unquestionable, laid the foundation for the 1988 convention and the second layer of securitization; this time addressing the threat of transnational organized crime and the illicit global drug trade. In reaction to this newly perceived threat, the Preamble of the convention exposed the deep concerns of the signatory states regarding “the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society.” (UN Convention, 1988, p. 10) Additionally, we can observe here that the paragraph directly mentions “human beings” and “society”, describing an apparent equal care for the security of the states and of its citizens.

The establishment in 1997 of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), which would be renamed UNODC in 2002, emblematically characterize this second layer of securitization, obscuring the first one and in the long run, conflating the two in such a way as to make drug and crime appear intrinsically connected. Today, because of those conflated and intertwined securitization processes, one could easily wonder what is actually being fought by the the global drug control regime and the subsequent “drug wars” it gave shape to. Indeed, reproductive actions from the prohibition framework have forged a self-referential feedback loop where drugs are identified as a “threat” within a “war” which intends to “eradicate” those who partake in these activities. Consequently, the constructing discourses around drugs steadily depicts, its users or anyone involve in the industry as “the antagonistic drug Other.” (Herschinger, 2011) The first “other” was the drug consumer, and through the second securitization, came the “narco” and their mischievous organizations, gradually becoming the most seriously dangerous of the “Drug Other.”

The case of UNODC is particularly interesting as it represents the largest international organizations fully dedicated to the prohibitionist framework. Because we are now fighting “crime” and “drugs” at the same time, very few people seem to question the logic behind the very name of the U.N. agency dedicated to the subject. The association has become completely natural.

Researches by Francisco Thoumi and Jensema Ernestien (2003) have notably shown that the largest funding contributions to the agency have come from publicly prohibitionist countries, “suggesting that such contributions allow greater influence in shaping UNODC policy.” (Crick, 2012) Critically analyzing UNODC discourse and practices, as intended in this thesis, can then allow us to understand why when a security threat has been constructed and depicted as such, challenging its assumptions and making progress can become relatively difficult.

As we will see in a coming article, Collins’ (2005) idea of the “Frankenstein's Monster” can partially explain “the bureaucratic inertia that some argue characterizes the development of the global drug prohibition regime.” Indeed, institutional, regional or global bureaucracies involved in the enforcement and the preservation of the global drug prohibition system, are intimately dependent and connected to the political elites that carried out the securitizing motions during the U.N. convention’s preparatory conferences. Institutions such as those, have an intricate interest in maintaining the securitization of drugs in order to preserve their relevance, fundings and roles. It has become, a question of survival. As the focus of the prohibition turned towards transnational criminal organizations, global drug policy was placed “above politics” and became effectively immunized from public scrutiny and accountability, creating the final layer of securitization.

Three layers of securitization now shelter the prohibition core: the first one targets drugs and “abuse”; the second marks the global fight against transnational criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking; and the third encompass the commitment from decision making institutional actors to maintain a long standing but crumbling prohibitionist framework. This commitment to the status quo, overrules any hints that the modus operandi is in dire need of transformative change in order to finally replace an outdated and unfit set of rules. Any challenges and evidences are seen as a a menace to the survival of the actors who depends on the current system and therefore cannot be integrated within the structure.

Scholar Ole Waever (1995), has shown that the possibility to label an issue a “security threat” can be a double edging. Indeed, while it allows the issue to be given higher priority, it also greatly limits the possibility in how this problem could be later dealt with; as what remains is often focused around “threat, defense and state-centered solutions.” By keeping a dogmatic attitude in regard to the twenty-first century drug market and by framing the issue as a threat to state security, the international drug control regime disregards the underlying root causes of the drug industry and eludes the transforming solutions that could potentially turn the “evil” around. In order to change this, questioning the reasons behind modern-era drug consumption and problematic addiction remain fundamental, as well as addressing the political, sociological and economic needs of the most vulnerable in order to cut-down the recruitment reserves and reduce the attractiveness of the narco-business.

The notion of “threat”, on which is based the rhetoric of the treaties (such as others in regard to nuclear arms and terrorism for example), is also greatly present in political agreements (CND, 2009), annual General Assembly resolutions (UN General Assembly, 2008) and statements of the highest U.N. officials (Ki-moon, 2009; Costa, 2009). Furthermore, in 2005, member states adopted a high-level agreement, which placed the threat of illicit drugs and illicit trafficking within the context of the U.N. three pillars (UN General Assembly, 2005). The issue here is that this rhetoric, now “inhibits appropriate evaluation of existing policies because a perpetual threat may always justify the means adopted” (Barrett, 2010) allowing the policies to become self-perpetuating and justifying.

Rita Taureck (2006) has argued that the power of the most important actors of the securitizing discourse could be interpreted in two different ways: on one hand, the more powerful an actor is, the greater is its capacity to influence the audience. On the other hand, the more powerful an actor is, and the less important is the necessity to influence the audience. The success of a securitizing move therefore greatly depends of other power relationships. In this regard, the semi-unsuccessful move by the Russians with the 2010 Rainbow 2 initiative to make of Afghan poppy production an existential global security threat, as worked towards the Russian audience, but much less toward NATO and the rest of the international community.

Through this analysis, the multi-processes of drug securitizations can be viewed as a device created in order to achieve global and unanimous adherence to the current regime. Despite the profusion of information and analysis showing the failure to suppress this mentioned “social and economic danger to mankind” (UN Convention, 1961, Preamble) conveyed on the world by drug consumption and the tentacular powers of transnational illegal organizations, the current regime cannot seem to be able to critically examine the root causes of the issue. Consequently, the prohibitionist framework involves the demonization of users, who are seen as criminals rather than potential medical patients. By doing this, policy makers overshadow the fundamental need to question the true nature of addiction in our modern society, favoring sobriety and punishment over connection and compassion. By introducing a new layer of securitization each time a new threat is identified, policy makers paint a paradoxical situation where the international community seems to be itself, addicted to the ‘drugs as a threat’ discourse.

Pouring trillion of dollars of funds towards the goal of enforcing the policies linked with the process, the securitization processes has created complex world multi-billion empires order. The idea of “de-securitization” would therefore mean putting out of jobs hundreds of thousands of individual, as-well as the necessity to recalibrate the missions of entire U.N. agencies. This need to be taken into account, as much as for identifying the forces fighting to keep the status quo alive, than for the aftermath. Danny Kushlick (2011a) notes that paradoxically, “by desecuritising the drug issues, we not only help promote security, but that we will also be dramatically better positioned and resourced to address the underlying drivers of drug misuse, and related social harms.” Because public opinion is inexorably moving toward alternative drug policies, the necessity to debate the securitization process equals to “a kind of democratisation of threat assessment.” (Kushlick, 2011a) While it is important to recognize that normalizing the issue of drugs will not resolve all security issues of the world, it can be argued that it would remove one of the most decisive factor of global insecurity.

Ironically, one could argue that the apparent success of the worldwide securitization of drugs, now embodies one of the most eminent menace to both state and human securities. The burden, nevertheless, is not equally shared. While affecting tremendously its most vulnerable areas, the Global North does not remotely undergo the same disastrous consequences that are inflicted upon the Global South. These outcomes are undoubtedly (tho not solely) linked to the production and transit of narcotic products intended for consumption by the population of the most economically advanced countries. Therefore, it must be recalled that the harms created by the global drug prohibition framework in order to protect humanity fall overwhelmingly upon the most disenfranchised, marginalized and disadvantaged people of the world.

Following the securitization process and shifting views on the issue through the critical human security lens can be a complex task to uphold for many of the global actors. However, by putting humanity interests at the core of the global drug regulation order, civil society, states and global institutions officials could transform the issue towards a more context-based and culturally conscious suitable resolutions. Furthermore, in regard to legality, both regulation and health provision must be moved away from one-size-fits-all global approach to supply and demand reduction in order to be critically constructed by questioning deeper the core reasons behind this social process. The senseless idea behind the so-called “War on Drugs” has produced impact-full outcomes and those consequences critically need further introspection from every actors implicated in the debate. As Damon Barrett and Manfred Nowak (2009) point out “in much the same way as the ‘war on terror’, the war on drugs has left in its wake human rights abuses, worsening national and international security and barriers to sustainable development.” Although the international community never endorsed the term, for most of the drug policy reform advocates and many of those at the “the front lines of the war on drugs, including indigenous farmers, people who use drugs and service providers – the United Nations drug control system is seen as a significant part of the drug problem, rather than part of the solution.” (Ibid.) In regard to this very term, the next article will discuss why it will not be using it during the course of this thesis.

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(1) “A characteristic feature of the CS [Copenhagen School] is its scepticism towards ‘security’. It [security] has often anti-democratic and anti-creative implications” and it can be seen as “a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.” (Waever, 2004, p. 10)

• (Acosta, 2009) A. Acosta, “El Buen Vivir, una oportunidad por Construir”, Ecuador Debate, no. 75, pp. 33􏰀-48, 2009.

• (Barrett, 2010) D. Barrett, “Security, development and human rights: Normative, legal and policy challenges for the international drug control system”, International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 21, Issue 2, Pages 140–144, March 2010, http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/science/article/pii/S095539591000006X, Accessed: 06/01/16.

• (Barret & Nowak, 2009) D. Barrett and M. Nowak, “The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards and human rights-based approach”, in A. Constantinides & N. Zaikos (Eds.), The Diversity of International Law, Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K. Koufa, Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 449–477, http://www.ihra.net/files/2010/07/01/The_United_Nations_and_Drug_Policy_%28with_Manfred_Nowak%29.pdf, Accessed: 22/10/15.

• (Buzan & al., 1997) B. Buzan, O. Weaver & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Pub, September 30, 1997.

• (CND, 2009) United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the fifty-second session, 14 March 2008 and11-20 March 2009, Economic and Social Council Official Records, 2009Supplement No. 8, E/2009/28 E/CN.7/2009/12, United Nations, New York, 2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V09/825/56/PDF/V0982556.pdf?OpenElement, Accessed: 29/12/15.

• (Collins, 2005) A. Collins, “Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian education”,The Pacific Review, 18 (4) (2005), pp. 565–586.

• (Crick, 2012) E. Crick, “Drugs as an existential threat: An analysis of the international securitization of drugs”, International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 23, Issue 5, September 2012, Pages 407–414m http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/science/article/pii/S0955395912000503#, Accessed: 22/10/15.

• (Herschinger, 2011) E. Herschinger, Constructing global enemies: Hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition, Taylor and Francis, Abingdon, New York, 2011.

• (Ki-moon, 2009) B. Ki-moon, Remarks to the Security Council meeting on drug trafficking as a threat to international peace and security, December 8, 2009, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2009-03-11.html, Accessed: 04/02/16.

• (Kushlick, 2011) D. Kushlick, “International security and the global war on drugs: The tragic irony of drug securitisation", Open Democracy, August 10, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/danny-kushlick/international-security-and-global-war-on-drugs-tragic-irony-of-drug-securitisation, Accessed: 06/01/16.

• (Kushlick, 2011a) D. Kushlick, “Drug policy that promotes security - The paradox of de-securitisation”, Transform Drug Policy Foundation, April 2011

• (Taureck, 2006) R. Taureck, “Securitization theory – The story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-structural realist”, Paper presented at the at the 4th annual CEEISA Convention, University of Tartu, Estonia, 25–27 June, 2006.

• (Thoumi & Ernestien, 2003) F. Thoumi & J. Ernestien, “Drug policies and the funding of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,” pp. 32-39 in Global Drug Policy: Building a New Framework, The Senlis Council, 2003.

• (UN Convention, 1961) United Nations Single Convention On Narcotic Drugs of 1961, As amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, United Nations, New York, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf, Accessed: 24/02/15.

• (UN Convention, 1988) United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, United Nations, New York, 1988, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf, Accessed: 06/01/16.

• (UN General Assembly, 2005) United Nations General Assembly, “World summit outcome”, UN Doc No A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005.

• (UN General Assembly, 2008) United Nations General Assembly, “International cooperation against the world drug problem”, G.A. Res 63/197, UN Doc No A/Res/63/197, 2008.

• (Waever, 1995) O. Waever, “Securitization and desecuritization” in R. Lipschutz (Ed.), On security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995.

• (Waever, 2004) O. Waever, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New ‘schools’ in security theory and their origins between core and periphery”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17–20, 2004.

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